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PART I:
THE DISCOURSE
2Chapter 1. Development and Democracy
1.1 Introduction
This essay, dated early 2002, is primarily written for fellow students, reflective activ-
ists, and concerned practitioners with an interest in one or more of three major 
themes. The first theme is about problems of democratisation; the second is on the 
importance of democracy in efforts to overcome obstacles to development suffered 
by marginalised people; the third is about the dynamics of politics and society in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and the Indian state of Kerala.1
For about two decades now, democratisation in the third world has been at the top 
of the agenda. While development, earlier, was often assumed to come first, many 
then said that the two could (and should) come together. The problems, however, 
have been mounting. Much of the mainstream crafting of democracy is in crisis. 
This is a study of the dynamics of these difficulties. But it is also, and primarily, 
an essay about the challenges and options for exciting popular efforts to promote 
more substantial democracy in order to further their attempts to combat problems of 
development. Part one is a discussion of these fundamental issues. Part two brings 
the central arguments to empirical test through case studies over a period of some ten 
years in the different contexts of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Kerala. Part three 
summarises the results and the policy implications.2
1 Hence, these themes also reflect the difficult but necessary combination of discipline-based 
political science, interdisciplinary development research, and contextual area studies.
2 This is an empirical study, but in contrast to many of the conventional political studies of 
problems of development, its point of departure is that a fruitful discussion presupposes three 
partly normative assumptions—two on what development and one on what kind of politics one 
should focus upon.
 The first assumption is that significant antagonisms between different groups and classes in 
society render it impossible to discern any self-evident common interest in development issues 
(in relation to which special interests can then be defined). Despite this, there are various ways 
of promoting development. One can invest, certainly, in the social groups who are already 
strong. One can count on the likelihood, certainly, that if these people are granted higher profits 
and a better business climate, some of them will also increase their investments. One could 
assert, certainly, that this would improve the conditions of the common people in the end. We 
agree, however, with those who argue that the result, in terms of development, would be at least 
as good—and of greater benefit to the majority besides—if investments were made, instead, to 
have the greatest possible dynamic effect on redistribution of resources. This means investing 
more in the popular majority—whose aspirations and capacity for hard and innovative labour 
are not fully utilised under prevailing conditions—than in the minority who are already strong.
 The second assumption (which follows from the first) is that since capitalism in the third 
world does not just imply industrialisation and ‘modern’ services but also marginalisation and 
the fact that so many people (especially in Asia and Africa) still live in or depend on rural areas, 
the politics of developmental redeployment must also include these people. One classical case is 
The essay (produced between July 2001 and April 2002) is the first attempt to 
bring together my analyses produced within a project that since the late 80s has 
focused on the mainstream crafting of democracy and (especially) the potential of 
alternative popular efforts. What follows below are brief summaries of major and still 
tentative conclusions. An unfortunate consequence is that full references have been 
impossible to include. A book will follow, but meanwhile readers with particular 
queries are welcome to contact the author (olle.tornquist@stv.uio.no).3 Comments 
are most welcome!
1.2 Poor people, poor democracy?
There are four main theories that claim to be universally valid about how democra-
tisation may come about and be promoted in late developing countries. The first 
thesis, by Lipset (1959) and so many others, is that capitalist market-based socio-
economic modernisation also promotes human rights based democratisation. This 
implies, for instance, that marginalised and ‘informal’ and often rural sectors prevent 
democratisation.
The second thesis is that it is not popular masses—particularly not in rural areas 
and particularly not when under radical influence—but rather the urban bourgeoisie 
and associated middle classes, with the support of the West, that tend to oppose 
state or private authoritarianism, thus promoting the rule of law, liberalism, and 
democracy. In his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore 
the redistribution of land from feudal-like landlords to industrious and independent peasants, 
in order thereby to increase production, reduce poverty, prepare the way for industrialisation, 
and create preconditions for democracy. Another example is decentralisation of politics and 
resources to balance the central powers and build linkages and alliances on an equal basis 
between rural and urban areas and people—ideally without enabling local bosses to monopolise 
the resources. A third illustration is efforts at going beyond conflicts between plantation labour-
ers and displaced peasant farmers by increasing and organising their production in such a way 
that both can agree and benefit.
 The third assumption is that even if enlightened authoritarian rule might generate develop-
ment which is more fruitful in the short run for those included, pro-people development is in 
the long run best served by consistent efforts at promoting, and applying democratic principles, 
rights and mechanisms in essential sectors of society.
 In other words, then: what are the problems and options of popular development and 
democracy with not just urban but also rural dimensions? 
3 I’m most thankful to all friends cum colleagues, as well as political leaders and activists, who 
in a spirit of mutual trust and interest in critical ideas have spent a great deal of time with 
me—continuously, for more than a decade—in informative and exciting discussions. Clearly, the 
project and the analyses would not have been possible without their contributions! These criti-
cally reflecting leaders and activists have not just been my most important source of information 
but also of knowledge. (Some further notes on specifically important people are later on given 
in relation to the cases studies.) Most of the project has been financed by SAREC, the depart-
ment for research co-operation within Sida, the Swedish International Development Authority, 
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Jr. concludes that peasants only contribute to democratisation when they are already 
independent and market-oriented, as in North America, or when they are transformed 
into this type of farmer by a strong urban bourgeoisie with a greater or lesser degree of 
revolutionary participation, as in France and Britain respectively. Otherwise, Moore 
argues, the rural poor tended either to be subordinated to commercial landed interests 
and fascism, or to revolt against economically less dynamic landlords. The latter, 
however, only occurred when the masses were cohesive as a class or a group and 
offered efficient external leadership, such as by the communists in China and Russia. 
So the conclusion reached is: “No bourgeois, no democracy” (Moore 1969).
Thirdly, Rueschemeyer and the Stephens, on the other hand, contend in Capitalist 
Development and Democracy that it is the working class, (within the framework 
of capitalist expansion) who are the only consistent pro-democratic force (Rue-
schemeyer et.al. 1992). Moore’s bourgeoisie is instead reluctant, especially when 
dependent on state support. The middle classes vacillate, especially when afraid of 
the labourers. With regard to rural dynamics, however, Rueschemeyer et al. do not 
only agree with Moore on the anti-democratic character of the landed elites’ interests, 
they also arrive at a similar conclusion concerning the democratic position of the 
rural poor: it rests with their cohesiveness, their ability to organise and with their 
relation to other classes.
The fourth and current thesis in vogue, then, (at least before11th of September) 
is simply to avoid discussions about various preconditions and to contend instead 
that poor foundations may be compensated for by foreign support and skilful institu-
tion building—crafting of democracy—on the level of the political elite and civil4 
associations. This can be achieved through the promotion of human rights, ‘good’ 
governance, privatisation, decentralisation, civil society, and political pacts among 
the elite. The original basis for the arguments is the transition from authoritarian 
rule in Latin America and Southern Europe since the mid-70s, which gained new 
prominence with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 (O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986). 
In conjunction with economic adjustment policies, similar ideas also spread to Africa 
and parts of Asia, for example in the Philippines in 1986 and Indonesia in 1998.
Of course there is much to all this. One has to look into the issues of unity and 
strength and institution building. And the rural dynamics can not be studied in 
through grants and a six year independent senior research position; whereafter my salary (as 
an ordinarily overloaded professor) has been paid by the University of Oslo. I also like to 
express my gratitude to UNRISD (United Nations Research Institute for Social Development), 
especially Krishna B. Ghimire, for encouraging me to summarise the major argument and results 
of my research in this essay (which originally was thought of as a much briefer commissioned 
paper for an UNRISD Research Programme on Civil Society and Social Movements). Finally I 
am most grateful to Lucy Earle (also with UNRISD) for her painstaking editing of the text. All 
the remaining mistakes are my own. 
4 A distinction could be made between the wider concept of ‘civil’ and the more narrow of 
‘civic’ (relating more to theories and expectations on citizens/citizenship). That will not be done 
in this summary essay.
isolation. But the absolute primacy of the bourgeoisie or workers or an enlightened 
political elite, and the dubious democratic potential of the rural poor and the radical 
Left, may partly be disputed. This is not so much in relation to the European and 
Latin American empirical cases, which most of the prevailing theses are based on, 
as with regard to the Asian contexts that we have some knowledge of, such as 
in parts of India, the Philippines and Indonesia. Here, we shall argue, neither the 
pro-democratic bourgeoisie plus the middle-classes nor the unified working classes 
have been equally important. Here authoritarianism has nevertheless been fought 
and democracy has made advances. This, we shall argue, is not just due to attempts 
at crafting democracy. Actually, as we shall see, these initiatives have often proved 
shallow and insufficient. On the contrary, broad support from poor and labouring 
people in general, including in rural frameworks, still appears to be indispensable. 
And renewed Leftist movements are in the forefront. Our major challenge is, there-
fore, to assess the key problems and options that are involved in their pro-democracy 
efforts.
1.3 The logic of the essay
In this essay, I begin by expanding on the mainstream arguments that are sceptical of 
popular efforts at development (with rural dimensions) and democracy. By contrast, 
I shall show that demands among the rural poor for land reform were a prerequisite 
for the initially rather influential pro-democratic tendency within the national revolu-
tions. This democratic character was undermined later on, not just by Communists’ 
and other nationalists’ top-down politics of modernisation but by the West and their 
local ‘liberal’ allies as well.
In the second and major empirical part of the essay we shall even argue (by 
drawing on case studies from India, Indonesia and the Philippines) that repressive 
political promotion of primitive capitalist accumulation has generated renewed left-
oriented, instrumental, and partly rural based demands for pro-democratic popular 
politics. These are reminiscent of the earlier struggles against the landed elite and 
colonial masters.
This line of argument contrasts with older theses that posited Leftist movements, 
which had both urban and rural backing, as irrelevant and undemocratic. It also 
argues against many of the recent elitist and international attempts at not just ‘getting 
the prices right’ but also the political and societal institutions, with slogans such as 
crafting ‘free and fair elections’, ‘decentralisation’, ‘good governance’, ‘civil society’ 
and ‘social capital’. Those efforts have often produced superficial forms of democra-
tisation that do not make sense for common people, remain unstable, and open up, 
instead, for the return of old emperors in new clothes.5
5 This has become even more obvious after the 11th of September, as the West has become 
much more preoccupied with its own security and thus with linking up with anyone, democratic 
or not, that can back up the US-led coalition against real or imagined terrorists.
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The main (and huge) remaining problems for popular efforts, then, are their social 
and political fragmentation, and their inability to transform extra-parliamentary action 
into institutionalised political alternatives for popular democratic governance of 
society as a whole. Consequently, the essay also critically analyses popular politics 
of democratisation (again on the basis of cases from India, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines). The predominant recommendations are questioned, including the call 
for political ‘realism’, local ‘civil societies’, issue-based action-groups, and militant 
networking. Rather there is a need to focus on the missing links: the deficient 
aggregation of single issues and specific interests, and the inadequate connections 
between central and local levels as well as civil and political societies.
In the final part of the essay, these conclusions are also related to the questions of 
what could (and should) be done.
7Chapter 2. The Mainstream Arguments
2.1 The background: important advances—and major set-backs
The nation-state projects in most developing countries are in crisis. Many radical 
political short cuts to a better standard of living—including land reforms as a basis 
for rural development—have not brought the desired results. In these countries, 
more people than anywhere else in the world remain powerless and poor. It is 
perhaps unsurprising, in view of this, that for almost two decades now the neo-liberal 
calls have rung out for globalisation, deregulation and privatisation. It is important, 
however, to keep a sense of historical proportion here. Not so long ago, for instance, 
we all paid homage to the French Revolution. Commentators noted, certainly, that 
the revolution derailed and ended in terror. Yet it was the historical significance of 
this event that was stressed: citizenship; liberty; equality and fraternity; the break-
through of the Enlightenment and of rationalism. Some of the better sides, in other 
words, of a modernism which has now lost its way. So let us not fall victim to 
the fashionable tendency to ignore (or to emphasise solely what ‘went wrong’ with) 
the French Revolution’s counterpart in our own time—the modern national revolu-
tions of the Third World. A good part of them sought to combine positive elements 
from their own traditions with valid insights and experiences of Western modernism 
(including bourgeois revolutions and socialist orientations), so that ordinary people 
could become independent citizens in their own countries; so that they could control 
and develop their own resources; and so that they could improve their own living 
conditions. Accordingly, the struggle for democracy and human rights in the Third 
World is neither new nor an exclusively Western innovation.
Yet, as we know, the outcome of this first generation of popular and often rural 
based efforts at democratic development were also ridden with severe problems. The 
Chinese land reform allowed for dictatorship and famine. The national liberation of 
Vietnam did not generate democratic development. The democratic changes in South 
Korea and Taiwan were belated and limited. In 1985–86 the peasant-based Philippine 
revolutionaries stopped short of linking up with the broader democracy movement 
that it had helped to generate, thus becoming irrelevant and deteriorating (Törnquist 
1990). In Indonesia the world’s third largest communist party, which had promoted 
and gained importance through democratisation, linked up instead with president 
Sukarno’s army-backed ‘guided democracy’. The party failed to trust or channel the 
resources of the growing popular movements, instead allowing several leaders to 
become involved in adventurous elitist intrigue. It thus missed out and was eliminated 
(Törnquist 1984). A few years later, the Indian state-modernisers lost much of their 
patron-client based rural following, tried to make use of state of emergency plus 
populism (with some Communist support) but failed, gave up structural changes 
such as land reform and began turning instead to market based transformation (e.g. 
Corbridge and Harriss 2000). Within this limited space, the Left Front governments 
and movements in Kerala and West Bengal still managed to implement fairly consist-
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ent land reforms. However, in Kerala these were not followed up and therefore did 
not generate much economic growth, whilst in West Bengal, alternative forms of 
patronage were employed which contributed to unbalanced growth. (cf. e.g. Törnquist 
1991a and Rogaly et.al. 1999).
2.2 The conventional counter arguments
Indeed, one may even doubt that this tradition of radical popular efforts at develop-
ment with rural dimensions and democracy remains endowed with any dynamics, 
credibility and or potential to provide alternatives. The two major arguments are as 
follows:
First, radical left wing projects breed dictatorships since they mobilise and manipu-
late the uneducated and dependent rural masses through top-led parties and state 
apparatuses. Democracy in these contexts is never considered important or priori-
tised and is only tactically respected under pressure from the Western orientated 
bourgeoisie and middle classes.
Second, commerce and capitalism have made agricultural prices and industrial 
labour more important than land and the rural poor. What is more: uneven capitalist 
development generates fragmented socio-economic structures, divisive interests and 
scattered new social movements that have less room for class loyalties and Left-
oriented politics in general than for ethnic, religious and other identities.6
2.3 The conventional recipes
What should be done instead? Two broad propositions dominate the discourse:
Starting with the classical determinist prescriptions, these stress necessary structural 
preconditions related to modernisation: no shortcuts to democracy. Certain modern 
social and economic prerequisites are necessary to begin with. Within that modern 
capitalist framework, then, progressive and propelling forces will emerge. There are 
‘liberal’ as well as Marxist variations to this. According to the classical ‘liberal’ thesis 
(forcefully synthesised by Huntington (1991)) there is a need for capitalist modernisa-
tion so that the bourgeois and middle classes can build a civil society and culture 
(especially embraced by scholars like Diamond (1992, 1999) and, thereby, liberal 
political democracy. The more Marxist oriented version, (e.g. represented by the 
already mentioned Rueschemeyer et.al.) would then add the working class. Despite 
those differences, however, activist scholars (like the followers of Huntington and 
Lenin) often agreed, in an almost touching way, that socio-economic modernisation 
and the rise of progressive classes was not enough. It was also necessary to add 
6 Similar arguments come from within concerned social movement and labour studies as well, 
but I will not discuss their recommendations at this point.
elitist political intervention to shape conducive institutions and provide leadership. 
Finally, the similarly deterministic dependency perspective was critical of most of 
this mainstream modernisation-thinking—arguing that the problem was not too few 
but too many of its recommendations—and thus gave special importance instead to 
the resistance against imperialism (or the current more positive term ‘globalisation’).
Secondly comes the virtually contrary idealistic proposition. For some time now 
the determinist theories that modernisation is insufficient, or international depend-
ency too extensive, have been out of fashion. The third wave of democracy has 
reached several parts of the developing world anyway. Show-case efforts at rapid 
modernisation (as in Indonesia or Singapore), and extreme independence (as in 
Cambodia), often produced authoritarianism. Many of the openings for democracy 
were due to the crisis not the development of modernisation. Voluntaristic political 
negotiations, institution-building, and international pressure seemed to be enough 
for democracy to emerge.
This more exciting and optimistic perspective, as we know, gained ground after 
the 1975 defeat of fascism in Portugal, the transitions from authoritarian rule in 
Latin America, and especially with the 1989 fall of the Berlin wall. By then, the 
idealistic post cold war notion that it was possible to craft democracies instantly, 
no matter what the conditions, had been accepted as truth. International pressure 
and influence would substitute for insufficient domestic circumstances. Thus, there 
would be enough liberal political space for the striking of deals among moderate 
incumbents and dissidents on the protection of private business interests in exchange 
for the introduction of ‘correct’ democratic practices and institutions. These would 
include human rights, the rule of law, ‘free and fair’ elections, clean and decentralised 
governance, and an extensive and (in comparison with the state) strong civil society.
One group of scholars and practitioners tends to focus on the central political 
system and administration, including pioneers such as O’Donnell and Schmitter 
(1986), and Lintz and Stepan (1996). Others, from supporters of neo-liberalism to 
new social movements that are advocates of ‘participation and empowerment’, extend 
the decentralisation-argument and stress the crafting of ‘good’ civil institutions in the 
society at large, including support for the ‘deepening’ of civil society and the promo-
tion of so-called social capital. We shall return to and expand on these propositions 
some sections ahead.
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Chapter 3. Alternative Propositions
The conventional theses above will now be disputed and alternative propositions 
outlined. There are nine alternative propositions: one that the democratic potential of 
the leftists and the poor (including rural) masses has been considerable, compared to 
the bourgeoisie and the middle classes in an historical perspective; another that the 
problems of the radical projects are not intrinsic to their theoretical underpinning but 
may be improved upon; a third that resistance against the expansive primitive accu-
mulation of capital may open up space for democracy; a fourth that fragmented and 
uneven development requires unifying opposition; a fifth that the ‘actually existing’ 
but repressive capitalist development undermines different Left-authoritarian short-
cuts to progress and calls for human-rights based democracy as such; a sixth that 
politics and actors are of primary importance; a seventh and eighth that there is a 
need to go beyond the crafting of elitist and civil-society democracy respectively; a 
ninth and final proposition that there is a third way to democracy. Thereafter, in 
the major empirical sections of the essay, all the relevant arguments will be ‘put to 
the test’.
3.1 The historical importance of leftists and the poor 
(vs. bourgeoisie and middle classes)
It is an understatement, of course, that several radical efforts at popular development 
with rural dimensions have backfired. We shall return to that. But to begin with, 
the major attempts at democracy in South and East Asia were, in fact, due to 
massive involvement of the ‘uneducated’ rural poor and to the leadership of radical 
nationalists, often communists. The Chinese land reform against rural overlords 
was a precondition even for the present local economic advances. Land reforms in 
South Korea and Taiwan were the backbone of their developmental success stories. 
It is a widely accepted but increasingly forgotten fact, that it took peasants and 
rurally rooted Vietnamese communists to put an end to one of the world’s worst 
crimes against humanity—the war and repression of the Vietnamese carried out by 
‘democratic’ France and the United States, and their ‘liberal’ local collaborators. 
During the Marcos era and until 1985, the lack of Philippine land reforms meant 
that even peasant-based Maoist guerrilla movements were intrinsic to the democracy 
efforts. In Indonesia, less widely known, the reformist communists addressed the 
interests of the rural poor in particular and built the country’s first (and still only) 
example of a modern mass-party (secular, democratic, ideology- and interest based) 
with trade unions and front-organisations (such as those of peasant farmers, women, 
and youth). The party made substantial gains in the 1955 first parliamentary elections, 
won the 1957 local elections, and was expected to dominate the then suspended 
general elections in 1959 (Törnquist 1984).
In India, the project of the radical nationalist elite was modernisation from above, 
including removing the ‘remnants of feudalism’, but with the support of the rural 
masses. The latter, however, were mobilised through patron-client relations. In the 
only exceptions, the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal, the most consistent 
efforts at agrarian reform on the sub-continent were primarily owed to democratically- 
elected communist-led governments, and continuous campaigns run by broad popular 
organisations, especially among peasant farmers and rural labourers. It may well 
be that the comparatively well-established minimum democratic Indian institutions 
have contained potential anti-democratic communist tendencies. But the most con-
sistent defenders and extenders of these institutions, then, have actually been reform 
oriented, yet ‘unreliable communists’. Meanwhile liberal oriented middle classes and 
other organisations have often played dubious roles, including introducing emergency 
rule, nourishing clientelism and exploiting communalism (cf. e.g. Drèze and Sen 
(1996) and Kohli (1987, 1990).
In many other Asian countries, the middle-classes and social democrats, along with 
intellectuals and labour leaders, were less capable than their Indian counterparts of 
mobilising the broad and predominantly rural masses and stand out in even sharper 
contrast. They backed US-led western interventions and at times so-called middle-
class coups (such as the Indonesian massacres and Suharto’s New Order), arguing 
that capitalist growth, with stronger bourgeois, middle and working classes, is a 
precondition for democracy (e.g. Törnquist 1984).
Moreover, few of the early pro-democratic efforts derailed entirely on their own. 
In Indonesia for instance, much of Sukarno’s authoritarian nationalism in the late-
1950s, was due to the Dutch refusal to give up colonial interests; because the CIA 
supported separatist movements; and because the West wanted to prevent the com-
munists and their unique modern interest-based mass movements from winning 
liberal democratic elections (c.f. Kahin 1995). The Western powers even paved the 
way for the military take-over and the massacres of 1965–66. The logic involved was 
that their own favourite so-called liberal and social democratic administrators did not 
have a strong enough social and economic base to make a difference, wherefore the 
United States, in particular, turned to the army instead. According to the conventional 
cold war wisdom of the West (and professor Huntington’s then forthcoming “politics 
of order” theory), the army would serve in policing and containing the masses, 
thereby allowing liberal middle class experts to run the country.
But as we know, once the Left had been massacred, and many others jailed, 
harassed and domesticated, it was the army generals who took over instead—with 
the middle-class experts as their servants. And yet, the repression, corruption and 
nepotism that followed were also sustained by political and economic support from 
the West, including loans issued on the basis of political guarantees rather than on 
well-founded economic evaluations. Also, it was the US which approved Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor in 1975, and Australia which recognised its annexation, 
while both nations sponsored Jakarta’s special military forces. Sweden and Norway 
(among others) also gave top priority to business dealings with Suharto’s Indonesia.
Finally it is nothing but ideological hypocrisy to state that the birth of the world’s 
third largest democracy in Indonesia came about because economic and political 
liberalisation had undermined Suharto’s corrupt despotism.7 In fact it had been quite 
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possible to combine corrupt despotism and rapid modernisation for decades. Political 
and economic ‘liberals’ based their activities and profits on bribing and backing the 
autocrats. For some thirty years after the ‘West’s best news for years in Asia’8—the 
massacres of 1965–66 and the coming to power of military—the rapidly increasing 
bourgeoisie and middle classes did very little to challenge Suharto’s ‘New Order 
and to promote liberal democratisation. The only exception was the tiny middle 
class intellectual groups amongst whom were students, scholars, lawyers, social and 
cultural workers, and journalists. (Aside from some marginal foreign support for 
them, it was not until the fall of Suharto that the West really began to back some 
form of democratisation.) The West-backed authoritarian modernisation project only 
derailed when despotic liberalism (the combination of old ‘stabilising’ oligarchs and 
new ‘dynamic’ privatisation and deregulation) made it increasingly difficult to govern 
the economy. From the mid-80s, domestic and international strongmen had been 
able to take advantage of increasingly privatised companies and deregulated markets. 
Neither the IMF&Partners nor various corporate leaders had anything decisively 
negative to say about Suharto’s Indonesia till hours before the crisis broke out in late 
1997. On the contrary, Indonesia was on the World Bank’s top-ten list of promising 
emerging economies. Only in early 1998—as the ship was about to sink—did the tone 
begin to change. Yet the West continued to support the establishment by derogatorily 
blaming the democracy activists (who faced an uphill battle after a recent crackdown 
and decades of repression and “floating mass” politics) for not ‘having produced an 
alternative’ (e.g. Törnquist (1984) and 2000, Schwartz (1994) Vatikiotis (1998).
In short, therefore, the argument that democratic development rests with West- 
oriented bourgeois and liberal middle classes is too general and not really trustworthy, 
at least with regard to the two paradigmatic cases of India and Indonesia, and does 
not need to be further examined empirically.9 In the major Asian contexts studied 
here, historical attempts at democracy have often instead been led by leftist leaders 
with a mass support base that included the rural poor.
3.2 The vital but superable problems of the Left
It is true, of course, that even ‘the best’ popular projects faced serious problems that 
were due to their own dynamics and shortcomings. In many ways this is a story 
about the similarities in weaknesses between the top-down Marxist oriented political 
7 Nor, of course, is the other dominant explanation for the economic crisis sufficient: that it is 
all because of neo-liberal regulations and the massive inflow of foreign high risk capital. For 
why was it that neo-liberalism became untenable in East and South East Asia, and especially in 
Indonesia, and only after some ten years or so?
8 Time Magazine, 15 July 1966, p.26.
9 The related thesis about the importance of the working class as a result of the expansion of 
capitalism, however, is not affected to the same extent and remains to be studied in conjunction 
with the associated theory (in section 2.2) that commerce and capitalism have made prices and 
labour more important than land and the rural poor.
modernisation strategies and the elitist Western modernisation projects (c.f. Scott 
1998). The outcome, however is different. ‘Liberal’ modernisation has been severely 
criticised, but its ideological underpinnings and recommendations have survived, 
presumably with the political victory of the West. Most probably for the same political 
reason, however, the Marxist counterpart in the third world, which has been much 
less well researched, has been indiscriminately refuted as inevitably unproductive 
and undemocratic.
My own studies of these problems, at least, indicate that this refutation of Marxist 
oriented political modernisation is premature (Törnquist 1984, 1989, 1990, 1991, 
1994).10 In cases as different as Indonesia, India and the Philippines up until the 
mid-80s, the major and common problematic factor seemed to be that politics was 
neglected to the benefit of narrow and ‘square-shaped’ analyses of material pre-
conditions. However, these serious flaws were not intrinsic to Marxism and radical 
politics. The latter may be renewed. A fundamental point of departure for this essay 
is the hypothesis that these flaws and setbacks may even generate potentially vital 
Left oriented attempts at consistent democratisation. This would serve as a basis 
for popular development, including in rural areas. Let us examine these alternative 
propositions in somewhat more detail.
3.3 Resistance against dominating primitive accumulation of 
capital and opportunities for democratisation
In the three distinctly contrasting contexts, and within their different theoretical 
interpretations, there emerge many and varied explanations for the problems faced 
by the radical projects. Yet, there is a fairly clear cut pattern which all the movements 
had in common:11 While their projects initially proved fruitful, the basic problem 
they encountered was an inability to realise the importance of new social, economic, 
and political forces. These had given rise to post-colonial authoritarianism and often 
politically facilitated the expansion of capitalism. As we shall see, even vital parts 
of radical strategies paved the way, unintentionally. Hence, the Leftist projects faced 
serious problems, gradually lost momentum and, when they failed to adapt, became 
almost irrelevant.
By subscribing to the traditional Marxist thesis (on “ideal” capitalist economies) 
that power and exploitation grow only out of productive labour in private processes 
of production, the radical Left disregarded the possibility that the emergence and 
growth of capitalism may be less ideal, more ‘primitive’. It would therefore involve, 
to a great extent, extra-economic control of land and capital as well as a set of 
10 Where not other works are cited in sub-sections 3.2—3.5, I am drawing on these references.
11 What follows is, of course, only with regard to the theories made use of by the political Left 
that I focused on. Moreover, I'm not saying that the neglected factors that I have identified were 
the only ones ‘missing’—but they proved to be the most important in the countries and during 
the periods that I studied.
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preconditions to get production up and running but would not be directly linked to 
the farm or company itself and would often, but not always, be publicly owned.
This in turn meant that they did not take into account that political, administrative 
and military control of such resources and preconditions for production (often publicly 
owned) constituted an independent source of power. It was also a way of indirectly 
appropriating parts of the surplus produced, which subsequently had a very important 
bearing on the character of development.
Finally, the control and regulation of those preconditions for production were often 
(but of course not only) carried out via the organs of the state and other ‘collective 
institutions’ (such as co-operatives)—some of which were even promoted by the Left. 
Consequently, many of the factors that led to undemocratic forms of government 
were overlooked.
A few indicators may serve as examples (primarily in the Indian and Indonesian 
contexts): Initial political and administrative protection of ‘national’ businessmen 
and peasant farmers, which the Left was a leading advocate of, often enabled politi-
cians and bureaucrats to make personal gains at the expense of promoting dynamic 
development. It also enabled businessmen to acquire particular favours and thus 
escape the progressive capitalist compulsion of producing ever more efficiently in 
order to survive on the market.
When the Left turned more statist and bet on so-called progressive nationalists 
and state led development policies, the importance of the resources and regulations 
which politicians, officers and other state administrators gained access to, was not 
addressed. In Indonesia most foreign-owned companies, especially plantations, were 
nationalised from 1957 onwards—but mainly taken over by officers, who then entered 
into co-operation with politicians, administrators and managers. This power and 
influence was further cultivated by leftist anti-imperialist policies, including through 
the legitimisation of emergency regulations. The new bosses received even greater 
privileged access to state resources, which also increased their control of labour. 
This was the very foundation for the later full-scale authoritarian rule of Suharto. In 
India, the similar victory in the late-60s of so-called progressive nationalists within 
the Congress party led to the deterioration of large parts of its old and more conserva-
tive clientelist base. They had no alternative popular organisation to turn to and 
were unable to integrate various groups and interests. This was compensated for 
by enlightened despotism, state of emergency, populism, and compromises with 
communal groups in various parts of the country. While the powers of the state 
formally increased, political and administrative institutions actually deteriorated and 
much control went into the hands of loyal ministers and executives on union and 
state level, nourishing contacts among, for instance, businessmen, affluent farmers, 
and communal leaders.
From the early-60s and seventies, in Indonesia and India respectively, the main 
question within the Left was how to handle the new problems. The basic argument 
was that the power exercised by the new state-related bosses in Indonesia was in 
turn based on that of imperialists and their affiliated so-called bureaucratic capital-
ists; and, in India, on big capitalists and semi-feudal landlords. However, there are 
strong indications that the new bosses had actually also managed to gain their own 
independent sources of power—even by making use of and actually conquering the 
very regulations and the very resources, mainly within the state, which were meant 
for progressive development policies. In Indonesia, the new bosses were not severely 
affected by the harsh anti-imperialist policies of the communist party and president 
Sukarno. On the contrary, they could sometimes even make use of anti-imperialism 
to gain control of more nationalised companies and to sustain their powers within 
the state apparatuses. In India, the state-rulers must have relied on sources of power 
other than that of ‘semi feudal landlords’ and big businessmen, who they were only 
loosely related to, who often resisted them, and who nevertheless survived without 
their support.
Further, the struggles for land reforms also reveal the existence of other important 
but neglected factors besides (the still important) privately owned land. The lack of 
unity among peasant farmers and rural labourers, despite strong and radical organi-
sational efforts, points to additional, neglected forms of exploitation and subordina-
tion. It was often difficult to identify and distribute ‘surplus land’ when only focusing 
on private ownership. Land was rarely as concentrated to a few landlords as had 
generally been assumed. Neither was it as consolidated as expected. This is not 
to suggest that private land was (and is) unimportant; or even less so that control 
(in general) of land would be a secondary issue. Moreover, the state in general, 
and the bureaucracy and military in particular, played a more vital role in primitive 
accumulation in Indonesia than in India. But many rural masters in both contexts 
were generally speaking capable of controlling land without necessarily owning it. 
Even in the cases of Java, West Bengal and Kerala, where the communists were 
strongest, the results indicate that regulation of private land ownership, and prohibi-
tion or regulation of feudal rents on it, did not prevent the possibility for old as well 
as new bosses to monopolise other assets and resources instead, including through 
public or co-operative organs. Those other resources included the control of political 
and administrative regulations of what private land should be exempted from reforms 
and also control of public and communal land, credits, water, other inputs, plus 
prices on the market. Much of this control and primitive accumulation of capital 
continued to cause problems even when comparatively consistent land reforms had 
been introduced and explains a lot of why and how explorative relations survived 
and new ones emerged.
Finally, we turn to the Philippine ‘control case’. The Maoist Left expanded for 
many years but swiftly lost the initiative in 1985–86. While it insisted on its ‘anti-
feudal’ people’s war, bourgeois and middle classes gained the initiative in the struggle 
for liberties and democracy and did away with the Marcos dictatorship. Hence, 
attempts at more radical workers and poor people based democratisation were caught 
in between the old irrelevant Left and the new successful bourgeois liberals. This 
came as a total surprise for the old Left. Its own perspectives only allowed for 
the identification of main sources of power outside the political field. Accordingly, 
democracy neither made sense to them, nor did they believe that it should make sense 
to people in general. As far as they were concerned, liberalisation and democratisa-
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tion would not help much to alter basic power relations and inequalities. A funda-
mental assumption was that politicians, administrators and so-called “bureaucratic 
capitalists” of the Marcos regime had no real power base own that could be hit at by 
way of political democratisation. Instead they relied on more powerful imperialists, 
compradors, and landlords with private sources of power—which thus had to be 
tackled head on by other means, including ‘anti-feudal’ guerrilla struggles. So accord-
ing to the mainstream leftist analyses, what actually happened (in terms of successful 
action against Marcos through democratisation and the irrelevance of Maoism) could 
not happen! Many even refused to realise what had happened.
What are the general implications? In short, the Left rarely considered the special 
importance of authoritarian political monopolisation in the process of late primitive 
accumulation of capital and was often unable to fight it effectively. My argument, 
then, is that once experienced and realised, this politically dominated symbiosis 
between politics and the economy should make it necessary for the subordinate 
classes not only to stand up against private capitalists and landlords, but also against 
the monopolisation of politically controlled assets and resources.
We shall return later to a close empirical discussion of the issue, but for the 
moment, suffice to say that it was above all neo-liberal ideas and vested interests 
that captured and expressed most of the new demands for freedom and liberalisation 
against authoritarian political monopolisation. Yet, as neo-liberalism fails and new 
insights are gained, the struggle against symbiotic political and economic bosses may 
still give birth to a formidable combination of class struggle against exploitation 
and national-citizen demands for freedom and substantial democracy. This would be 
second only to the anti-colonial combination of class and nationalism.
3.4 Divisive uneven development requires unifying resistance 
against common enemies
The above hypothesis of the structural imperative for subordinate classes to fight 
political monopolisation, at best by way of democratisation, is not just counter to 
the established thesis about democratically dubious rural based radicalism. It is also 
partially at odds with the mainstream view that capitalist development has made 
agricultural prices and industrial labour more important than land and the rural poor. 
To contrast these categories and sectors is unfruitful. As already discussed, it is true, 
of course, that land is rarely the sole or the principal asset disputed, but is one of wide 
range of other resources including those available on the market. However, while 
there are few ‘pure’ peasants any more, that does not imply that all have become 
industrial labourers, or that industrial labour is the only potentially dissident class in 
town. Rather, one has to analyse how an increasing number of rural households and 
even individuals combine various jobs, roles, and activities.
This, however, is not to agree with the currently widespread view that uneven 
development generates such fragmented socio-economic structures, discordant inter-
ests, and scattered new social movements, that class loyalties and Left oriented 
politics in general will inevitably give way to various action groups and to ethnic, 
religious and other identities. It may well be that third world late capitalism gener-
ates less unified subordinate classes than early European capitalism did. But it is 
reasonable to assume that in order to serve their followers, the increasing number of 
movements that emerge around the many different conflicts would instead have to 
give more emphasis to various forms of co-operation against common problems, such 
as monopolistic control of numerous ‘hidden’ and ‘nomadic’ resources. And that, in 
turn, may promote democratic arrangements, such as post-land reform co-operation 
among agricultural producers on the acquisition of various inputs, the trading of their 
products, the running of plantations, or unified action among common rural people 
against the onslaught of commercial interest on their land or state-led construction 
of dams.
3.5 Capitalist expansion, left-authoritarianism, and human 
rights-based democracy
One major problem and counter argument remain. Even if it is accepted that subor-
dinate classes, including the rural poor and the Left, may have instrumental reasons 
to resist the political monopolisation that is a vital part of primitive accumulation of 
capital, they have historically rarely given priority to democracy as such.
Undoubtedly there is much to this. Even if we set aside the worst instances like 
China and only consider the ‘best’ cases that have some liberal democratic pre-
conditions like the Philippines, India, and Indonesia, where rural based Leftists have 
often been comparatively the ‘best’ promoters of preconditions for democracy, that 
does not exclude a wide range of fundamental problems regarding democratic rights 
and mechanisms as such. Even towards the end of the struggle against Marcos (and 
many years thereafter), it was not just the Philippine Maoists, but also many other 
leftists who disputed the ‘fruitfulness’ of giving priority to human rights, electoral 
work, and democratic governance. The same goes for Indian Maoists and many 
radicals within the extra-parliamentary oriented sections of the mainstream com-
munist movements. The more statist pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) 
supported the emergency rule in the early seventies and only regretted it when it 
did not pay off. It is true that the larger Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) 
has more consistently opposed authoritarianism, but mainly among its enemies and 
with remarkable tolerance for rough practices among allies. It is also true that it 
has implemented a wide range of pro-democratic conditions and institutions in West 
Bengal and Kerala, including agrarian reforms and democratic decentralisation. But 
there are problematic aspects of alternative patronage, so-called democratic central-
ism, and tendencies to dominate other progressive forces.
Indonesia, however, is the most obvious and tragic case. The experiences of the 
world’s third largest communist party—from the early- till the late-50s a pioneer of 
democracy in the country—clearly illustrate what I would hold as the major Achilles’ 
heel within the radical Left. Firstly, the insufficient internal democracy and centralism 
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in Indonesia allowed for a few of the very top leaders to engage in adventurous 
and dubious deals with sections of the national and military elite, thereby putting 
the entire party and the huge mass movement at risk. Secondly, the neglect of links 
and alliances with liberal intellectuals and social democrats on fundamental issues of 
human rights and democracy meant that there was no opposition to political violence 
or authoritarianism, and also isolated the movement. This enabled other groups and 
foreign powers to take advantage of generations of dynamic and potentially radical 
students and intellectuals. Thirdly, was the tendency to even give up basic rights 
and the democratic system in face of what were regarded as more ‘basic’ aims and 
conflicts. Soon after the first parliamentary elections of 1955, the Indonesian com-
munists abandoned liberal democracy that had served its rapid political advances so 
well. This was done with reference to the primacy of the anti-imperialist struggle and 
in favour of what later emerged into Sukarno’s army-backed ‘guided democracy’. The 
situation was difficult, of course. When ‘guided democracy’ was proclaimed in 1959, 
the PKI had few alternatives but to stick to ‘the only game in town’. But there had 
been alternative, though difficult, paths to choose before that. And at least to the 
extent that theory and strategy mattered, it is clear that the party itself gave priority 
to anti-imperialism instead of democracy at a rather early stage and even nourished 
positive assumptions as to the democratic character of their allies (cf Törnqust 1984). 
Actually, therefore, the Left also contributed to the emergence of more than thirty 
years of extreme repression and exploitation.
Fortunately, however, the tide now seems to have turned against the old practices. 
Firstly, there are not just instrumental reasons to fight the political monopolisation 
that is basic to primitive accumulation of capital. There are also instrumental reasons 
to promote basic rights and democratic mechanisms as such, so as to get rid of 
closely associated authoritarianism, repression and limited political opportunities. 
In other words, a lesser degree of political monopolisation (which was achieved 
in the Indonesian context by doing away with Suharto) is a necessary condition 
for subordinated peoples to improve their living conditions. It is not the only condi-
tion, however, as scattered elite monopolisation of various assets, resources and the 
control of labour can still continue if substantial democracy is not achieved.
Secondly, (and in addition to the disintegration of destructive cold war front lines 
and loyalties), ‘actual’, not ideal, capitalism is spreading. That, of course, is a mixed 
blessing. But as we shall see, it does undermine the old, rigid, and irreconcilable 
rationales for undemocratic strategies among communists as well as social democrats 
and liberals.
The background is that since the early 1920’s anti-colonial Marxists, communists, 
and many of the enlightened radical nationalists, used to argue that there was a 
need for top-down political shortcuts to progress. This was because coexistence in 
the third world of imperialism and feudal-like structures blocked dynamic bourgeois 
revolutions. Hence the workers were also weak, and as such, the driving social 
forces would have to include the huge majority of oppressed peasant farmers and 
the frustrated bourgeois factions. This called for efficient centralised organisation, 
enlightened radical leadership, and strategies—to gain political power, to get rid off 
colonial or neo-colonial masters and their partners, and to conquer the state. The 
latter would then be used to implement grand development strategies. Now that ‘real’ 
capitalism is spreading, however, it should be possible for radical movements within 
this tradition to focus more on gradual and democratic pathways from below, broad 
alliances between various and less unified rural and urban forces, and to abandon 
enlightened authoritarianism.
Similarly, there would also be less fertile ground for the earlier third world liberal- 
and social-democratic ‘middle class coups’. These, as we know, occurred in order 
to resist ‘threatening masses’ (which the liberals and social democrats were much 
less capable of organising than communists and radical nationalists) in favour of 
elitist modification of imperialism and the use of international capitalism to promote 
enlightened national modernisation, including the growth of workers and middle 
classes. Now that ‘actually existing’ capitalism may produce a critical mass of middle 
class and ‘educated workers’, however, it might be easier to mobilise them in peaceful 
elections then the earlier ‘backward masses’. Hence, western oriented socialists and 
centre-leftists may become more interested in political work among ‘the masses’, and 
also engage in joint projects with groups and people that previously were looked 
upon as communist-pariah.
3.6 The primacy of politics and actors
In short, the arguments to be followed up are: (1) that there are instrumental reasons 
for large sections of the population to oppose the political monopolisation that is 
key to the ever-prevailing primitive accumulation of capital—and that this renders 
possible class-based demands for democratisation in contrast to neo-liberalism; (2) 
that divisive uneven development should be an instrumental reason for subordinate 
classes to unite by way of democratic mechanisms to resist common enemies; (3) that 
the ‘actual’ expansion of capitalism as well as its repressive character are additional 
instrumental reasons for subordinate classes to fight for human rights and democracy 
as such; (4) that the ‘real’ development of capitalism has undermined the strategic 
rationales for both authoritarian shortcuts to progress and ‘middle class coups’—thus 
also opening up for reconciliation and advances within the Left on the basis of a 
pro-democratic agenda.
In other words, what used to be projected as liberal-capitalist ‘end of history’ may 
rather be the beginning of renewed popular development and democratisation.
The unfolding of all these structural imperatives for democratisation, however, is far 
from automatic. It may prove that there are indeed instrumental reasons to promote 
co-operation, basic rights and democratic mechanisms as such (to unite scattered 
subordinated classes and to get rid of the authoritarianism, repression, and limited 
political space that is basic to the political monopolisation of primitive accumulation 
of capital). But even then: that very struggle in turn calls for ‘skilled’ politics on (a) 
what particular rights, mechanisms and capacities should be shaped, and (b) how 
that should be done. In short, it calls for the best possible politics of democratisation.
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While there is a growing awareness of this among pro-democrats, most activists 
are still preoccupied with fighting evil, and increasingly global, structures in order 
to create appropriate general conditions for a better society. Only a few believe 
in stoning policemen, but discussions on if and how such improvements could be 
achieved instead, through strengthening of basic rights and democratisation, continue 
to take a back seat. Few frameworks and models have emerged.
As a point of departure, one must therefore proceed, instead, by way of a critical 
review of the best available established propositions. These are within the discourse 
of the crafting of instant liberal democracies, through international support for ‘good’ 
political, administrative, and civil institutions.
The easiest and most fashionable counter-argument to that is that such pro-demo-
cratic efforts in general are naive and almost ridiculous. The message, then, is that 
patrimonial culture and systems are so old and strong that they will overrule any 
element of democracy that is introduced (e.g. Chabal and Daloz 1999).
I do not share this view. The role and importance of patrimonialism and clientelism 
rarely have such deep, strong roots. The ‘saffron Wave’ in India, for instance, as 
the best recent expression of such characteristics, may instead be analysed as an 
essentially middle class based reaction and an attempt to channel new and scattered, 
but threatening, plebeian influences into the democratic system
 
(Hansen 1999). In 
Indonesia, as another example, the patrimonialism and clientelism that characterised 
much of Suharto’s regime primarily gained importance as a result of the authoritarian 
rule and exploitation of the late fifties and onwards. So if one focuses on these issues 
as basic hindrances rather than as seemingly irrevocable cultural traits—the favouring 
of democracy ceases to appear impossible.
The question then, is whether it is possible to develop more challenging pro-
democratic policies within the mainstream framework for the institutional crafting 
of democracy. We shall first turn to the efforts at reforming the central political 
and administrative system (in terms of rights, elections, and ‘good governance’), 
then discuss the creation of appropriate civil institutions (through decentralisation, 
a dynamic civil society and social capital) and finally present an alternative proposi-
tion.
3.7 Beyond the crafting of elitist democracy
As we know, many of the earlier structural and institutional approaches to the 
problems of third world democratisation were based on the assumption that democ-
racy, according to established scholars, would only come about if there were more 
modernisation, or, as their critics retorted, if there were less international depend-
ency. Just about the only thing they had in common, then, was that both arguments 
were proved wrong. The third wave of democracy (which started with the fall of 
the dictators in southern Europe and continued with the fall of the wall in Berlin) 
reached the third world despite insufficient modernisation and despite increased 
dependency.
The new approaches that emerged in response to these unexpected changes, then, 
mainly turned out to be elitist supplements. The ‘liberal’ scholars (including Diamond 
(1992, 1999), Linz & Stepan (1996) and Huntington (1991) did away with much of 
their outdated hard-core modernisation theories, and substituted them with discus-
sion on a myriad of partly unrelated and empirically generalised factors. These con-
gregated around a normative focus on the role of middle-class elites, the institutional 
mechanisms of liberal democracy, and the possibility of crafting such institutions. 
For instance, even the very best book in this tradition, by Linz and Stepan (1996), 
combines structure and actor approaches by looking at constraints through the prism 
of normatively identified and empirically localised elite-actors and ‘best possible’ 
institutions. Meanwhile, the dependency scholars simply set aside the structural 
dynamics—which according to their previous analyses could not generate democ-
racy—and focused on contingent elite-manoeuvres and the engineering of institutions 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986).
This is not just on the central level. As neo-liberal deregulation and ‘hollowing 
out’ of the developmental state has been modified by the transferral of regulatory 
capacities to sub-and supra-national institutions, (cf Jessop 1993, 1994) and a shift 
from ‘less government’ to ‘good governance’ (World Bank 1997), the local state and 
civil society have emerged as special arenas in which a host of objectives are to 
be achieved. A number of institutional reforms have been introduced to get the 
‘formal’ local institutions right in terms of the rule of law, basic rights and free and 
fair elections, including the mobilisation of votes on local issues and identities, in 
order to further development (Williams & Young 1994). To this is added different 
forms of decentralisation (Rondinelli et.al (1983) and World Bank (2000), including 
privatisation to actors in the market or semi-privatisation to NGOs and other actors 
in civil society, deconcentration of tasks and fiscal transfers to local units of central 
offices; and devolution of power to local governments. There are also proposals to 
initiate local partnerships between state institutions, businesses, and actors in civil 
society (Wolfensohn, 1988).
These neo-institutionalist approaches to new democratisation suffer from two 
major problems and one negative outcome: (1) the first problem concerns missing 
societal dynamics. The literature is unclear on, and at times fails even to mention, 
the broader societal dynamics (Gill 2000). Rather, these approaches contribute to 
the dominating idea that if international pressure and influence can compensate 
for the worst domestic obstacles, and if one acts swiftly during periods of crisis 
(when the normally powerful forces are in disorder), the major task is simply to 
craft alliances within the elite, and establish the rule of law, human rights, and the 
‘right’ type of constitution and electoral system. These and other ‘good’ institutions 
are considered to be those that best serve a type of minimum liberal democracy, 
that the international community seems, normatively, to agree upon. In fact, most of 
the literature discusses and generalises such measures comparatively and on a grand 
scale—far removed from specific contexts with different power relations, actors and 
cultures; almost like the IMF and World Bank economists handle economic crises 
with universal recipes, or as the old Communist modernisers directed their satellites 
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through the Comintern.
(2) The second major problem with the predominant approaches is the a-historical 
fallacy. This is a the tendency to analyse democracy on the basis of definitions 
that build on historically static means of democracy in Europe and North America, 
rather than on the universal ends, the principles of democracy. Hence we are also 
engulfed by static and normatively based analyses of stages such as transition to 
and consolidation of democracy. What universally and once and for all defined 
democratic means are supposed to be consolidated?
Similarly out of touch with historical realities are the frequent recommendations 
to give priority to the ‘rule of law’ and ‘good governance’. It is true, of course, that 
efficient, predictable, and fair governance are prerequisites for sustainable economic 
development and democracy (e.g. North (1989, 1990, 1993) World Bank 1997). The 
only problem is, that when constitutionalism does not precede popular sovereignty 
(as it did in the West) we either have to say (like the supporters of the East Asian 
development state did) that the time is not yet ripe for democracy—or discuss what 
social, economic and political forces would simultaneously be able to enforce consti-
tutionalism and democracy. And this is rarely done. Most of the proponents of rule 
of law and good governance talk at length of what should be done but avoid the 
problem of who would be able to enforce and implement it (e.g. World Bank 1997).
(3) The likely negative outcome, then, of mainstream crafting of democracy are 
shallow and unstable democracies. Political monopolisation as part of primitive 
accumulation of capital render ideas about crafting ‘good’ political pacts and institu-
tions difficult. The assumption is that if business is allowed to ‘take care of itself’, 
there will be space enough for cautious political changes, as in southern Europe and 
parts of Latin America. This is not likely to work, however, where there is a deeply 
rooted symbiosis between politics and economy that is largely left intact. Central 
political monopolies may be done away with, but if there is no drastic altering of the 
structure of power around them, local and sectoral bosses will survive. And since 
no (Mafioso-like) ‘godfather’ is then able to control politics and put some limits on 
the primitive accumulation of capital (in order not to undermine the system and also 
to nurture it), political violence and corruption may well increase. (c.f. Olsen 2000 
and McIntyre 2000) Hence, democratisation will be shallow and unstable, vacillating 
between unrealistic elitist crafting of institutions with international backing and the 
return of old powerful forces who draw on populist nationalism within the formal 
framework of some rudimentary democratic institutions and populist nationalism 
(Törnquist 2002).
The obvious first step to get out of this three-dimensional impasse, I suggest, is to 
substitute the ordinary people for the elite. This is not just because the basic principles 
of democracy relate to the people rather than to the elite. Equally importantly, this 
would allow us to consider the broader societal and structural dynamics, for instance 
by supplementing Linz et al.’s analyses of the constraints through the prism of the 
elite with studies of how popular actors relate to such preconditions (cf. Rudebeck, 
Törnquist and Rojas 1998).
Further, one also has to separate the universal ends or principles of democracy 
from the contextual means that vary over time and with the balance of power (cf. 
Beetham (1999) and Törnquist (1999: Ch.12). Thus it should be possible to replace 
the fixation with Western means, with studies of the actual dynamics of democratisa-
tion, in terms of the forces at play and their interests in being able to shape and use 
the democratic means to reach the democratic ends.
We shall soon return to an alternative framework (under 6.9. below), but let me first 
discuss the pros and cons of the second, societal aspect of the crafting of democracy 
approach.
3.8 Beyond idealist crafting of civil society democracy
In contrast to measures concerning the elitist and political and administrative levels, 
the other tendency within the discussion about building democracy is about the pro-
motion of local and civil institutions. These are often held to be necessary precondi-
tions for liberal democracies.
The idea is to generate a public sphere of communication and co-operation among 
citizens on the basis of voluntary and independent civil associations and self-man-
agement. This, all agree, is in order to reduce and counter the influence of state 
and local government. Some would add that ‘good’ civil organisation should also be 
separated from and act as a counter-weight to politically and economically ‘partisan’ 
organisations, such as political parties and trade unions, corporate actors in the 
market and/or the kind of non-citizen associations that one is more or less a member 
of by birth, such as families, clans, and ethnic and religious groups. The argument, 
then, is that this institutional civil set up—which is related to the liberal struggles 
against feudalism and other forms of authoritarianism—is a basic pre-condition for 
liberal democracy. The more dense and vibrant the civil society, the better the democ-
racy (e.g. Cohen and Arato (1994). The proponents of social capital, finally, add 
that inter-personal trust, norms and networks are essential for citizens’ co-operation, 
and their ability to promote democracy. This in turn varies with the level of civil 
communalism in terms of unhierarchal associational life, (including football clubs 
and bird watching societies)—which in turn is due to historical ‘path dependence'. 
The original argument, for instance, is that the dense associational life in northern 
Italy is rooted in the late-medieval city-state culture (Putnam 1993).
What are the pros and cons of this paradigm with regard to democratisation? 
Civil society and social capital may be fine as normative concepts (and personally 
I subscribe to many of them) but with regard to democratisation they are not analyti-
cally effective. Rather we should proceed by handling five major problems.12
(1) Essential factors neglected: The paradigm sets aside relations of power, interests 
and ideas. Rather it assumes citizens to be equal and the very existence of civil 
12 Much of what follows below in sub-section 3.8 is based on Törnquist (1998b) and (1999; 
Ch. 13).
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associations, trust and networks to be almost enough for democracy to develop and 
survive. Yet most social science research indicates that conflicts over power, related 
for instance to class and gender, and differences, associated for instance with ideolo-
gies, ethnicity and religion, are absolutely fundamental—including in processes of 
democratisation. In our cases, any neglect of the importance of political monopolisa-
tion of resources as part of primitive accumulation of capital is to negate the most 
basic hindrance against democracy—especially on the local and rural level where the 
political space is usually especially tight.
(2) Ambiguous roots and bases: Hardly anyone would dispute the importance of 
associations and public discourse that is relatively independent from the state, and, 
even better, from the market, the family, and ethnic and religious organisation as 
well. (But why should they be independent from parties and trade unions?) But what 
generates it all? What shapes civil society and social capital? Most analysts involved 
claim that modern civil society emerged with the rise of socio-economic relations 
relatively independent from the family, the feudal lord, and the absolutist state. First, 
however, many scholars have questioned Putnam’s path dependence explanation 
for the paradigmatic case of Italy.13 Moreover, the approach as such does not help 
us to analyse the reproduction of history—to explain what survives and why—and 
to account for the fact that seemingly similar phenomena like associations do not 
necessarily have the same function (e.g. to promote social capital) under different 
conditions.
Further, while some scholars do modify the general agreement within the paradigm 
on the historical importance of anti-feudal and authoritarian capitalist modernisation 
by also pointing to its mixed blessing in terms of its anti-social effects, the paradigm 
itself offers no precise tools to analyse these dynamics. Here it is rather Marxism 
that is most sharp and fruitful. It stresses the atomisation of people under ‘bourgeois’ 
division of labour and a social plurality which, if not resisted politically, tends to 
produce bureaucratic authoritarianism rather than a political plurality (c.f. Gibbon 
1998). But this is hardly even considered within the civil society paradigm. On the 
contrary, Cohen and Aroto (1994), for instance, even assume that the best way of 
fighting the negative effects of capitalism is to further deepen the same dubious 
civil society that capitalist modernisation is giving birth to, and to bet on ‘people 
themselves’ and their autonomy (including their special identities) as against, and 
13 Among the convincing arguments are that Putnam has not accounted for changes over 
time, that the degree of civicness is much more fluctuating than stated, that vital norms are 
fairly similar in the regions, and that the critical differences between them were rather “mega-
constraints imposed by geography, location (earthquake areas in the south), economics, and 
politics” (Sabetti 1996:27). For instance, according to Sidney Tarrow, “every regime that governed 
southern Italy from the Norman establishment of a centralised monarchy in the twelfth century 
to the unified government which took over there in 1861 was foreign and governed with a logic 
of colonial exploitation, (and) southern Italy’s semi-colonial status (did not) suddenly disappear 
with unification” (Tarrow 1996: 392 and fn 15). The only plausible reason for why a well read 
scholar like Putnam could miss this, Tarrow argues, is that there is something wrong with “the 
model with which he turned to history (Tarrow 1996:395).
in order to influence, state and politics.
 14 What is more, the entire argument is 
undermined if there is something to the rather widespread agreement among critical 
scholars that the spread of ‘actually existing’ capitalist relations in the third world 
rarely promotes the kind of politically fairly independent business and middle classes, 
and the relative separation between state and civil society, that this modernisation 
is often associated with.15
(3) Politics neglected: In total contrast to the paradigm, it may even be that the 
growth and importance of civil society is much due to political action and state 
and government regulation and intervention.16 Some scholars within the paradigm 
differentiate between parties, parliament and governments on the one hand, and 
the state apparatuses on the other. But there is almost no interest in the extent 
to which governments are in command of their state apparatuses, and citizens are 
in command of their governments. For instance, there is hardly any reference17 to 
the pro-democratising effects of close to a decade of north European co-operation 
between popular movements, democratic government and state at various levels; 
parts of which have also been labelled social corporatism and associative democracy. 
Or to return again to the paradigmatic Italian case: Why was it that Sicily, by 1922, 
had the “highest number of locally constituted and operated farmer co-operatives 
and the second highest number of locally established (…) rural credit institutions 
in Italy"? Why did the labour movement in the Capitanata region of Apulia really 
fight fascism and why was it “stronger and more powerful than its counterpart in 
Emilia Romagna"? (Sabetti 1996:32f.) Why did fascism emerge in Putnam’s northern 
civil and therefore inherently pro-democratic communities in the first place? What 
of their contemporary scandals over bad governance and corruption—and of the 
rise of civil associations in the South? (Tarrow 1996: 392 and fn. 15) And perhaps 
most important of all: what of the deliberate and powerful efforts of the Italian 
Communists, and many Socialists and Christian Democrats too, in key areas of the 
North from the late nineteenth century onwards to constitute and work through civil 
associations? (cf. Tarrow 1996:393f.). Given the weakness of the path dependence 
explanation, is it not plausible that this kind of politics is of vital importance in the 
process of shaping civil societies and in the creating of social capital?
Moreover, outside Europe, in what came to known as the Third World, the initial 
shaping of citizen societies, or ‘demos’, was mainly directed against former colonists 
14 The deepening of civil society in terms of stressing empowerment of individual citizens may 
be contrasted to the ‘politicising’ of the same in terms of giving priority to common ideas and 
collective organisation and action.
15 For the related results and conclusions that this essay is based on, see sub-sections 3.3–3.5.
16 Historically, incidentally, civil society signified a politically created society of citizens (exclud-
ing slaves, mobs, natives, immigrants … and, of course, distinguished from ‘anarchy'). The 
Greeks explicitly talked of politike koinonia, political community, and the Romans distin-
guished societas civilis, society of citizens, from non-citizen societies like those based on 
residence or kinship.
17 Not even in the almost 800 pages of standard work on civil society and politics by Cohen 
and Arato (1994).
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and indigenous peoples. In countries like Japan, the externally induced modernisa-
tion and subsequent steps towards democracy were mainly carried out through the 
state from above. The initial modernisation in the colonies was first imposed by 
conquerors but later turned against them by nationalists, who often added initial 
democratisation and always made use of state and politics (Therborn (1992) and 
(1995) In many parts of Africa, for instance, the early ‘actually existing’ civil societies 
were primarily in urban areas. The rest, the subjects, were under customary rule; 
which, however, was integrated, refined and made use of by the colonisers. Much 
of the nationalist struggle was about deracialising the civil societies—whereafter 
the world of subjects was either governed through clientelism or ‘enlightened and 
developmental’ one-party states. Democratisation among the subjects at the grass-
roots level was rarely even attempted. The few real efforts are still lacking firm co-
ordination with urban civil society movements. Equally isolated civil society move-
ments, including many of the recent pro-democracy ones, either turn shallow and 
formalistic—or approach, again, the world of subjects through potentially explosive 
clientelist linkages based on for instance, ethnicity or religion
 
(Mamdani (1996), cf 
Törnquist (1999:9–14).
Obviously one has to give much more emphasis to the importance of political action 
and intervention—both as a prerequisite and a hindrance for civil organisation.
(4) Ambiguous pro-democratic effects: Given their existence and strength, civil 
society and social capital as such are poor historical explanations of democracy. They 
have coexisted with very different types of regime—including fascism in Italy and 
Germany. Sweden’s very vibrant civil society, that has deep historical roots, stands 
in sharp contrast to the country’s comparatively late democratisation. If it can be 
assumed that civil societies and self-management really do promote a public sphere of 
communication and co-operation among citizens, and thus also the rule of law, plus 
human and civil rights, then of course, this is essential to democratisation. It is not, 
however, the same as democracy (popular control and political equality with regard 
to binding collective decisions), or even sufficient for democratisation. Democracy 
has often come about through illegal means and in spite of the lack of civil rights. 
And anyway, democratic struggles (within or outside liberal public/civil space) are 
more a question of socio-economic conflicts (such as over class) and of politics to 
alter the rules as well as the division of labour and resources, (at least to such an 
extent that both civil and political rights become universal) than of civil society 
associations, however important they may be, within the framework of existing rules 
and inequalities.18
18 Also, for instance, it is true that civil society activists who fought the totalitarian regimes in 
Poland and Latin America consciously limited themselves to the strengthening of civil society, 
and to the democratising of some of its associations, in order thus to influence and undermine 
the regimes—as it was impossible to conquer the state, fight the armies, and democratise the 
society and its institutions as a whole. But it is equally true that the very processes of transition 
to democracy soon called for political organisations and actors—and that many well intended 
and hard working grassroots activists were thus set aside.
Consequently one should also specifically question how and why social capital 
would translate into democratisation and efficient democratic government. In Putnam’s 
study there are correlations but few causal chains and no agents of change. Why 
and how would football clubs always promote co-operation outside the clubs and in 
wide societal fields? What is “the causal chain between bird watching and political 
activism"? (Levi 1996:49) How are people capable of really standing up against non-
performing governments and suggest other policies? Why would civil community 
demands have to be democratic? (What of democratic middle class decisions to 
wall residential areas? Or ethnic and religious-based social capital or community 
co-operation that are enforced by authoritarian rulers like Suharto?)19 Again, how 
and why do Putnam and his followers exclude other plausible explanations for all 
this—including state and politics? In terms of far-stretched explanations, one may 
even equate the social capital school of the nineties with the capital logic school of 
the seventies.20
In contrast to this, our previous discussions and propositions indicate, that people’s 
instrumental interests—for instance in relation to agrarian reforms—have been abso-
lutely vital in the struggle for democracy. Similarly, the role of agents and ideas such 
as political organisations, strategies and ideologies cannot be overestimated. They 
must be central to a fruitful approach for critical studies of democratisation.
(5) Dubious relevance: Finally social science is also about societal relevance, beyond 
the curiosity of applying and testing theses. Do researchers and their analytical 
tools tackle real and vital societal dilemmas? Since the eighties, the civil society 
paradigm (later on supplemented with the theses about social capital) has been 
widely acclaimed. This is not the place to discuss why,21 but the paradigm, at least, 
is not particularly helpful if one considers the lack of popular political organisation 
and representation based on interests and ideologies to be the most serious problem 
in current uphill attempts at democratisation.22
19 On a closer look, one actually finds that the dependent variable of the social capital analysts 
is neither democratisation nor democratic practice (despite the titles of books and applications 
for funds) but government performance—which is not part of ‘normal’ definitions of democracy, 
but rather used to be stressed by instrumental Leninists, among others. The content or outcome 
of democracy, of course, has some bearing on its consolidation, but as we know from fascism 
in Europe or the pre-crisis East and Southeast Asia, government performance is not altogether 
clearly related to a democratic type of regime.
20 However, some of the initially most enthusiastic scholars now report more cautious conclu-
sions and interesting results (Blomkvist and Swain 2001). 
21 Cf. e.g. Gibbon (1998), Beckman (1998), White (1994) and Mohan and Stokke (2000) 
22 The most serious problem for at least four reasons: (1) because the genuine efforts at 
democratisation which emerged in the course of the liberation struggles were undermined both 
by the deterioration of the movements themselves and by the rise of new authoritarian forces 
which repressed the movements and reduced or redirected ambitious land reforms and health 
and educational programmes, all initially aiming at turning subjects into citizens; (2) because 
the then emerging civil movements which contributed to the undermining of the authoritarian 
Alternative Propositions 27
28 Popular Development and Democracy
3.9 A third way to democracy
To summarise, the series of structural imperatives (with rural dimensions) for democ-
ratisation, and partly even for democracy as such, calls for agency in terms of knowl-
edge and politics of what rights, mechanisms and capacities should be promoted 
and how. A critical review of the best available mainstream propositions suggests (1) 
that since the approaches are elitist, a-historical, set aside vital parts of the societal 
dynamics, and are likely to create shallow and unstable democracies, one should 
substitute the ordinary people for the elite and separate the universal ends and the 
historically specific means of democracy; (2) that while the civil society and social 
capital paradigm assumes citizens to be equal, and dense civil associational institu-
tions and co-operation to be sufficient for democratisation, one must add to this the 
importance of the balance of power and other interests, organisations, and ideas; (3) 
that as the same paradigm is ambiguous as to the historical importance of capitalist 
modernisation for civil associations and co-operation in the West, there is a special 
need for contextual analyses of the role of the often different but yet actually existing 
types of capitalism in the former colonies in the South; (4) that since politics tend to 
be seen as a dependent variable, while its role can hardly be exaggerated particularly 
in the South, much more emphasis must be given to its positive as well as negative 
significance; (5) that since the paradigm is incomplete and confusing with regard 
to the pro-democratic effects of the very existence of civil associations and chances 
to co-operate, one has to add the role of intermediate variables in general and the 
importance of political and ideological agency in particular; (6) that the paradigm 
does not address the most crucial problems of democratisation—the lack of popular 
political organisation and representation based on interests and ideologies—which 
should be given priority instead.
Consequently, a third way must be developed between the earlier dominating but 
authoritarian-prone determinism on the one hand, and the currently fashionable but 
analytically unfruitful idealism on the other.23
regimes (as in Latin America and the Philippines during the eighties) were unable to generate 
efficient political organisations and representatives—wherefore the inevitable horse trading 
associated with most transitions to democracy was captured by the traditional political elites, 
their clientelism, and their (sometimes) emerging state-corporatism (this, the reader will find, is 
also a major conclusion in this essay regarding ‘our’ empirical cases); (3) because the related 
problems of ‘consolidating’ democracy may best be summarised, with Adam Przeworski et.al. 
(1995:57), as “something more profound (…) than institutional factors” namely “the absence 
of collective projects, of socially integrating ideologies, of clearly identifiable political forces, 
of crystallised structures of interests to be represented"; (4) because persisting authoritarian 
tendencies often coexist with the rise of capitalism, general modernisation, elements of civil 
society, and the creation of social capital—but not, necessarily, with democratisation.
23 The following framework has grown out of the project that this essay summaries the results 
from, and especially from my analyses of the experiences in Indonesia since 1997 (cf Törnquist 
2000, 2000c, 2002, 2001a), the joint work with Arief Budiman and the research team at 
ISAI (Institute for the Studies of Free Flow of Information, Jakarta) on (and with) the Indo-
This implies two steps: first the separation of democratic ends and means—which I 
shall return to a few paragraphs below, and second, the specification of the minimum 
material, social, economic and political preconditions that must be promoted in 
addition to the current crafting of basic rights and institutions. These are the pre-
conditions that are necessary for ordinary people to be able to use and improve 
democratic rights and institutions, plus see to it that they are applied in relation 
to vital sectors of society (to avoid ‘choice less democracies’), thus developing a 
substantial democracy.
By such substantial democracy we do not mean a utopia. Substantial democracy 
‘only’ means that the conventional democratic rules of the game (which just about 
all political scientists would agree upon) are both fair and applied in vital sectors 
of society—so that, at least, strategic decisions are not taken in military staff rooms 
or in chambers of commerce, or at the IMF headquarters—and that all the players 
are granted political equality and have an actual capacity to take part and win. 
Accordingly, substantial democratisation implies the promotion and application of 
such rules of the game by methods that do not undermine them, even during the 
most repressive conditions. That does not mean that force must always be avoided 
by pro-democrats, but that it must only be used in order to practice basic democratic 
rights such as to organise and express an opinion.
This means a democracy and democratisation process that is likely to make sense 
for most people concerned. Not because its outcome is always to their advantage 
(for instance in terms of social safety nets and land reforms rather than neo-liberal 
measures). That result is an open question and another matter, as long as the demo-
cratic fundamentals are not undermined. No, a substantial democracy is likely to 
be meaningful (and solid) simply because the people at large (and not just the 
elite) has both the possibility and the capacity to make use of (and improve) conven-
tional democratic principles and institutions at work, in order to handle their prob-
lems—by influencing, controlling, and participating in equal and peaceful governing 
and administration of vital sectors in their societies.
How is it possible, then, to start identifying such minimum preconditions that 
should be added to the current crafting of minimum rights and institutions in order 
to promote a democracy that makes sense? What are the rights and institutional 
mechanisms that must be both fair and applied in vital sectors of the society? And 
what kind of rights, institutions and popular capacities are needed for people to be 
both equal and capable to take part and make a difference?
This is the point when we return to the need to separate between democratic ends 
and means. The democratic principles of popular control and political equality with 
regard to collective binding decisions (among a necessarily specified ‘demos’, i.e. 
people or members) are universal in terms of the democratic aim. Their substance 
nesian democracy movement, and is now being further developed within the new—yet to 
be financed—project, based in Oslo, on Local Politics and Democratisation in Developing 
Countries (Stokke and Törnquist, 2001).
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and implementation through various means, however, are not. Hence our questions 
should be thoroughly contextualised. But since no cultural relativism is involved and 
there is a lack of space, we shall stick to the general categories.
In my own writings, I have separated the contents (in terms of the results of 
democratic decisions) and pointed to different scope (reach, extension or the sectors 
in society where they are applied) and forms (civil and political rights and institu-
tions) of democracy, as well as their preconditions in terms of other rights and 
institutions, balance of power, and citizen’s aims, strategies and capacities (Törnquist 
1999:Ch.12). To avoid unnecessary conceptual disputes, however, let us instead point 
to what should be covered, by drawing on the four basic criteria that have gained 
wide acceptance in the European discussion about ‘auditing democracy’ (Beetham 
1999). Those criteria include the application/reach and quality of the ‘conventional’ 
means to promote democratic principles of popular control and political equality, as 
well as the existence of additional conditions that are necessary to enable people to 
make use of and improve those instruments in essential sectors of society.
These ‘conventional’ means to promote democracy, according to Beetham, are, 
firstly, what used to be called free and fair elections—to which we add their sub-
stance and scope. The second instrument is open and accountable government (politi-
cally, legally, and financially)—which also requires independent public knowledge, 
movement, organisation, and government responsiveness to public opinion. Let us 
group these two instruments under the label of institutional channels.
The third instrument to promote democracy is the conventional cluster of constitu-
tional civil and political rights, including to what extent that they are real and useful 
for ordinary people. This, thus, includes thus the judicial aspect of the rule of law.
The additional fourth factor, then, is the set of extra background conditions that are 
needed to make the other factors viable—including democratic governance, not just 
of state and local governments, but also of society at large (at least civil associations). 
It would therefore be possible to promote a democratic culture as well as provide 
basic needs, social and cultural rights and education to make citizens reasonably 
self-confident. This may be labelled ‘a democratic society’.
In addition to this, then, comes the citizen’s capacity to make use of and improve 
the democratic means. This is not explicitly mentioned as a separate category in the 
writings of Beetham, but is, rather, included in the briefly mentioned background 
conditions that are needed to make the others viable. The need to pay special atten-
tion to the role of actors and politics, however, should be clear from our earlier 
discussion in this essay.
31
Chapter 4. Analytical Framework
4.1 The level of substantial democracy
To examine empirically and discuss the validity of the various contrasting proposi-
tions, a map cum yardstick is needed. Within such a model, it must be possible to 
situate various actors and propositions.
I believe that it is most fruitful to take the most ‘demanding’ thesis as a point of 
departure. This relates, then, to the alternative proposition just presented on the need 
to promote the crafting of additional social, economic and political preconditions to 
make possible substantial democracy and democratisation.
Hence, while many scholars (and activists) may not agree with this third way in 
terms of additional crafting, all of us are likely to be able to agree on what substantial 
democracy is about. So let us begin there and define what substantial democracy and 
democratisation is, and then use that as a yardstick.
Given that the vital decisions in a society are actually taken within its political 
system (and not primarily elsewhere, such as in private ‘non-political’ companies), 
what I have labelled substantial (and therefore also sustainable) democracy (in terms 
of actual political equality and popular control with respect to essential sectors of a 
given society and demos) rests with certain equally substantial rights (civil and politi-
cal), institutional mechanisms (free and fair elections plus open and accountable 
government), certain societal background-factors along each of these dimensions—
and most importantly (but not specified by Beetham)—the chances and capacity of 
citizens to make use of (and extend and improve) these rights and mechanisms to 
further their interests/instrumental aims.
Similarly, substantial democratisation implies the promotion of all this by demo-
cratic means or, if that is impossible because of repressive conditions, measures that 
neither undermine the principles of democracy nor vital democratic instruments but 
instead try to uphold them in their nascent form. An attempt is made to illustrate 
this in Figure 1.
The figure can be read in several ways. First, it includes the main elements of 
substantial democracy and democratisation—given, again, that the essential decisions 
in a society are actually taken within its political system. The latter may be ‘tested’ 
empirically by asking if the model applies with respect to the most vital issues and 
interests. (For instance, whether a serious economic crisis like that in Indonesia, 
post-Suharto, is an actual issue in parliamentary elections or not.)
Second, the lines indicate how citizens would try to promote their instrumental 
aims (such as better standard of living) if democracy (including democratic struggles 
for democracy) makes sense to them. If so, they would make their way through 
the various steps in the model. If not they would rather try to bypass them and 
find other non-democratic or even anti-democratic avenues (e.g. violent protests, 
paying or bargaining for protection and influential positions and contacts within the 
administration, government and elite circles). Obviously, there are combinations and 
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deviations, but this is where empirical studies and explanations will be most useful.
Third, in principle, pro-democrats, on the one hand, may be defined as actors who 
consistently follow, uphold, and improve democratic pathways, as well as citizens’ 
capacity to make use of them. This is in order to promote democratic principles and 
thus achieve their main aims. Under harsh conditions, moreover, they would not use 
other means, which could undermine democratic ones, and would only use force 
to uphold democratic principles such at the right to organise. Anti-democrats, on 
the other hand, would consistently try to undermine this. Finally in the middle, are 
the majority that may be labelled ‘consumers of democracy’ (as opposed to the pro-
democrats who also ‘produce’ democracy). The ‘consumers only’ include clientelist 
and bossist politicians within formal democratic frameworks, who only follow the 
pathways and principles when it suits them. What is more, they sometimes undermine 
them, often bypass them, rarely improve them, and seldom enhance citizens’ capacity 
to use them (Budiman and Törnquist, 2001).
Aim B: citizen’s instrumental
aims (and the more or less
efficient implementation of the
latter)
Aim A: The autonomy, reach, quality, and actors’ usage of
democratic aims: Popular control and political equality
regarding binding collective decisions
Means A: The autonomy, reach, quality,
and actors’ usage of civil and political
rights upheld by constitution and an
independent judiciary.
Means B: The autonomy, reach, quality,
and actors’ usage of institutional
channels (a)‘free and fair’ elections as a
basis for popular control (b) open and
accountable government according to
law.
0HDQV & 7KH DXWRQRP\ UHDFK
TXDOLW\ DQG DFWRUV· XVDJH RI D PRUH
RU OHVV democratically oriented
society LQ WHUPV RI D XQLW\ DERXW
ZKR FRQVWLWXWH WKH GHPRV DQG
E DGGLWLRQDO GHPRFUDWLFDOO\
IDYRXUDEOH LQVWLWXWLRQV
BypassBypass
       Bypass Bypass
Citizens and their capacity
to make use of and improve the
democratic means – or only ‘consume’
them and/or occasionally bypass them
Figure 1: Elements of substantial democracy/democratisation. (Full lines are ideal-type connec-
tions and dotted lines are shortcuts within the system).
4.2 The competing propositions as reflected in the model
Since the concept of substantial democracy and democratisation is not a far-fetched 
ideal, the alternative framework in Figure 1 may also be used in empirical discussions 
of the validity of the various contrasting propositions. Below, we shall first indicate 
very briefly how the major propositions, if empirically valid, would be reflected in 
the model. The next major part of the essay, then, will be the point of departure for 
empirical studies.
To begin with, the four major mainstream arguments. The first, as we may recall, 
is that radical popular development and democracy with rural dimensions breeds 
authoritarianism through Machiavellian means and tactical adaptation to democracy 
as such. In the model, this would be indicated by actors bypassing the democratic 
pathways and principles and only following them when it is opportune to do so.
The second thesis is that actual capitalist development makes prices and labour 
more important than land and rural poor, while also generating fragmentation, scat-
tered movements, and a reduction in the importance of class compared to other 
identities. In the model this would be reflected by the type and number of actors, 
their limited capacities, their main instrumental aims, and their divisive ways of 
furthering them.
The third argument, then, is about alternative policies, suggesting that it is possible 
to craft instant democracies almost irrespective of conditions, through international 
influence and by way of protection of private economic powers. This would enable 
political pacts within the elite and the promotion of basic constitutional rights and 
institutional channels including rule of law and ‘good governance’.
Similarly, the fourth thesis is that the more dense and vibrant civil society and 
social capital, the better the democracy and democratisation. In the model, these two 
arguments would translate into a clear tendency towards the generation of substantial 
democracy in the system as a whole. It would not, however, cover essential economic 
sectors of the society, as it would mainly give priority to the promotion of aspects 
of the rights- and ‘institutional channel’ boxes in the first case and the ‘democratic 
society’ box in the second.
Turning to our alternative propositions, our initial alternative argument can be 
set aside as it has already been deemed convincing: that the rural poor and radical 
leaders have been fundamental to the early pro-democracy efforts under siege.24 
Furthermore, our second initial proposition that the problems of the radical project 
are not intrinsic to their theoretical basis by rather may be improved upon may best 
be evaluated by examining empirically the validity of the additional proposals which 
often relate to such attempts at renewal, in theory and practice.
Hence, what remain are five propositions of immediate contemporary concrete 
relevance. The first is that the Left (including rural poor) mainly fight political 
monopolisation (to hit at primitive accumulation of capital) and may possibly relate 
24 See sub-section 3.1 above!
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this to democratic rather than neo-liberal aims. In the model this would be reflected, 
of course, by the actors’ instrumental aims and with their eventual linkages to demo-
cratic aims.
The second proposition, (in contrast to the second mainstream thesis) is that 
interests and movements may be fragmented, but have also come together against 
common enemies. In the model, the actor’s capacities would thus increase in con-
gruence with unifying instrumental aims—which in turn would relate to specific 
democratic aims and means.
The third and supplementary argument is that ‘actually existing’ capitalist expan-
sion undermines Left-authoritarian shortcuts, while its repressive character calls for 
pro-democratic incentives. This would be reflected in the model by a clear tendency 
by actors to consistently follow, uphold, and improve the democratic pathways as 
such, as well as citizens’ capacity to make use of them, in order to promote demo-
cratic principles and thus reach their instrumental aims.
Further, as we turn to pro-democratic policies, the fourth argument is that the 
mainstream elitist and a-historical crafting of ‘good’ rights and institutions as well 
as dense civil societies and social capital, is likely to create shallow and unsustain-
able democracies. This is because vital parts of the societal dynamics, including 
the primacy of power relations, interests, organisation, politics and ideas are set 
aside. In the model, then, this crafting would translate into little generation of 
substantial democracy, despite the promotion of specific elements in the three ‘means-
boxes’. On the contrary, a tendency to exclude essential sectors of society from the 
political system and otherwise only to ‘consume’ democracy would gain ground. 
Most dominant actors remain the same and only follow the democratic pathways 
when it is opportune, sometimes undermine them, often bypass them, rarely improve 
them and seldom enhance citizens’ capacity to use them. Hence, democracy often 
does not make much sense to common people.
The fifth and final alternative proposition is that often it is popular instrumental 
interests and politics instead that are vital factors behind the generation of civil 
society and social capital, along with their possible (but far from necessary) demo-
cratic importance. In the model, this would be reflected not just by connections 
between instrumental and democratic aims and means, but also by a clear tendency 
towards causal links primarily from ‘citizens capacity’ to ‘a democratic society’, plus 
to ‘the means in terms of ‘constitutional rights’ and ‘institutional channels’, as well 
as from those ‘rights’ and ‘channels’ to ‘a democratic society’—and only secondary 
the other way around.
4.3 Enhancing citizen’s democratic capacity through politics of 
democratisation
A fruitful and close study of the fifth proposition calls for additional analytical tools. 
What are the dynamics and problems of citizens’ capacity to make use of, improve 
and expand democratic means to reach democratic as well as instrumental aims?The 
first tentative answer, of course, is that this rests with the given socio-economic 
conditions. For instance, there may not be any reasonably unified classes similar to 
peasants who together fought their landlords. The mainstream thesis may be right 
about socio-economic fragmentation. This may generate a lot of scattered movements 
and interests, as well as identity rather than class politics.
Another obvious response is to point to unfavourable political opportunities. Repres-
sion and disorganisation is likely to matter (like that of Indonesia that lasted for more 
than thirty years). Also one has to consider the impact of various political institu-
tions, such as the proposition among several NGOs to introduce simple-majority 
elections in single-member constituencies. This may favour the major established 
political parties, and/or bosses with (political) machines, at the expense of efforts to 
build new parties or coalitions just like in the Philippines, for example.
There is much to this. We must learn from the huge discussion about social move-
ments and political opportunities. Political opportunity refers to the relative openness 
or closure of the political system, the stability of alignments among dominating 
groups, the possibilities for movements to associate with sections of the elite, and the 
risks of harsh repression (e.g. McAdam 1996).
To be able to discuss fruitfully the relevance of those factors we must select empiri-
cal cases with significant variations. To what extent does it matter if there are more 
or less favourable social structures, more or less repression and disorganisation, and 
different forms of representation, for instance?
But we must also be able to consider how and whether the dynamics of citizens’ 
democratic capacity relate to the actors’ politics of democratisation, i.e. how the 
actors read and are able to read, manage, and alter the political opportunities (which 
partly, in turn, reflect the socio-economic conditions). This calls for rather elaborate 
analytical instruments
4.4 Reading the political opportunities
To begin with, then, it is essential to ask how actors understand political opportuni-
ties or at least react to them. For all practical purposes this calls for enquiry into 
their preferred terrain of struggle. The very essence is the location and extension of 
political space. So where in the political terrain do actors position themselves—given 
the structure of political opportunity and the discussion among actors on how to 
read and relate to it? To answer, we need to imagine the political terrain and draw a 
map. An attempt is made in Figure 2.
The framework: state, business and self-management
The political terrain has three structural bases. These are the major and often overlap-
ping ways in which societal activity is organised on the central as well as local level: 
state & government, business units (from small farms to big corporations) and self-
government & management. The latter include voluntary neighbourhood manage-
ment associations and non-profit foundations or co-operatives and other forms of 
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what might be called ‘civil management’, but ethnic and religious communities, clans, 
and families with similar functions as well. In Figure 2, these structural bases are 
indicated by the big circles on both the central and local level. Of course there are 
connections and overlaps. In the figure, these are indicated by the channels between 
the circles—within as well as between the central and local level.
State
Business units
Self-governmentunits
Civil societies
State
Business units
Self-governmentunits
Political societies
Political/civil societies
Civil societies
CENTRAL
LOCAL
Political societies
Political/civil societies
Figure 2: The political terrain for action.
The public sphere and political, civil and civil-political societies
The point is, then, that our actors must relate to these basic structures and channels. 
How do they work within them, including at their workplaces but also when elected 
into a local government council or a co-operative committee? And how do they try 
to impact upon them from outside?
The latter especially is usually done by way of activities in the public sphere. 
In totalitarian societies this is minimal, of course, but elsewhere it has developed 
between (and partly also within)25 the basic structures and channels, usually as part 
of democratisation. The activities themselves are usually facilitated by different move-
ments and associations, including political parties, pressure groups, trade unions, 
and networks.
Here we may also acknowledge, firstly, that some actors simply can not be active 
inside but have to (or anyway prefer to) stay outside the officially recognised ‘system’, 
at times even illegally and underground. In Figure 2 this possibility is indicated 
with shades. Secondly we need to separate between political, civil, and civil-political 
societies.
Political societies mainly try to influence directly state and government, on the 
central as well as local level (and in-between). With Linz and Stepan, this is the arena 
within which polity is elaborated that controls public power and administration. This 
is where political parties and lobbying groups are active, for example, as well as other 
networks (including clientelist ones) that have greater or lesser degrees of formality.
Civil societies are actually existing associations, not just the ideal ‘civic and free 
and non-primordial’ ones of many normative theories. In terms of politics, civil socie-
ties only affect indirectly state and government. Primarily they relate to business or 
self-management units. Trade unions or peasant farmers’ organisations, for instance, 
tend to relate primarily to business units, employers, landlords and so on. Human 
rights groups in support of victims of violence, may relate to self- management units 
such as an independent legal aid bureau. Study circles may link up with a collective 
library. Religious movements may be close to various churches.
Civil-political societies, finally, combine or link the activities that relate to state, 
on the on hand, and business or self-management, on the other. One example would 
be a labour movement that includes a party as well as broad trade unions, youth 
and women groups, and co-operatives. Another example is human-rights groups that 
both support victims of violence and try to influence related state policies. A third 
case is peasant farmer’s movements that do not just fight landlords on their own but 
also campaign for state led land reforms.
Generally, in each country, district, and specific case, there is a huge debate, on 
how to interpret the structure of political opportunity and what conclusions one 
should draw as to where in the political terrain it is most fruitful to be active, given 
ones ideal and instrumental aims. But before we consider this, let us also try to 
conceptualise what the actors do, given their positions in the terrain.
25 For instance when (as in Sweden and Norway) all state and government documents are 
public, when not classified for special reasons.
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4.5 Politicisation
How do the actors go about their work? We have to consider two major dimensions. 
One refers to what kind of issues and interests they choose to bring up on the 
political agenda or politicise. The other is about how they try to mobilise support 
behind those ideas and interests by getting people politically involved and organised, 
or in other words politicised.
There is a lack of sharp analytical tools to handle this. On the basis of a Marxist-
oriented understanding of civil society and democracy, Peter Gibbon has succinctly 
suggested some exciting propositions that may serve as a point of departure. Modern 
civil society primarily reflects the ‘bourgeois’ social division of labour with its indi-
vidualised and privatised entities. The plurality of groupings created is not likely 
by itself to promote general interests and democratic forms of government. On the 
contrary, the associations may turn into prisoners of the process through the deepen-
ing of civil society, and become unable to combine single issues, specific interests, 
different localities, and associations through politicisation (Gibbon 1998).
This way of conceptualising politicisation, however, is slightly normative and 
general. One should not, for instance, rule out politicisation through development-
oriented civil society organisations. And just like pluralism, politicisation is not a suf-
ficient recipe for democratisation, as recently demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia, 
and earlier when carried out with the very best of intentions within the framework of 
various socialist projects. There is a need for qualifications and specifications.
Politicisation of interests and ideas
The interests and issues that actors focus on are fundamental, of course, and consti-
tute the point of departure. They signal what kind of propelling social forces, such as 
class, that various movements relate to—as well as for what purposes democratisation 
makes sense (given that we analyse democratically oriented actors). At this stage, 
however, we limit ourselves to the broad and general categories that may later on 
guide contextual specifications.
First, there are the kind of ideas and/or interests around which people come 
together and which they consider in a societal perspective. Here we may distinguish 
between, on the one hand, single issues and/or specific interests, and on the other 
hand ideologies and/or collective interests. For example, the first category is often 
(but not always) linked to cause oriented movements, lobby, and pressure groups 
as well as craft- or factory based unions. The second, on the other hand, is associ-
ated, for instance, with parties based on societal conflicts and visions of how to 
handle them as well as large sector-based unionism. Whilst I previously thought 
that when analysing democracy-oriented movements it would be possible to avoid a 
special category for ideological thinking based on moral and spiritual values linked 
to communal loyalties and symbolic personalities, Abdurrahman Wahid et al. in 
Indonesia have revealed my naivety, so that category has now been added.
• Single issues or specific interests
• Ideology or collective interests
• Moral and spiritual values and communal loyalties.
Finally, of course, these different types of politicisation of issues and interests are 
then carried out by various actors positioned in different parts of the political terrain. 
For instance, some may lobby the central government for special social security 
systems, while others try to negotiate specific benefits from factory owners, and yet 
others promote co-operative self help schemes among labourers.
Politicisation of people
Politics, essentially, is about people coming together to decide on what should be 
held in common by all citizens (not just by members of various associations) and 
how this could be governed jointly. So, given the chosen arenas of operation for the 
actors, and the kinds of politicisation of ideas and interests that they give priority to, 
how do they try to involve people in politics by bringing them together and politicis-
ing them through mobilisation and organisation? This may be operationalised in 
three steps.
To begin with, of course, political inclusion is related to Sidney Tarrow’s (1994) 
‘mobilisation structures’. But especially in third world contexts, we should start with 
a wider perspective. First—and in general accordance with Nicos Mouzelis (1986)—it 
is possible to distinguish historically between the integration of people into politics 
on the basis of relatively autonomous broad popular movements generated by com-
prehensive economic development (like in many parts of Western Europe), and 
the elitist incorporation of people with less solid organisations of their own into 
comparatively advanced polities in economically late-developing societies (like in 
the Balkans and many third world countries).
Second, and again following Mouzelis, one may separate between two different but 
not mutually exclusive ways of incorporating people: clientelism and populism. The 
concept of clientelism is not confined to Weber-inspired ideas of patrimonialism, 
but is more general and associated with what one may call patrons or bosses on 
different levels with their own capacity to deliver some protection, in return for 
services and votes. This, as we know from the Philippines and Indonesia, may well be 
combined with shallow democratisation. The main difference between patrons and 
bosses is that the former may still, to some extent, be related to patron-clientelism 
and more reciprocal and benevolent relations, while bosses’ patronage may actually 
be protection against some of their own oppression.26 In some cases clientelism is 
also ‘modernised’ in the form of state dominated corporatist representation (as was 
attempted in Suharto’s Indonesia by reformist ICMI).27 Populism, on the other hand, 
generally involves charismatic leaders like the Philippines’ Estrada or Indonesia’s 
26 For a fine analysis of bossism, see Sidel (1999)
27 Not to be confused with Scandinavian social-corporatism, now largely defunct.
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Megawati who are able to express popular feelings and ideas, and sometimes, but 
not necessarily, interests. Their positions are essential to the stability of adjoining 
leaders and their ability to patronise followers. In addition to this, political leaders 
aiming to integrate people into politics have often tried shortcuts by adding elements 
of clientelism and populism—thus usually ending up with extreme elements of incor-
poration—which we may label alternative patronage. One obvious example is the 
attempt by the Philippine ‘popular democrats’ to gain from rallying behind Joseph 
Estrada. A more successful case is the West Bengal communists, who exchanged 
protection of small and ‘middle peasant farmers’ for votes and meanwhile, from top 
down, introduced extensive and efficient democratic decentralisation. We may also 
add the example of many development-oriented NGOs that offer alternative external 
support to people, thus giving them a chance to act more independently, but usually 
cannot sustain the initial dynamics.
Third, one may distinguish, in accordance with Sidney Tarrow (1994), between two 
basic methods of trying to integrate people into politics: one emphasises autonomous 
collective action and the other focuses on the internalisation of actions and move-
ments in organisation with some leadership. The key-factor is the ‘mobilisation 
structure’ that helps movements to co-ordinate and persist over time by linking the 
‘centre’, in terms of formally organised leadership identifying aims and means, and 
the ‘periphery’, in terms of the collective action in the field. Historically, according 
to Tarrow, there have been two kinds of solutions. One is to trust people’s natural 
and spontaneous willingness and ability to resist repression and exploitation through 
linked networks and federations of autonomous associations (in reality, however, 
through instigating organic leaders as spearheads)—like the Indonesian students. 
Another is to stress the need for political ideology, organisation and intervention 
through integrated structures of parties, unions and self-help organisations (which 
in reality may hamper dynamic collective action)—like the reformist Kerala com-
munists. In the West those have often been rooted in anarchist and democratic 
socialist thinking, respectively.28 To avoid biased connotations, we shall instead talk 
of networks and organised integration. Finally, as far as I can see, a greater or lesser 
degree of networking and organised integration may well be combined.
Types of politicisation
In conclusion, let us combine the kind of issues and interests that actors bring up 
on the political agenda with how they try to mobilise support—to thus arrive at 
a typology of politicisation, as illustrated in Figure 3. Vertically are the different 
kinds of ideas and interests; horizontally are the various ways of mobilising people. 
Within the major categories of the latter, it is not a question of either/or but of a 
continuum. Incorporation varies between combinations of greater or lesser degrees of 
populism and clientelism. The same is true of integration with regard to networks and 
28 In the “anarchist” solutions Tarrow also includes, for example, syndicalism and guild social-
ism; in the second he includes European Christian Democracy—and one could add reformist 
communist patterns.
organised integration. Alternative patronage varies between greater or lesser aspects 
of incorporation and integration.
Within this typology one may map many of the experiences from different cases 
and contexts (as well as more general third world discussions). But for the typology 
to really make sense, one must analyse the types of politicisation within the spaces 
of the political terrain that the actors have given priority to. Thereby we may get an 
answer to both ‘where’ and ‘how’.
Recalling Figure 2, imagine that the actors (and their transformation over time) are 
identified within the political terrain, and then apply Figure 3 to characterise what 
each actor does, over time.
4.6 Disputed propositions as reflected in the framework of 
politics of democratisation
It is difficult to identify a mainstream scholarly-academic debate about this. The most 
interesting propositions are from among activist-scholars and self-critical ‘organic 
intellectuals’ in the field. Because of lack of time and space, I will just identify 
five major general arguments that later on will be related to various actors in our 
empirical contexts and cases.
(1) According to the class-party proposition, a particularly important factor in 
the continued occurrence of problems is the neglect of political organisation and 
class-based ideology. Most democracy-oriented activists, it is argued, are lost and 
fragmented in NGOs and other civil organisations. These relate primarily to self-
government units and bet on single issues and rather innocent questions, which 
the middle class may well have time to discuss, but which are not vital for the 
subordinated majority of the population.
Rather, it is recommended, one must build broad civil-political societies on the basis 
of organised integration of people, class interests and ideology. When such organisa-
tions are present, they need to be reinvigorated. When they have been eliminated 
(like in Indonesia), their fundamental ideas must be propagated and demonstrated. 
Mobilisation
Ideas/interests Incorporation Alternative Patronage Integration
Single issues/
specific interests
Populism<—–>Clientelism Incorporation<––>Integration Networks<–>Organised integration
Ideology/
collective interests
Populism<—–>Clientelism Incorporation<––>Integration Networks<–>Organised integration
Values/communal
loyalties
Populism<—–>Clientelism Incorporation<––>Integration Networks<–>Organised integration
Figure 3: Politicisation of interests, ideas, and people.
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When such organisations are present but non-democratic one may try to reform 
them or build new ones.
(2) Turning to the pragmatic argument, problems are instead due to a lack of 
realism and presence within the system. Unfortunately, it is stated, democrats avoid the 
centre of power—which must be shaken up, redirected and made use of—and prefer 
what is labelled unrealistically principled, radical ideas and organisation. Moreover, 
some of the self-critical pragmatists themselves add cynically, that democratic dis-
sidents are hopelessly lost when it comes to mass organising.
Hence, one thesis is that the dissidents should gain as much influence as possible 
within the elite and avoid mingling with uneducated masses who are often attracted 
and misled by authoritarian doctrines and leaders. A partly different argument is 
that leading democrats should make their way to the top by drawing on the ‘tra-
ditional’ clientelist and populist clout of certain leaders. Both tendencies agree, 
however, that there is rather substantial space for intervention and change within 
the mainstream—within certain organs of the state, governments, expert committees, 
parties, universities, think tanks, socio-religious organisations and so on. Thus one 
can reform old policies, divide the elite, mediate somewhat better pacts, and craft 
improved rules of the game. Why shout in the street or lobby in vain if one can draw 
on activists outside and then change from within?
(3) The grassroots thesis, on the contrary, emphasises the lack of extensive civil 
associations and well anchored popular movements for real changes on the local 
level. The politically most active democrats, it is argued, often neglect this and focus 
on the centre, the state, and the elite.
The recommendation is that fragmentation and lack of political influence can only 
be fought if there is a solid alternative and democratic base. There are two major 
ways of going about this. One tendency, primarily among liberal oriented NGOs, 
is to emphasise the general extension and strengthening of civil societies and self-
management in addition to decentralisation of the political system, to thus build a 
democratic local culture. Another proposition, which is more common among radical 
groups and activists, is to stress the organising of people in relation to various key 
interests, including via unions at their workplaces, and ideas of how to develop their 
villages and areas, again in relation to democratic decentralisation.
(4) The liberal-left political-market thesis is another pragmatic one. But here the 
argument is that all the other propositions are unrealistic in terms of politics of 
democratisation because none of them makes sense in elections and in terms of 
democratic governance. This, the adherents continue, explains the fragmentation and 
the lack of political influence among the democratic activists. The first thesis, it is 
argued, is partly right and partly wrong, and anyway too radical and long-term. The 
second can be applied but is too elitist and restricted, thus often limiting democracy 
severely. The third is right in principle but too radical when one has to strike deals 
and form broad alliances. Hence it does not make sense in elections and in terms 
of generating alternative governance. It is necessary to attract the votes of many 
more than (at best) the activists themselves, and then to govern for all. Hence, the 
adherents of the forth proposition conclude, there is no need to exclude the other 
political tendencies but to form a popularly attractive political vehicle (for instance a 
generally progressive catch all party) that can bring them together, since it is the logic 
of liberal, representative, electoral democracies that counts.
(5) The extra-parliamentary militant network proposition is that the popular poten-
tial is contained by rigid structures and ideas, both in terms of the established politi-
cal and administrative system and the conventional forms of protest and organising. 
Hence there is a need for groundbreaking interventions—near the centre of power 
but not inside. Networking and often militant activists should be in the forefront to 
pave the way and get people to understand the ‘real’ conflicts as well as possibilities.
It remains to be seen to what extent these propositions make sense—and if alterna-
tive and more powerful patterns (in terms of description and explanation) emerge 
when the framework is now applied empirically.
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Chapter 5. Cases, Design and Sources
What is the most fruitful way of bringing the nine competing propositions regarding 
democratisation in section 4.2 above to empirical test as well as venturing into the 
more specific problems of citizen’s democratic capacity in relation to the five major 
and general arguments in section 4.6?
Since the late eighties and thereafter, I opted for a series of repeated case studies 
in three selected contexts where I had some earlier experiences. To begin with, 
these contexts had to represent predominant types of social, economic and political 
preconditions in the third world. To minimise the risk for straw man arguments, 
moreover, these also had to be critical cases where the mainstream theses seemed to 
be valid—but yet could be challenged (in a way that I shall return to a few paragraphs 
ahead).
The first context, therefore, was the Philippines, Asia’s Latin America and one of 
the showcases of pro-democratic middle class uprisings. This uprising had a profound 
impact on the previously strong and well established Maoist and rural based left 
wing movements, which as a consequence became almost irrelevant. Also in the late 
eighties, new radical popular and democratic movements, that I predicted would gain 
ground, began to emerge.29
The second empirical framework was economically dynamic, but politically repres-
sive, Indonesia. Here the established argument was that capitalist modernisation and 
slow ‘liberation’ of the middle class was the only realistic way to change. Meanwhile 
the old popular movements had been eliminated and new ones were only just begin-
ning to occur. Despite this, my prediction was that mass based democracy would 
anyway become the key issue, and not just in the urban centres.30
The third context, finally, was the Indian State of Kerala. This is probably the major 
show case of the few stable democracies that have grown out of national liberation 
movements and consistent land reforms in the face of powerful resistance. By the 
eighties, however, much pointed to a crisis of the model in general and the old Left 
(with rural roots) in particular. In spite of this, my hypothesis was that a renewed 
radical and often rurally rooted popular and democratic movement was about to 
emerge and would become the most promising and significant alternative.31
Within these contexts, then, through equally theoretically critical case studies, I 
would focus on the kind of actors and processes that, according to the mainstream 
theses, should not become significantly pro-democratic—and would argue that there 
were in fact good reasons to suggest otherwise. In other words: the existence of Left 
oriented popular movements which did not reject Marx and class nor excluded the 
rural poor by only giving priority to labour and/or middle classes.
In the Philippines therefore, I focused on three new attempts: one by the legendary 
founding father of the New People’s Army, Bernabe ‘Dante’ Buscayno; another by 
29 For the initial hypotheses and research design, see Törnquist (1990, 1990a, and 1990b).
30 For the initial hypotheses and research design, see Törnquist (1984a and 1990b)
31 For the initial hypotheses and research design, see Törnquist (1987 and 1990b)
the similarly rural but also more middle class and civil society oriented ‘popular 
democrats’ with revisionist Maoist leaders in the forefront; a third by a coalition 
of revisionist communists, radical socialists and Maoists that bet more on gaining 
ground by reforming and participating in the democratic institutions, including elec-
tions. In Indonesia, the entry point was a follow up on what came out of various 
radical movements that related themselves to a major rural conflict over land in 
Kedung Ombo, Central Java. In Kerala, the focus was on the attempts by radical 
leftists, mainly communists, to renew the radical political development project by 
way of initiating popular and rural rooted civil alternatives through the People’s 
Science Movement (KSSP)—this through co-operation rather than rejection of the 
government, political parties and various interest based organisations.
Among each of these actors, sources included interviews with (when possible) the 
same leading activists and key informants over time (between 40 and 50 in each 
context, plus additional activists and informants), supplemented by related docu-
ments, news clippings and relevant research literature. My visits were usually all too 
brief, but they were fairly numerous. Hence, it has been a privilege to be able to 
follow several of the activists and their discussions on relevant issues for more than 
ten years. In each case, I asked for their ‘best’ cases of pro-democratic efforts—to 
thereafter be able to carry studies that were as critical as possible without being 
‘unfair’. Further, I have often relied on self-critical evaluations by leading actors who, 
when in confidence (but not secret) accept and point to problems in their own ‘pet 
projects’, that tend to be much more reliable than inherently critical opponents.
Finally, there is a step-wise logic to the comparisons. As theorising within this field 
is weak, the point of departure is the contrasting of different key processes, attempts, 
and conditions (Skocpol and Somers, 1989). In relation to the specific theses, then, 
the comparisons are based on both standard methods. When analogous outcomes 
need to be examined, it is possible to compare similar attempts under very different 
conditions to identify common factors. When different outcomes shall be explored, 
historical perspectives in each of the contexts and cases may be employed.
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Chapter 6. Operationalisations or Expected 
Contextual Outcomes
Given these contexts and processes, what are the indicators (in terms of likely 
outcomes) that one can focus upon in a discussion about the pros and cons of the 
mainstream and alternative propositions and arguments on how to enhance citizens’ 
democratic potential? From section 4 above, we know the general characteristics of 
the models, but what are the rough equivalents in reality?32
In the Philippine framework, the mainstream expectations are that the Left, unable 
to renew itself in a consistent democratic direction, would again become significant, 
especially in relation to the rural scene and land reform. Further, urban workers 
might gain some importance, but otherwise there would be many, diverse and scat-
tered movements and organisations and few signs of class loyalties. The middle class 
based process and crafting of democratisation from 1986 onwards, however, would 
be expected to generate more substantial and stable democracy, especially by way of 
decentralisation and the promotion of civil society.
If, on the other hand, the alternative propositions make sense, it is true that one 
would not anticipate a renewal of the old Maoist Left unless it revised its basic 
analysis. Those who were prepared to do so, however, would come a long way and 
give emphasis to the struggle against politically facilitated monopolisation as part of 
primitive accumulation, possibly relating this to demands for democratisation. Such 
efforts would make sense for a former Maoist guerrilla leader among his old peasant 
followers. Further, there would be ‘objective’ incentives for unified action among 
the many various groups. They would then opt for democratic means. Increasingly 
ecumenical leftists (from liberal social democrats to former Leninists and Maoists) 
would even combine the promotion of democracy with their instrumental aims of 
sustaining and expanding human rights, as well as ‘formally democratic’ ways of 
influencing the system. The middle class crafting of democracy, however, would 
largely be a failure, not making much sense to the common people and mainly 
nourishing atomised civil societies and ‘consumers’ of democracy, including local 
bosses.
Furthermore, if the class-party proposition made sense we would expect successful 
rebuilding of the Maoist organisations. Flourishing work within the series of post-
Marcos government would indicate that the pragmatic argument is vindicated. Suc-
cessful attempts to boost democratisation through the extensive NGO network and 
often related popular organisations would testify to the relevance of the grassroots 
thesis. The liberal-left market thesis, then, would be supported by success for the new 
People’s Action Party (Akbayan), which fits broadly within this line of thinking, and 
aspects of the militant network proposition may be indicated by the dynamics and 
effects of the ‘people power’ revolutions.
32 For the early formulations, see Törnquist (1990b).
In Indonesia, the mainstream theses would translate into predictions that, while 
the Left and the radical (and especially rural based) popular movements are outmoded 
history (and would anyway have ‘continued’ to be non-democratic), rapid socio-
economic development from the late-60s and onwards would either generate middle 
class democracy through a stronger civil society (within which industrial labour, 
as against other subordinate classes, would also gain influence), or demands from 
above, “within the system", for more efficient regulations, rule of law and meritocracy, 
and less corruption. Further, we may now add the sudden change in thinking among 
the mainstream scholars at the end of May 1998, whereafter they predicted that it 
would be possible with international support to craft a functioning and sustainable 
democracy within just a few years.33
If the alternative propositions proved right, however, demands for democracy would 
not be restricted to some middle class civil society groups and reformists ‘within the 
system’. In fact, most of them would be rather co-opted and isolated. Despite the lack 
of liberal conditions and opportunities that most theorists see as necessary precondi-
tions, the potentially powerful democratic forces would instead emerge among broad 
sections of the population, including peasant farmers and workers, all of whom were 
suffering from political and state promoted primitive accumulation. Corruption and 
human rights violations, for instance, would not just be a middle class issue but 
also something that related to the ways in which capitalists and managers controlled 
the economy, subordinated their labourers and appropriated the surplus. Within 
the extremely authoritarian framework of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime, therefore, 
the issue of democracy, in terms of popular control and governance of common 
resources, might even either generate radical systemic critique, or set off extreme 
privatisation and deregulation. The new movements would be very scattered, but 
increasingly unified against political monopolisation and democratisation (whether 
related to liberal, social democratic or reformist-communist groups). Finally, we may 
now also add our alternative prediction from mid-1998, that the sudden introduction 
of crafting of instant democracy would largely fail and instead nourish fragmentation, 
political violence and various ‘consumers’ of democracy, including local bosses.
Moreover, the class-party proposition would be supported by forceful attempts at 
building new and radical socialist parties, the validity of pragmatic argument may 
be discussed through analyses of work in relation to Megawati and Abdurrahman 
Wahid (among others), and the grassroots thesis would be vindicated by successful 
pro-democratic NGO-activism. The liberal-left political-market thesis, then, may be 
evaluated by the efforts at building political vehicles behind Megawati and the so-
called PAN-party of Amien Rais, whilst the militant network proposition would be 
evaluated by analysis of the student movement.
In Kerala, finally, (not forgetting that its underdeveloped economy should not, as 
it were, have produced a democratic polity in the first place) one major expectation 
from the mainstream theses would be that the long and outstanding importance of 
33 For the early formulations (in addition to Törnquist (1990b), see Törnquist (1997).
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Leftist politics would diminish after the land reform. Also, further democratisation 
could be expected to occur primarily in the southern areas where market middle 
class, civil society (and partially labour) driven modernisation was most important.
If the alternative propositions proved correct, on the other hand, the tendencies 
would be of a similar kind as in the Philippines and Indonesia, but, of course, 
less drastic. One likely trend following the land reform34 would be increasing focus 
on the control of various resources (such as inputs) beyond land as such, through 
which it would be possible to appropriate surplus indirectly through the market. This 
would then spur co-operation among real producers in terms of joint management 
of, for instance, irrigation, the buying of inputs, and the marketing of their products. 
There would also be more need for co-operation among fragmented labour (rural 
and urban) organisations against mobile capital—which would call for democratic, 
political co-ordination among the former and negotiations and pacts on their part. 
Finally, therefore, democratic governance on both local and central levels would 
become the new main issue after the preceding struggle over fixed resources such 
as land. And all this would actually be propelled and lead by reform-minded com-
munists in increasingly wide co-operation with other radicals, even liberals—with 
one foot in the independent civil associations’ camp and the other in that of the old 
leftist parties, unions and peasant farmer movements.
Finally, the class-party proposition is related to the efforts to sustain the traditional 
communist party politics and the pragmatic argument to attempts at furthering democ-
ratisation from within the state and government. The grassroots thesis, on the other 
hand, should primarily be evaluated through the extensive work of activist organisa-
tions such as the People’s Science Movement (KSSP) while the liberal-left political 
market thesis may be discussed in terms of the fate of the reformists related to the 
communist parties. (The militant network proposition has only played a minor role 
in Kerala.)
Changes over time: The rough indicators above in the form of contrasting expected 
outcomes are mainly from the early nineties, when the project started. As things 
changed (and indeed it is not just in Indonesia where much has been turned upside 
down) supplementary predictions were added as were further developed analytical 
tools. But the original indicators have remained basic, both as a matter of principle 
and because they have been quite fruitful. Hence, we may return to the supplementary 
indicators, theses and analytical tools along the road, as we begin to tell the story 
and are confronted with new developments and challenges.
So let us then (finally) turn to the exciting stories in each context! What happened? 
What arguments have been proved right? What new insights have been gained? 
Given the limited space available, we must be brief. The Philippine results will be 
summarised as a reference case. More will be said of Indonesia and Kerala. The rural 
dimensions are most central to the Kerala case.
34 The least inconsistent in India; mainly concluded in the seventies. 
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Chapter 7. Fresh Ideas but Uphill Tasks in 
Muddy Philippine Waters35
7.1 A mainstream showcase
There is no doubt: the mainstream thesis is entirely correct—as far as the major 
and primarily rural-based part of the Philippine Left, the Maoist-led NDs (‘national 
democrats’) and their New Peoples Army are concerned. They have never come to 
terms with democracy.
 36 As previously noted, they swiftly lost the initiative after 
rejecting the idea of fighting Marcos by way of ‘liberal’ democratisation. The basic 
argument was (and is) that even the best possible political and economic liberalisa-
tion would not be enough to alter the fundamental relations of power. Politicians, 
administrators and so-called bureaucratic capitalists did not have any real bases 
of power of their own which could be hit at by way of political democratisation. 
They continued instead to rely on the more powerful imperialists, compradors, and 
landlords whose private sources of power needed to be tackled head on by other 
means. Social and economic inequalities would prevent most people from voting 
in accordance with their own interests. But even if more progressive people were 
elected, they would not have access to many resources and almost no room for 
manoeuvre. Besides using elections for propaganda purposes and some horse-trading, 
one must therefore, the argument continued, hold on to extra-parliamentary and 
often armed struggles against landlords, capitalists and other fundamental enemies. 
Also, this required, of course, rather authoritarian but still enlightened leadership—at 
the expense of democratic principles within the movement as well as co-operation 
on equal terms with other progressive movements. Little of this changed over the 
years, except that the NDs did not repeat their historical blunder ten years later, in 
2001, when another not very democratic president (Estrada) was toppled in another 
popular uprising (‘EDSA 2’). Rather, they tried to make tactical use of the new 
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s need for organised popular support.
Also supporting the mainstream theses: the democracy movement was rarely rural 
but mainly urban and middle class-based, comprising everything from liberal (and 
politically marginalised) businessmen, local bosses, and religious leaders to radical 
NGOs and students. Peaceful mass demonstrations and protests against massive 
electoral rigging incapacitated the military and brought down the Marcos regime. 
Corazon Aquino became the new president. Economic and political liberties were 
saluted. The fragile new government survived a series of attempted coups. Liberalisa-
35 For more extensive reports from the case studies over time, see Törnquist (1990a), (1993), 
and (1998a). (No report was published from the field studies in 1998 due to commitments 
regarding the transitions in Indonesia.). (I’m particularly indebted to co-operation with Randolf 
David, Karina Constantino-David, and Joel Rocamora, as well as with several other scholars-
cum-activists related to the three groups of actors that I have followed.)
36 For a comprehensive analysis, see Törnquist (1990).
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tion and decentralisation were introduced. Even most of Marcos’ supporters followed 
suit. His former chief of the constabulary, Fidel Ramos, was elected president in 1992 
and managed to partially reform and stabilise both politics and economics by hanging 
on to global structural adjustment as well as some of the then successful East Asian 
Tigers’ need to expand in less developed countries (such as the Philippines). When 
subsequent elected president Joseph Estrada abused his powers and responsibilities, 
the middle class defended the second and third pillars of democracy (in addition to 
free and fair elections): constitutional rules and rights plus open and accountable 
government. And while the mainstream predication of increasing socio-economic and 
political diversity (as against unified classes) also seems to have been vindicated, the 
‘actually existing’ civil society (from chambers of commerce and religious groups to 
radical NGOs and actions groups) has been extended and often played a significant 
democratic role.
7.2 Shallow middle class democracy
But that was the rosy picture only. Below the surface things are different. Many 
radical pro-democratic NGOs and popular movements that had contributed to the 
undermining of the Marcos regime lost ground almost immediately. Constitutional 
changes paved the way for the return of ‘cacique democracy’. (Anderson 1988) Of 
course, much of its old socio-economic basis is falling apart, but new solid forms 
are failing to appear. Even today the polity continues to be almost a caricature 
of the individualising, personality-oriented and ideology resistant American settler-
democracy—which was exported to the former US colony and was then conformed 
with and taken advantage of by feudal-like clans and bosses. The widely esteemed 
middle-class democratisation still has no solid foundation, including reasonably clear-
cut representation of different interests and ideas of societal change. The presidential 
position as well as most of the nationally elected senate is decorated with various 
personalities (from comedians, film stars and basketball players to strong men and 
generals, and crown princes and princesses of political dynasties), usually with roots 
in the most densely populated parts of the country. Meanwhile, modified patronage 
and political machines remain important in the elections of congressmen (represent-
ing various constituencies), governors, and mayors. Also, vote-buying and electoral 
rigging are most frequent at this level. After Marcos’ god-father-rule, and with the 
new decentralisation, local elections have in fact become critical. Many bosses give 
priority to their own basic fiefdoms.37
Hence, in terms of the basic elements of democracy (outlined in our model 1), 
the most vital issues are often avoided in elections that are not very fair and only 
free for people with goons, guns and gold. There are all kinds of cheating and those 
37 For the best analysis of Philippine bossism and its dubious relation to democracy under 
primitive accumulation, see Sidel (1999), and, e.g. Lacaba (1995); for regular mapping and 
analyses, see the reviews and electoral analyses by the Institute for Popular Democracy.
lacking resources rarely stand a chance to compensate by forming political organisa-
tions as these seldom make sense in one-man constituencies. The government and 
administration is formally open and accountable but ‘by tradition’ major sources for 
primitive accumulation of capital remain. The optimistic view is that the ousting of 
Estrada points to the rise of ‘modern’ dominating classes with less need of politics 
to make fast bucks than rule of law and legitimacy to sustain what they have already 
gained. But even so, and even if supported by the IMF and the West in general, they 
are surrounded by bosses and short of Estrada’s broad popular following. Constitu-
tional rights are largely in place and civil and political life is vibrant, but it does not 
mean very much for the majority of the population. While the upper classes wall their 
residential areas, political violence is widespread and mainly privatised. By regional 
standards, the society at large is comparatively liberal and there are many democratic 
civil organisations. However, most of the ‘actually existing’ civil society reflects the 
combination of religiously backed liberalism, commercialism, and feudal-like bossism. 
In brief, then, the dominating groups generally adapt to and ‘consume’ democracy, 
while also, ‘when necessary’, bypassing and even undermining major democratic 
pathways. Meanwhile ordinary citizens mainly serve as spectators without a real 
chance to improve and make use of the democratic institutions autonomously. The 
only exception seems to be protest voting against really ‘bad rulers’ (such as Marcos).
Interestingly, this is not the kind of ‘illiberal’ democracy that various scholars 
talked of when authoritarian rulers adapted to formal electoral frameworks (Bell et.al. 
1995). I would rather label it a ‘laissez-faire democracy’—where almost everything is 
possible, for the resourceful.
A final and major consequence is instability. For a few years under Ramos some 
political steadiness emerged. In the 1995 elections, several of the dominant local 
candidates even ran unopposed. With a combination of weak idea cum interest-
based parties and organisations, new elitist horse-trading and finally some economic 
growth, there was simply no fertile soil for any powerful opposition. But this was 
temporary. In the longer perspective there is vacillation between briefly popular 
but shallow democratisation on the one hand and often populist but authoritarian 
tendencies on the other: By 1986, the middle class was deprived of its electoral 
victory and thus gained mass support against Marcos’ authoritarianism. An entire 
world was thrilled, but the outcome under Corazon Aquino was the resurrection of 
the traditional elitist-cum-boss democracy, and under Fidel Ramos additional and 
more efficient structural adjustment. In the next presidential elections, therefore, 
populist and semi-nationalist Joseph Estrada could benefit from people’s frustrations 
and win a landslide victory. But the outcome was misgovernance and abuse of public 
resources. So in early 2001, the undermining of another pillar of democracy paved 
the way for another middle class cum business led revolt—which may not necessarily 
be sustainable. The only other major difference from 1986 was that Estrada had not 
(yet) lost as much mass support as had Marcos—and that this was compensated 
for by the massive mobilisation of the major parts of the radical Left that had not 
stubbornly invested in Estrada’s populism but finally learnt the lesson to defend 
constitutional democracy, some by principle, others for tactical reasons. 38
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7.3 A renewal-oriented Left
In the early 1990s, however, renewal-oriented popular organisations and movements 
began to address issues seriously that in turn put more consistent democratisation 
than the rootless middle class democracy on the agenda. One reason for this was 
that the once dominant NDs were in a serious crisis, ideologically, strategically, and 
militarily.39 In face of the 1992 elections most NDs were not yet prepared to risk 
full-scale disintegration by stepping outside of the old fold. Only certain leaders 
within the open sections of the movement tried to stress important issues, to bet on 
‘electoral education’ and to endorse ‘progressive candidates.40 But the crisis within 
the ND movement had also contributed to more democratic forms of co-operation 
among other dissidents within the Left as a whole. Many opposition groups felt more 
self-confident than before. As previously indicated, I decided to follow critically three 
renewal-oriented tendencies. They were all initiated outside the framework of the 
established political system—in ‘civil society’—but represent different approaches in 
different settings.
The first was the co-operative effort in Tarlac, Central Luzon, by Bernabe ‘Dante’ 
Buscayno, legendary founding father of the New People’s Army. This may be described 
as non-politicised ‘democratic guidance’ of large projects based on calculated inter-
ests and practical experiences—to prepare the ground rapidly for further politics of 
democratisation. Tarlac is where poor peasants first fought hard against the Japanese 
occupation and neo-colonial governments, and then formed the New Peoples Army 
in 1969.41 While in prison (1976–1986), Dante produced new ideas but failed to 
change the line of the NDs, even after the fall of Marcos, and even though he was 
one of the Left senatorial candidate in the 1987 elections who gained the most votes. 
He thus returned ‘home’ to start anew.
38 Or take Thailand, for another example of democracy at risk. Just a few weeks before the recent 
debacle in Manila, Thailand’s major business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra, won a landslide 
victory on the basis of an Estrada-like nationalist-populism, against a liberal middle class cum 
business and IMF sponsored ‘post-1997-crisis regime’. The idealist NGO attempts at crafting 
new ambitious constitutional regulations against boss politics and vote buying did not help 
much. With fresh and massive backing, Thaksin himself might even avoid being disqualified for 
having tampered with the new and well-crafted rules of the game. But later on he may face 
similar problems as Estrada did. 
39 For some time, the armed units had been on the defensive, popular support was dwindling, 
and logistical problems were severe. Many of the leading members had been rounded up or had 
opted for other forms of struggle. Old theses and strategies were being questioned, especially, 
but not only, within the legal branches of the movement. The members were far from an 
agreement on what to reconsider and how to go ahead.
40 For instance, in 1991, they made an attempt to revive the legal national democratic party 
Partido ng Bayan. Furthermore, in early April the next year, ‘their own’ movements were 
brought together in a separate non-partisan electoral committee, Kapatiran, Kilusan ng Alter-
natibong Pulitika para sa Inang Bayan, with some 40 organisations (including Bayan, New 
Democratic Alliance).
41For a more comprehensive analysis than the following, see Törnquist, (1990) and (1990a).
According to Dante, the peasants who had forced Marcos to implement a partial 
land reform were now facing exploitative businessmen with good political contacts 
and control of inputs, rice-mills, marketing, etc. Hence, he concluded, the small 
farmers could and would have to come together. Their interest in increasing produc-
tion and making a better living was basic. There was no need for externally inter-
vening intellectuals with fine theses and parties and ‘concientisation’. Dante often 
indicated a lack of trust in this type of theorising ‘comrade’ due to previous bad 
experiences. He even stressed ‘his’ small farmers’ ascribed interests to such an extent 
that friendly critics spoke of ‘economism’: One simply had to kick off by getting them 
engaged in economically promising dynamics, whereafter they would fight anyone 
that tried to stop them. The new liberties under Mrs. Aquino, and useful contacts 
with her,42 made it possible to organise in late 1988 a NGO-foundation, ask for 
government credits, and initiate legal co-operation among some 500 suspicious but 
loyal small-scale farmers. Already two years later, the results were phenomenal: some 
8000 farmers with individual plots43, collective and efficient use of modern inputs 
and methods; drastically increased production; collective market arrangements, lesser 
indebted farmers and better paid workers, new jobs, a collective rice-mill, a duck-
farm, a fishpond, and production of organic fertilisers; government credits repaid 
ahead of schedule… And while problems thereafter included the devastating eruption 
of Mt. Pinatubo eruption in 1991, there was also a lot of reconstruction work and 
the chance to participate in local elections.
The Movement for Popular Democracy had a similar background but very differ-
ent projects. Former heads of the Maoist’s legal National Democratic Front, Horacio 
‘Boy’ Morales and Isagani Serrano, and the leader of the closely associated Christians 
for National Liberation, Ed de’la Torre, were in the forefront. In the mid’ 80s they 
belonged to the ND revisionists who worked out platforms for broad coalitions, 
including the use of elections, against President Marcos and for the development of 
non-elitist or ‘popular democracy’. This was rarely practised but the ideas survived 
and committed middle-class professionals, industrialists and intellectuals made alli-
ances in post-Marcos coalitions. However, when neither critical support of the early 
Aquino government nor participation in the 1987 elections made much sense, their 
efforts to help vulnerable people to become reasonably autonomous citizens were 
increased. This was identified as a basic prerequisite for the development of democ-
racy. Their projects, however, were very different from Dante’s and usually based 
on time-consuming analyses, education, ‘concientisation’, and small-scale schemes 
with participatory democracy and supplementary coalition building. One branch was 
based at the Institute for Popular Democracy and mainly worked with general politi-
42Through previous close relations during the anti-Marcos struggles with her assassinated 
husband ‘Ninoy’Aquino.
43Actually, the co-operative efforts encompassed larger areas than the famous and huge sugar-
growing hacienda Luisita nearby which is partly owned by Mrs. Aquino and covers some 6000 
ha. While the co-operative efforts are, of course, endowed with less capital, they continued to 
expand further.
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cal studies and discussions to pave the way for non-elitist popular coalitions and 
projects. Another, based at a BINGO,44 was called the Philippine Rural Reconstruc-
tion Movement (PRRM). The latter tried especially to revive the stagnating ND 
movements by offering progressive militants and their families (who had invested 
their lives in the struggle) alternative or supplementary ways of advancing their ideas 
and improving their lives. For instance, this was done through community organising 
where people tried to make best possible use of their own minor resources while 
also dealing with those who monopolised the land where people lived or drew water. 
Various projects were often related to ND leaders and organisations for peasant 
farmers, workers, and urban poor as well as related to their cause-oriented groups 
and NGOs.
In many ways, the Bisig projects are reminiscent of those of the popular democrats, 
minus the fact that they linked up with quite different coalitions and constituencies. 
Bisig, or the Alliance for the Advancement of Socialist Thought and Action, was 
founded in May 1986 by radical socialists and Marxists with various backgrounds, 
such as radical Christian social democracy, trade union work, community activism, 
concerned scholarship, and the new as well as old communist movements. In addition 
to several radical socialist labour leaders, the ‘initial’ personalities included profes-
sors Francisco ‘Dodong’ Nemenzo (communist scholar and later rector at the Uni-
versity of the Philippines), Randolf David, (dependency theorist, head of the Third 
world Studies Centre and later TV talk show host) and Karina Constantino-David 
(senior community organiser and temporarily junior minister under Aquino as well as 
Estrada). The projects were mainly carried out by a number of related NGOs, which 
in turn linked up with, for instance, rural poor communities in Greater Manila or 
Cebu City in search of alternatives to eviction; poor fishermen between Cebu and 
Bohol forming joint co-operatives, plantation workers in the south who were trying 
to save their jobs by taking over more or less abandoned companies, or ordinary 
workers in various strongholds having to develop their unions.
7.4 Collective empowerment and democracy
To what extent, then, are our alternative propositions on the growth of significant 
pro-democratic popular movements validated? To begin with, close studies tend to 
confirm an interest in democratisation, as is shown by attempts to fight the primitive 
accumulation of capital (often politically facilitated) as well as efforts to unite scat-
tered people around the use and control of resources.
Projects among the three tendencies were usually in support of popular initiatives 
such as co-operatives; initiatives which in turn may or may not be related to interest 
organisations like peasant farmer’s movements or trade unions. (Friction remained, 
however, between various NGOs, as well as between comparatively well endowed 
and non-membership based NGOs on the one hand, and poor popular organisations 
44 Big NGO.
like unions on the other.) The point of departure was to address people’s immediate 
problems of survival and development on the local level, whether among urban poor 
and workers, or with rural communities and peasant farmers. This is in contrast 
to previously dominating leftist ideas of first trying to get hold of political power, 
and then using it to redistribute essential means of production, such as land. The 
logic being that (carrying out) labour is also a way that people can enhance their 
bargaining power, along with more traditional strategies of blocking production. 
Moreover, the attempts at promoting production seemed to generate an interest 
in the availability, management, and control of necessary resources. Hence, while 
the renewal-oriented groups often went beyond conventional class conceptions and 
acknowledged the importance of many different issues and movements, their activities 
nevertheless indicate a common focus on the use and control of material resources. 
And this had a clear bearing on the importance of democratisation.
Aside from opportune nice statements, it is true that democratisation did not make 
much sense for local groups in need of external funds and political protection to 
get new alternatives started. The traditional Left was rarely a fruitful and sufficiently 
powerful partner. State, private domestic and foreign backing was necessary. This 
called for good contacts and clientelism. Several NGOs and popular organisations 
tried (and still do) to act skilfully on comparatively large and open ‘markets’, but 
this patronage remain one of the new movements’ and organisations’ weakest points. 
Once operational, however, democratic organising, management and co-operation 
tended to be instrumental for directly promoting people’s ‘empowerment’ and better 
living conditions, precisely by enhancing their own capacity to use and control vital 
resources.
7.5 Divisive empowerment and insufficient democratisation
Simultaneously, however, many of these efforts at local empowerment through co-
operation met with huge problems. The mainstream thesis that capitalism would 
generate socio-economic diversity and less class based action was vindicated. But 
at the same time the alternative proposition, that betting on civil associations and 
social capital would be insufficient without interest based political facilitation was 
also supported. Moreover, as the actors were confronted with these problems and 
challenges, we shall see that they all actually tried to move ahead in different ways, 
but generally speaking, as predicted in our third alternative proposition, by way of 
more, not less, democratisation. Then the remaining challenge is to understand why 
the results were usually so disappointing.
The collapse of Dante’s project: Probably the most obvious case was the fate of 
the co-operative in Tarlac between 1992 and 1996. Of course, the 1991 Mt. Pinatubo 
eruption devastated most of the co-operative’s land, made efficient rice cultivation 
impossible, and caused enormous hardship and financial losses for the individual 
farmers and the co-operative as such. Neither these losses nor the extensive resources 
and countless working hours put in by the co-operative in relief and reconstruction 
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work in the area were shared by the new Ramos government. But natural disasters and 
an unfriendly government do not explain why the co-operative was unable to handle 
these formidable problems in a better way. With hindsight the depressing outcome 
might even be seen as the best example of the need for more democratisation.
Some may put the blame on the co-operative’s indisputably poor business 
management45—and there is much to this. But as a primary explanation it is shallow 
and technocratic. Many of the managerial problems were actually due to the imagina-
tive and dynamic leadership of Dante and his team, without which the co-operative 
efforts would never have come about in the first place. The lack of checks and 
balances upon this propelling force was primarily the result of minimal democratic 
participation from below rather than inefficient business management from above. 
And the main reason why Dante gave no priority to democratic participation was 
that he overestimated the joint material interests of the members. He assumed they 
were peasant farmers, and that they would be eager to work hard and efficiently 
once they got access to the necessary resources. They would, in the process, achieve 
greater consciousness, assume the functions of management, and act politically. But 
most of the members (not to mention their households) were far from just peasant 
farmers (instead engaged in various activities) and had no clear-cut material interests 
even in paying back their loans, or in other ways maintaining the efforts of the 
co-operative.
Dante and his team were already aware by mid-1992 of the need to integrate the 
members in the running of the co-operative. But the continuous hardship—caused 
by Mt. Pinatubo, the new unfriendly government, and the undemocratic institutional 
logic and poor management within the co-operative itself—made it impossible to 
alter the situation swiftly. It is true that a greatly reduced co-operative was doing 
reasonably well by early 1995, primarily by growing sugar. Once again many wanted 
to join, but there was little room either for productive or political expansion. Efficient 
rice agriculture was very difficult because of ash falls and lahars.46 Most of the former 
rice-farming members of the cooperative had left, and were suffering, unable to pay 
off their debts to it. Even if the cultivation of sugar was profitable, the market was 
limited. And while rice demands continuous co-operation in the fields—thus making 
it possible to initiate other forms of joint action as well—sugar does not require this.
Ideally, therefore, there should have been large-scale and popularly organised 
environmental relief work recovering fertile land, such as by way of reforestation 
in the mountains, and alternative production and sources of income in the plains. 
This could have brought many of the poor workers and tenants of Tarlac together 
once again, benefiting the province as a whole and even linking them up with the 
middle classes. Dante knew of this, of course, but at that point he was lacking 
influential contacts as well as loyal and dedicated co-operating farmers with families 
and relatives. Realising this, he simply had to rework his strategy and enter into 
local politics, thus trying to get access to resources and creating the necessary pre-
45C.f. Montelibano (1994) 
46 Volcanic mud flows.
conditions for further popular co-operation and advancement. In the 1995 local elec-
tions in the basic Capas municipality, therefore, he engineered and backed an alterna-
tive coalition that aimed to develop a showcase local government, fight powerful 
resistance against the co-operative and create ample opportunities for both recon-
struction and new efforts. Even if he could have engaged himself more in this project 
and campaign it was probably too late and it all failed. One can always put the blame 
on massive electoral cheating, but a few years earlier, that would most probably have 
been prevented by the dedicated and loyal people themselves. This was the final 
turning point for Dante’s project. Thereafter there came only the tragic end game.
So the failure of Dante’s attempt rapidly to combine development work (based 
on material interests that turned out to be more complicated than expected) with 
‘political guidance’ does not prove he was wrong to stress the insufficiency of efforts 
that were restricted to the deepening of civil society. Rather it showed that while he 
understood that the primacy of struggle for land was over and that there was a need 
for joint action against the monopolisation of other resources, he underestimated the 
degree to which the rural poor had been fragmented (hence preventing an equivalent 
to former unified peasant class struggles for land), and thus also the need to add 
democratisation, within the movement, as well as in the setting as a whole.
Popular Democrats in search of new roots: A major contrast to Dante’s efforts 
was that of the rural oriented popular democrats. While Dante had a social base 
and tried to build a new project from below, the ‘Pop.Dems’ initially tried to rescue 
(and redirect) the stagnating ND projects, by way of fashionable participatory and 
empowerment oriented NGO initiatives. The first problem, however, was that the 
NDs were reluctant, to say the least. So however the NGO initiatives might have 
worked out, they were lacking sufficient socio-political base in the first place.
The question then was whether the ‘rural pop.dems.’ would close down their shop 
or try to find a social constituency and political project of their own. The outcome 
was a compromise: an attempt to combine new ideas (and aid-money) betting on 
civil society and green alternatives with old ideas of community organisation and 
seemingly non-political popular fronts.
On the one hand, this was related to the new space offered by the implementation 
of the various decentralisation measures in the Local Government Code. There were 
substantial resources to fight for, as well as increasingly powerful local politicians 
and administrators that had to be dealt with. Also, the law stipulated that NGO 
representatives should constitute no less than one-fourth of the local development 
councils. An additional argument was, that when it came to local political candidates, 
the grassroots organisations would be better equipped to mobilise support and to 
keep track of them than of national politicians. The outcome, however, was rather 
frustrating. The attempts at strengthening civil society and community co-operation 
did not automatically generate political alternatives even on the local level. Various 
groups, issues, and initiatives remained disparate. The locally powerful bosses usually 
found ways, of course, to capture the decentralisation schemes, including by forming 
and favouring their own NGOs. The attempts at engineering local political coalitions 
were few, scattered and rarely successful.
Fresh Ideas but Uphill Tasks in Muddy Philippine Waters 59
60 Popular Development and Democracy
On the other hand, the idea was also to relate the local efforts to similar alliances 
on the central level, thus gaining influence in key sectors. In the 1995 elections, 
for instance, the pop.dems with the PRRM under Boy Morales did most of the 
successful campaigning for President Ramos’ widely acclaimed secretary of health, 
Juan Flavier. The next step was the major responsibility faced with the 1998 elections, 
for positing Estrada as a friend of the people and for organising his popular support. 
This was even more successful and a few concessions were given in return by the 
then new president, including the position as minister for agrarian reform to Boy 
Morales (while Ed de’la Torre preferred a less influential job with further education). 
The story of Estrada’s presidency, his administration, the impeachment process and 
revolt to get him out of office is too well known to be told here. Morales’ fought 
an uphill battle on agrarian reform, did not achieve much and stayed on the sinking 
ship (with de’ la Torre), arguing, in the end, that if they remained with the captain 
and if he was able to hang on, their influence would increase. Democratic politics 
does call for tactics, but here it is obvious that consistency and credibility were set 
aside. The costs will remain substantial.
Obviously, then, the experiences of the ‘rural pop.dems’ testify to increasing socio-
economic fragmentation and the insufficiency of an approach that bets mainly on 
deepening civil society without political facilitation and linkages. Again, also, attempts 
were made to move ahead by way of democratisation, though they were not very 
consistent and undermined by attempts to find opportunistic shortcuts.
The ‘three little pigs’ advance democratisation but fail to transform actions into 
votes: Most of the problems in the case of Dante and the ‘rural pop.dems’ were 
shared by the Bisig-projects as well—testifying to the fact that the problems were 
not just rural, but held true in urban areas and among the middle class and workers 
as well. Bisig-related activists and the ‘pop.dems.’ who worked at IPD on political 
analyses and coalitions (plus ecumenical Ed de’ la Torre), however, arrived at quite 
different conclusions. Struggle against politically facilitated accumulation of capital, 
they said, called for strong intervention on the very political level, locally as well 
as centrally. There had to be some co-ordination of scattered demands and interests 
and civil society actions. There was a need for some kind of political leadership and 
alliances, despite bad experiences from party building. And it was not meaningless to 
enter into the established political field and try to advance via elections. Rather it was 
necessary to develop democracy further and to build new principled, transparent, 
and popular political alternatives.
Hence, the activists linked up with a non-elitist social democratic third group,47 
and decided in face of the 1992 elections, to form a partisan electoral movement, 
Akbayan. These, ‘three little pigs’ (as they were called at the time) against the big ND 
wolf, in turn, linked up with like-minded cause-oriented groups, NGOs, and interest 
organisations (such as unions). They adopted an agenda generated by many different 
progressive groupings as its own programme. The key-words were ‘people’s interest’, 
‘participatory democracy’, ‘sustainable development’, and ‘genuine structural reform’. 
47 Pandaya para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas; Workshop for a Socialist Philippines
In the spirit of realism, moreover, leading members brokered an alliance with the 
liberal electoral coalition. The respected senator Salonga, ex-speaker of the senate 
and responsible for carrying through the anti-US-bases treaty campaign, and Aquilino 
‘Nene’ Pimentel, primus motor in decentralising state powers, were presidential and 
vice presidential candidates respectively.48 This was the only block with some ideo-
logical profile, radical propositions and progressive nominees, at least on the national 
level. There was also an exciting attempt by a broad group of generally progressive 
NGOs, to gradually intervene in politics—the so-called project 2001.
It is true that most movement activists were eager to stress that the new political 
efforts were subordinated to their basic tasks as, for instance, unionists or NGO-
workers, “in support of people’s own initiatives” and various forms of extra-parlia-
mentary pressure politics. But now many of them really wanted to supplement and 
make use of all this to mobilise votes for progressive political representatives.
The results, however, indicated that the certified capacity of the new movements 
and associated organisations to carry out actions, conduct alternative development 
work, nourish civil society and support ‘ideal’ community networks and co-operation 
could not be transformed into votes and a more widespread and dynamic politics 
of democratisation. Most activists gave priority to their ‘normal’ progressive work 
independently of partisan and especially electoral politics. This time, for instance, 
almost the only thing that the NGO coalition could agree on was partisan “electoral 
education", including information of which candidates could be expected to support 
the aims and means of the NGOs themselves. Many groupings did not link up with 
the new efforts at all. It was an uphill task to convince radical people, whom the Left 
had been telling for years and years that it did not matter which way they voted, that 
this time it would really make a difference. Rival candidates gained a lot of votes even 
from people who otherwise fought against them, for instance within a union, action 
group or co-operative. Collective interests such as those ascribed to peasant farmers, 
workers or co-operative members were usually not strong enough to generate votes 
for progressive nominees. Basically the electoral movement carried the same issues 
as its constituent groups used to emphasise in their extra-parliamentary work, and 
paid little attention to how one should govern public resources and implement their 
great general ideas. Hence, the field was open instead for populist anti-corruption 
candidates (such as Miriam Defensor-Santiago) and clientelist politics.
In view of these experiences most leading activists talked of the need to institution-
alise the electoral movement, but little happened. By the 1995 elections, moreover, 
progressive groups and movements had further disintegrated. The renewal-oriented 
organisations were still there, but limited themselves to supporting various ‘reason-
able’ individual candidates and local efforts where there was more space for progres-
sive grassroots organisations and NGOs, due to decentralisation of state powers. 
Simultaneously, however, implementation in the mid-90s of the Local Government 
48 Plus, for instance, the radical nationalist senator Wigberto “Bobby” Tanada and consistent 
NGO spokesman and expelled agrarian secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad as senatorial candi-
dates.
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Code paved the way for traditional bosses and their client-organisations. It is true 
that much experience had been gained, that civil society was stronger, and that 
social capital had been promoted, but that did not hit hard at the bosses. The basic 
problem was still the need to transform fragmented interests, groups and actions into 
consistent and efficient politics of democratisation.
By the time of the1998 elections however, political opportunities had improved 
slightly. Firstly, a new ‘party-list system’ for limited proportional representation on a 
national basis in the Congress (in addition to the present simple-majority elections 
in single-member constituencies which made it almost impossible to build new prin-
cipled alternatives) had finally been implemented. This was thanks to much pressure 
and lobbying. Secondly, the disintegration among the NDs had reached such an extent 
that several of its pro-democratic reformists (such as Etta Rosales and Joel Rocamora), 
as well as more revolutionary critics of the Maoist doctrines and chairpersons, openly 
sided with the attempts at building a new principled alternative. It was a long and 
painful process, but finally, in the run up to the 1998 elections, a new and permanent 
political vehicle, “Akbayan!—Citizens’ Action Party”, was formed. This was just a few 
months before the race. The new rules and options were complicated. The election 
commission did not do much to propagate them. And of course, the new opportuni-
ties also paved the way for several other party-list initiatives within the fragmented, 
dissident and non ND Left (including one ‘from below’, set up by the PRRM). Fortu-
nately, however, this did not mean that all initiatives failed. Akbayan was among the 
few that made it above the threshold. There was a lot of enthusiasm and dynamism 
in the campaign and a sense of ‘it will take time but we are finally on the right track’ 
among the activists. But there were also many and serious problems, not just because 
of the miserable electoral commission arrangements but also, again, in relation to 
the uphill task of combining extra-parliamentary activism on various fronts, with 
electoral efforts for integrated programs. Thereafter, however, Akbayan (including 
its single representative to the parliament Etta Rosales), and associated groups and 
institutes, did very serious work in this area. For the first time within the dissident 
Left, the important work in-between elections was not set aside, such as the promo-
tion of participation by way of continuous discussions (between activists and elected 
representatives) on current issues as well as education of activists and representatives 
on problems of ‘good’ local governance. Moreover, Akbayan played an important role 
in generating and building the case and movement against Estrada’s mismanagement. 
So all this was expected to produce more votes for the party in the 2001 elections. At 
that time, even the hard-core Maoist NDs had decided that Akbayan’s strategy to take 
elections seriously had been proven ‘right’. However, the result, on the one hand, was 
that the tactical ND party-list vehicle Bayan Muna, under media attractive ex. NDF-
leader Satur Ocampo, made a very impressive showing, by unofficial co-operation 
with sections of the shaky Arroyo regime, covering its weak left flank, and applying 
traditional Philippine strongmen politics. On the other hand, the more principled 
Akbayan made only modest advances by relating to civil organisations, progressive 
unions and peasant farmer movements, and consistently opposing traditional shady 
politics. (Although it is true that it was the only other progressive party formation that 
made it to the congress.) So despite fine aims and advances, the Akbayan perform-
ance still testified to the difficulties of transforming and generalising activism into 
more general political influence.
7.6 The logics of the stalled popular potential
In brief, much of our alternative propositions are confirmed in the Philippine context. 
The showcase middle-class democratisation process remained unsubstantial and 
unstable. The strengthening of civil society did not help much. The Maoist Left 
remained undemocratic—but renewal oriented sections of the Left, even the legen-
dary founder of the New People’s Army, became increasingly interested in democ-
ratisation as part of their attempts to unify people and fight politically facilitated 
primitive accumulation.
However, there were also serious problems. The proposition that there would be 
‘objective’ incentives for unified action among scattered people and groups was far 
from vindicated. For instance, a similar assumption in the case of Dante (of unifying 
interests among peasant farmers) clearly failed to materialise and was an important 
factor behind the collapse of his project. Further, both Dante and the rural-oriented 
pop.dems. tried to find democratically inconsistent shortcuts. And generally, all cases 
testify to the incapacity of the new pro-democrats, even those who really tried, to 
transform scattered and extra-parliamentary actions into organisation and votes for 
institutionalised popular policies and governance.
What were the roots of these problems? Why has it been so difficult for pro-
democrats to combat fragmentation and transform extra-parliamentary action into 
institutionalised political alternatives for society at large?
Neither of the major propositions from section 4.6 (operationalised in section 6) 
seems to make sense. The Philippine class-party adherents, to begin with, were not 
particularly successful. Generally speaking they have become rather disintegrated and 
have continued to lose momentum, apart from one faction (of the late F. Lagman) 
that demonstrated its organisational clout on the trade unions front and, recently, 
another (Sison and Ocampo) that succeeded in tactically entering the electoral arena. 
The principled theoretical positions have been combined with old communist ideas 
of the need to build organisations and strike alliances, in a tough if not rough way, 
within the framework of ‘democratic centralism’ and/or bossism plus machiavellian 
alliances. This has definitely contributed to their ability to sustain their own projects 
(and probably also to gain votes, such as in the recent case of Bayan Muna in the 
Philippines), but it has also met with wide criticism and is hardly a way of unifying 
the movement and gaining wider popular influence.
Secondly, the pragmatic attempts to work from within a serious of post-Marcos 
governments have proved rather frustrating, sandwiched as they have been by the 
establishment from inside and insufficient popular back up from outside. The grand 
‘Pop.Dem.’ experiment to boost Estrada and use his strength to expand and promote 
radical reforms even ended in outright failure.
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Thirdly, many Philippine pro-democrats have actually subscribed to the grassroots 
thesis about the need to counter traditional Left preoccupation with the central 
state and to emphasise instead extensive civil association and well-anchored popular 
movements on the local level. But the general liberal betting on civil societies and 
self-management has been plagued by fragmentation. More focused, but still ‘autono-
mous’, ground level interest-based organisation (such as among labourers) has often 
suffered from similar problems.
Fourthly, what is the fate of the political-market proposition that there is a need 
for a generally progressive party that can bring scattered efforts together at times 
when it is the logic of liberal, representative, electoral democracies that counts? The 
Philippine experiences definitely testify to the need for co-ordination of different 
efforts, which otherwise may not support and at times even contradict each other. 
But are the recommendations vindicated? They are very reminiscent of the electoral-
party tendency within the Latin American Left after the transition from authoritarian 
rule. This involved building catch-all electoral parties within the formal political 
system in addition to (and at times rather separate from) more radical social move-
ments on the grassroots level. (cf. Roberts 1998) Similar ideas were present in the 
discussions behind the building of Akbayan in the Philippines. Despite good inten-
tions, the results are not altogether positive. Akbayan has not yet proven a full 
success, although that may have less do with moderation versus radicalism than with 
the co-ordination of electoral and parliamentary work itself on the one hand and 
the logic of movements and actions on the other. So, the problem of co-ordination 
remains unresolved.
The fifth thesis, finally, of extra-parliamentary militant networks, has of course only 
proved viable during brief periods of radical political momentum such as the ‘people 
power’ uprisings against the Marcos dictatorship and Estrada’s mismanagement.
In conclusion, therefore, our empirical results indicate that while the five estab-
lished theses offer vital insights, they can neither explain nor cure the problems. 
Hence, we have to proceed by asking ‘why?’. Are there any unifying factors (in 
terms of in the concepts of political terrain and politicisation in sections 4.4 and 
4.5) which point to what might be neglected in, and by, most of the different 
propositions and actors?
Indeed there are two such patterns. The first pattern relates to the predominance 
of single issues and specific interests. Aside from the adherents of the class-party 
proposition (who emphasise ideology and collective interests but in reality have often 
been linked to specific interests and sections of the working class or the peasant 
farmers anyway) the general tendency is quite clear. The followers of the pragmatic 
argument, to begin with, who have worked in relation to the Aquino and Estrada 
administrations, have tended to become prisoners of the issues and interests that the 
dominating actors have put on the top of the agenda.
The pattern is even more obvious among the proponents of the grassroots thesis. 
Here the deliberate policy of most NGOs is not so much to rally the masses behind 
collective interests, as to relate to a host of civil interests among various groups in 
order to promote co-operation and organisation in dense civil societies. In fact, more 
cause-oriented civil society groups, such as human rights associations, have also 
tended to focus on single issues. Usually even sectoral and class oriented labour and 
peasant farmer groups have been lost in particular questions and interests related to 
the wish (or need) to start from the very grassroots level. And when Dante in Tarlac, 
tried to organise peasant farmers on the assumption that they were a class-collective, 
they instead turned out to be small farmers with a host of additional interests within 
their households.
The advocates of the more recent political market thesis usually try to aggregate 
issues and interests when forming, for instance, broad progressive electoral parties. 
The Philippine experience is comparatively encouraging. The history of the Akbayan 
citizen action party points to an increasing capacity over the years to present more 
than just a collection of scattered issues and interests. Yet, the ability to aggregate 
is hampered by the necessarily weak ideological principles. Many ideological groups 
co-operate by setting aside their different bases and focusing instead on concrete 
issues. Meanwhile there is no actual, strong, or collective social movement logic from 
below that could help define the priorities. So, potential advances still very much 
depend on organisational capacity (to which we shall soon return).
The most extreme form of concentration of single issues and specific interests, 
finally, is among the extra parliamentary militant networks. This characterised many 
of the dynamics in the series of people power manifestations. As the activists have 
left the streets, established leaders have set the agenda and defined the policies.
The second pattern (indicating what all the problematic propositions seem to 
neglect and what all the actors that follow such different theses seem to miss) is the 
insufficient co-ordination between action in the civil, civil-political, and explicitly 
political society, as well as between the central and local levels.
The adherents of the class-party position have focused mainly on the political 
society and the central level, even when there were strong local chapters and when 
the Maoists talked of encircling the cities. This relates to the previously identified 
tendency to promote democracy by bypassing much of the ground-work (in terms 
of enhancing people’s democratic capacity) in favour of a single and top-driven 
institutional channel, the party with related organisations.
The pragmatists, moreover, have mainly tried to compensate their own weak ability 
to mobilise the masses by boosting, and then trying to advance behind populist 
politicians like Estrada, including through fairly independent means (such as Jeep)49. 
The failure, however, was devastating, and clearly related to the dual tendency among 
the pragmatics of consuming democracy in practice, while defending and promoting 
it in theory.
The supporters of the grassroots theses, on the other hand, have instead experi-
enced the opposite problem—of being confined to the local context and to civil 
society work. This is partly a deliberate protest against statist and top-driven com-
munist groups and parties as well as an attempt to project various civil-groups and 
49 Popular grass roots organisation initiated by Boy Morales and Ed de’la Torre in support of 
Estrada.
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individuals as non-partisan. More importantly, however, it also signals an inability of 
the grassroots activists to build links. Generally speaking they have either remained 
in the margins—and sometimes have even lost out, as in the case of Dante—or have 
had to rely on top-driven central networks of NGOs and pressure groups. In the 
latter case it is true that there are some clear examples of civil-political societies. 
But even when these have been less elitist and more rooted on the ground, they 
have usually been confined to specific issues such as human rights, agrarian reform, 
anti-debt or US-bases, or the building of sectoral trade unions.
As previously indicated, the primary Philippine example of the third thesis of 
political market, the Akbayan Citizen Action party, has proved increasingly capable 
of aggregating issues and interests (even though the lack of ideology remains a 
problem). But then the question of how to politicise people; to mobilise and organise 
and attract votes remains. There are no clear answers, instead there is a need for fresh 
research. Most probably, however, one factor (beyond the unfavourable electoral 
system) is that there is not (yet) enough organisational clout to compensate for the 
lack of spontaneously unified and powerful social movements from below; popular 
pressure and logic that otherwise might have helped to integrate the various groups, 
organisations and individuals that now support the Akbayan idea; thus defining 
priorities and linking central and local, as well as political and civil society.
Neither, finally, have the extra-parliamentary militant networks been able to handle 
these problems of linking the civil and political, and the central and local. Their 
action has mainly been formed in the cities and leading individuals have played 
a vital role—though students have been less dominant than in Indonesia. Further, 
the basic requirement of democracy in terms of clear-cut identification of who is 
eligible to decide and also who has to follow collective decisions is usually lost in the 
networking process. ‘Bad’ rulers may be done away with but there are few elements 
of democracy to use as a basis for better alternatives.
67
Chapter 8. New but Poorly Anchored 
Democratic Options in Indonesia50
8.1 From disaster to showcase?
There has always been an unhappy relationship between mainstream theses on democ-
racy and actual Indonesian developments. To begin with the West fought hard against 
the democratic nationalist movement and the new Democratic Republic. In the 
late-50s, liberal modernisation theory was first used to legitimate Western support of 
the regional-cum-ethnic and religious separatists, on the one hand, and the contain-
ment of electorally successful communists, on the other. This contributed to the 
destruction of Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy. In 1965/66 the same thesis was 
applied to legitimate (and cover up) the massacre of at least half a million leftists. This 
destroyed whatever remained of Indonesia’s democracy. For more than 30 years, 
then, the modern package was used to support Suharto’s authoritarian modernisa-
tion. This again prevented rather than promoted democratisation (and caused the 
death of another 300,000 people, not just in East Timor). According to mainstream 
scholars, pro-democracy movements were irrelevant. In the long run, rapid capitalist 
modernisation would instead generate democracy via a stronger middle class, civil 
society and/or demands within the regime itself for more ‘good governance’ to handle, 
if nothing else, an increasingly liberalised and complicated economy. Little happened, 
however. Generally speaking, and aside from some dissidents, the middle-classes and 
its moderately expanding civil society adjusted to the rules of the ruler instead of 
fighting for democracy. The reform minded groups and individuals who wanted to 
change the system slowly from within, such as sections of the Association of Muslim 
Intellectuals (ICMI), were equally unsuccessful, especially after the 1996 clamp-down 
on the radical movement. With the 1997 crisis, finally, the action of the markets 
and its supporters proved politically disastrous, contributed to a socio-economic 
catastrophe, obstructed democratisation, and only accidentally helped oust Suharto. 
By April 1998 even IMF & Co. had conceded. It was little but Suharto’s cock-
sureness and the economists’ political stupidity (in relying on repression, provoking 
massive popular anger and thus triggering the end game, on May 4, by reducing food 
and fuel subsidies to an even greater extent than the IMF had asked for in order to 
‘get the prices right’), plus the students’ spearheading of an unorganised democracy 
movement, that opened the floodgates and finally forced the elite to rid themselves 
of the old man.
50 For background analyses, see Törnquist (1984, 1984a, 1989, and 1991). For more extensive 
reports from the current case studies over time, see at first hand Törnquist (1996, 1997, 1998, 
1999a, 2000, and 2001b), Budiman and Törnquist (2001), and ISAI (2002). (I’m particularly 
indepted to long time co-operation with Arief Budiman and, from the mid-90s, with ISAI, as 
well as to continuous operational support from Bimbim.)
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In other words, it was only after the collapse of the regime on May 21, 1998, 
that mainstream analysts suddenly agreed that the problem was political, that a 
revolution might unfold, and that nothing would improve without legitimate govern-
ment—which called for some democracy. As we know, much of the western discourse 
on democracy after the Second World War was about the need to defend liberal and 
democratic societies against authoritarian mass-opportunism. But never did I experi-
ence such liberal and democratic mass-opportunism as in Indonesia. This was not 
confined to the opportunist domestic elite. While ‘parachuted in’ western economists 
had failed to get the prices right, their somewhat softer colleagues were now flown 
in to get the institutions right and thus craft democracy. They were the big American 
and other Western party-institutes, the United Nations and national development aid 
agencies, the NGOs and the turn-key election managers, the democracy-consultants 
and the political science celebrities with ready made universalistic recipes. Within 
a year or two, it was argued, they would put Indonesia on the right track by supple-
menting economic and financial ‘reconstruction’ with, firstly, the brokering of pacts 
among moderate incumbents and realistic reformers and, secondly, the engineering of 
‘free and fair’ elections, ‘good governance’, decentralisation and civil societies, plus 
essential right, and liberties.
About three years later, however, it seems as if the historical chance to promote the 
generation of the World’s third largest democracy may turn into an equally historical 
failure. As such, Indonesia should be the best ‘critical case’ to study the problems of 
both the fashionable ‘crafting of instant democracy thesis’ and the alternative ways 
of promoting more sustainable democratisation.
8.2 Pacts without foundation
To begin with, according to the mainstream theses, the chances to craft democracy 
rested with the brokering of realistic pacts between moderate incumbents and realistic 
reformers. Initially this was rather successful. A triangular conflict unfolded among 
the elite. This was almost in accordance with Samuel Huntington’s three common 
pathways of changing the system: of transforming it, of replacing it, or of compromis-
ing and ‘transplacing’ it.51
In the first act of this play, the then president Habibie, armed forces chief Wiranto, 
and reformist Golkar52 leaders Akbar Tanjung and Marzuki Darusman with collabo-
rators, entered from the right, preferring ‘guided democratisation’ from above. From 
the left, then, marched the radical students, spearheading a wider pro-democracy 
movement, and arguing that democratisation presupposed the replacement of the 
incumbents. From in-between, finally, emerged the dominant moderate opposition, 
51 Huntington, (1991). And this, of course, fits well with the general results of the transition 
projects led by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988&1989), Linz 
and Stepan (1996), and Bratton and van de Walle (1997). 
52 The top down corporatist party of Suharto’s New Order regime.
the Ciganjur four53—of pragmatic and often liberal oriented Muslim leader Abdurrah-
man Wahid (Gus Dur) (widely respected within the elite and with a strong mass base 
among rural Muslims in East and Central Java), nationalist party symbol Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (the daughter of the late President Sukarno), modernist and semi-liberal 
Muslim leader Amien Rais (with a mass following among urban Muslims), and the 
incarnation of ‘the good Javanese ruler’, the Sultan of Yogyakarta. The outcome was 
that the moderates managed to domesticate and benefit from the radicals’ protests 
while basically focusing on negotiating and winning reasonably free and fair elec-
tions. Their next move was to form pragmatic coalitions and strike the best possible 
deal with sections of the establishment.
After the elections, however, when the radicals and most consistent democrats 
were outmanoeuvred and the second act of the play began, there was discontent 
amongst the two remaining corners of reformist incumbents and former moderate 
opponents. On the surface this was about the indirect election of the president. 
Megawati had won the parliamentary elections but had failed to negotiate a deal 
either with the reformist incumbents or with the other moderate dissidents. She was 
therefore eliminated in favour of Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid, however, apparently 
thought that once appointed as, in theory, ‘powerful president’ he could abandon 
unofficial deals with the others and instead implement his own agenda, including 
substitution of repressive and corrupt sections of the state with civil society, negotia-
tions and human rights. This, of course, generated all kinds of resistance among 
politicians, administrators, officers, and businessmen with all kinds of shady deals. 
Whereafter Wahid was also removed. Currently, we are into the third act of the play, 
where Megawati has been appointed president and has negotiated a more formalised 
and conservative deal with all the others, among them the incumbents, the moderate 
old opposition and the IMF. This may well last for some time, but under the surface 
the real conflicts remain formidable.
In fact, the difficulties in reaching a fruitful pact through which to craft democracy 
indicates that there was a lack of the most vital precondition for the implementation 
of the mainstream recommendations: that powerful businessmen are able to survive 
on their own while the political elite try limited democratisation. In Indonesia it was 
not the development of modernisation but a political crisis of despotic liberalism (the 
symbiosis between political monopolisation and economic liberalisation) that helped 
give birth to democracy. So given the character of this crisis, business either fled the 
country or was as dependent on political patronage as ever in order to survive. The 
institutions crumbled and there were no independent and forceful actors that could 
take command and propel change; economically, administratively, and politically. 
The international banks did not pay and the domestic tycoons escaped, so the huge 
losses had to be socialised. Hence, sections of the economic and political elite still 
fight about what companies and banks should be saved, plundered or sold; and 
what parts of the administration and public sector they will gain control of. The 
53 So called because of the Islamic School run by Gus Dur where students managed to get the 
four leaders to meet on November 10, 1998.
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most obvious central level cases relate to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency, 
IBRA. Politicians, businessmen, officers and religious and ethnic leaders horse trade 
and struggle for services and financial back up. Local bosses, warlords, and business 
people can no longer gain enough power through relating to a supreme godfather, but 
have to develop their own alternatives through combinations of various central and 
local sources, by competing for control of local government and administration, and 
by organising their own security and popular backup. So the increasingly localised 
struggles tend to take on ugly proportions and to relate to ethnic and religious 
loyalties. (Ironically, local politics is also what we have least good knowledge of in 
Indonesia. Most studies have focussed on the central level and its elitist intrigues.) 
In fact, the quite understandable attempts by pro-democrats to undermine previous 
authoritarian state structures, and the current international aid agency euphoria 
over decentralisation and civil society, may even make things worse—given the poor 
democratic institutions and the weak popular checks and balances.
In brief, formal liberal politics became a battlefield for increasingly scattered, pri-
vatised, and localised military, administrative, and economic interests. There was 
a shift from centralised corruption, where the repressive godfather figure placed 
some limitations to promote his own high returns, to a laissez faire regime—without 
alternative democratic co-ordination—under which it is perfectly rational and only to 
be expected that symbiotic political, economic and military leaders will instantly grab 
and extract as much as possible.54 Even the enlightened establishment thesis of the 
need to first promote ‘rule of law’ and ‘good governance’ was out of context. There 
was very little of the kind of rechtsstaat that preceded European democracy—and 
few ideas of what significant interests and groups would simultaneously promote 
‘good governance’ and substantial democracy.
8.3 Unsubstantial crafting of democracy
In other words, the very idea of crafting democracy in Indonesia, without supporting 
the struggle against the symbiosis between politics and economics that undermine 
even elitist pacts, was doomed to fail. So what happened to the associated ideas 
of rapidly engineering democracy by introducing essential rights, mechanisms and 
institutions? The most clear-cut test is to ask the basic questions (discussed in 
section 3.9) about the substance and scope of the four fundamental prerequisites and 
instruments that most scholars (including of democratic audits) agree are necessary 
to develop if the principles of democracy (popular control and political equality 
regarding collective binding decisions) are to be realised.
Free and fair elections: The basically free and comparatively fair rules of the 
game in the June 1999 elections forced much of the elite to compete temporarily 
54 This is no news for students of late developing countries—se e.g. McIntyre (2000)—but even 
international economic and political experts might now become aware of it as Mancur Olson 
last grand theory also addresses the phenomena.(Olson 2000)
by mobilising votes, rather than manipulating within closed elitist circles and trying 
to divide and rule by provoking religious and ethnic groups. But the context of the 
election was not so just, and its substance was shallow: there was a lack of reasonably 
equal opportunities for use of political liberties and many fundamental problems 
continued to be swept under the carpet.
For example, several of the major conflicts and issues in Indonesia were not subject 
to debate. The parties and leaders did not have to declare their positions on them. 
The major economic crisis, for instance, and how it should be solved, was almost a 
non-issue. The same was true with regard to the many subordinated struggles over 
land, the regional grievances, the struggle in East Timor, the problems of human 
rights, and the need to sustain and further develop democracy. It is a long list.
Moreover, the elections did not produce a reasonable representation of various 
segments, interests and ideas among the population. There were no reformed elec-
tions on the very local level, in the villages and their urban equivalents, which is 
where most people must find solutions to their problems. (And the current elections, 
or at times merely appointments, of new village councils to balance the power of the 
headmen, seem to be very arbitrary affairs that depend on the local balance of power 
and mainly involve sections of the local elite.) On the other levels, 7,6% of the seats 
were reserved for the armed forces. One third of the delegates who would then elect 
a new president were not elected, but appointed by the military and the political elite. 
Remarkably many seats in the elected parliament were allotted to provinces where 
Golkar remained intact. Ex-communist parties were barred from taking part. Most 
important of all: local parties were also not allowed. Only organisations that were 
already very strong—previously accepted parties or groups based on religious, ethnic 
or cultural loyalties—stood a real chance of winning. Other preconditions were also 
unjust. Golkar and its associates could make good use of the state apparatus and 
foreign funded credits for co-operatives and social safety net programmes.
The foreign experts on the crafting of democracy did not try to alter this but 
focused on instant elections to appoint ‘legitimate leaders’. Support was limited to 
electoral arrangements, technical information, some restricted voter education, and 
electoral watch efforts via a few NGOs. Critical voter education about the actual 
political forces involved was scarce. Promotion of democratic organisations among 
labourers, farmers, civil servants, and employees was almost absent. There was hardly 
any attempt to give preferential treatment to new parties that focussed on vital social 
and economic cleavages, interests and societal ideas, beyond religious and ethnic 
loyalties.
Open and accountable government (which also requires independent public knowl-
edge, movement, organisation, and government responsiveness to public opinion): 
Aside from informal contacts and networks, much of state and politics remains closed 
for those who lost out, and has often become non-operational and disintegrated 
in the process of fragmentation, decentralisation, and localisation of power. Boss 
politicians have taken over—brokering deals between religious and ethnic leaders 
with mass following, businessmen and administrators with resources, and military 
and militias with muscle.
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It is true that the centralisation of power during the Suharto regime no longer exists 
and that much more power is now localised. But on the different levels, access is 
still through limited circles among increasingly rival factions of the political elite (c.f. 
eg. Sidel 1998, van Klinken 2001). This is enhanced by the fact that the elite itself 
has few organised links with the masses beyond socio-religious, ethnic, and generally 
cultural-cum-nationalist populist movements. The established parties are very much 
dominated by the elite on various levels. Ordinary people may relate to them but 
can hardly change them. In this respect, even the most ambitious attempt to form 
a secular, inclusive and democratic new party, called PAN55, has collapsed and 
resorted to its partly non-pluralistic socio-religious pillar. And the PDI-P56 has rapidly 
turned from what could have been a broad alliance in favour of ‘de-Golkarisation’ 
of state and business, to the combination of co-operation with vital parts of the 
Old Order establishment and secular nationalist slogans. Worse: there are only very 
weak alternative pressure groups and interest based organisations. It is true that 
several NGOs have emerged over the years, but generally speaking they remain 
urban student and middle class phenomena. There are still very few examples of 
forceful attempts at making use of new liberties, to go from elitist foundations to 
mass-based organisations. The attempts at building outright popular movements and 
organisations from below, such as trade unions or peasant farmer leagues, remain 
limited, scattered and often dependent upon links with patrons within the elite, and 
the dominant socio-religious and cultural streams. These problems are aggravated 
by the lack of formally institutionalised alternative channels of influence within the 
political system. Beyond the elections, with all their limitations (and the possibility, 
at best, to ask for a dialogue with elected leaders or civil servants) there are few 
other ways of making a difference than to turn to informal contacts and networks or 
outright pressure politics by using social, religious, economic or military resources, 
or simply to take to the streets or occupy plantation land.
Worse (again): this is partly nourished by foreign support, limited as it usually is 
to urban elite circles with good international connections. In addition to support for 
shallow elections and local administration, priority is given to monitoring and lobby 
groups, not to the universal accepted need for mass based popular organisation that 
may be able to enforce substantial elections and open and accountable government. 
Ironically, even the organisation of the foreign support itself is a good illustration 
of lack of transparency and accountability, at least in relation to those who matter 
(and are supposed to learn from foreign experiences), i.e. the Indonesian population 
in general and the pro-democracy movement in particular. Some handling agencies 
may include Indonesians, but how are they selected? On the basis of what criteria 
do these people in turn select projects? And to whom are they accountable? There is 
risk that a virtual ‘democracy-industry’ emerges among donors and well as recipients. 
And as the selection of people and projects is often related to previous individual 
55 Partai Amanat Nasional (National Awakening Party) led by Amien Rais
56 Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) lead 
by Megawati Sukarnoputri
contacts, such as education in the donor country and socialisation in international 
NGOs and organisations, the actors tend to belong to various factions of the intel-
lectual, administrative and cosmopolitan city elite that survived Suharto’s repression 
and have their roots in the old PSI-cum-Masjumi networks. For one, very few of 
these usually very nice and bright people have good knowledge of and contacts 
outside the major urban areas. One cannot but recall the so-called Berkeley Mafia 
promotion of New Order technocrats in the 60s.
Furthermore, the decisive public sphere that had evolved among pro-democrats 
during the struggle against authoritarianism (via open and underground communica-
tion and media by committed journalists and cultural workers) has been difficult to 
expand locally, outside the cities, and to ordinary people, especially when abandoned 
by foreign democracy-makers that bet instead on their own NGOs and consultants. 
Hence, speculative media has filled most of the empty ‘liberal’ spaces.
Civil and political rights: The liberalisation of civil and political life is vital and a 
relative success, but it is now under threat from the weaker emphasis given to it by 
Megawati and remains of limited significance for major parts of the population. Politi-
cal violence is localised, semi-privatised, and nourished by instigation and manipula-
tion of ethnic and religious loyalties. The lack of social and cultural rights is part 
of the problem.
In terms of the roots of these problems, Indonesia calls to mind Germany after the 
Holocaust, and still more so South Africa before it settled account with apartheid. 
There is a tendency to overlook the quests for trust and justice and give priority 
to unspecified reconciliation. But the major problem is not so much to find ways 
in which neighbours or members of different ethnic or religions groups can live 
with each other as equal citizens. The problem is rather that they must first be 
reasonably equal citizens. Hence, of course, basic minority rights, and probably 
reservations and perhaps even quotas, for instance, (like in India) must be regulated 
and institutionalised. But even before that, one has to come to terms with the politi-
cal and economic instigation and exploitation of communalism, and the massive 
acts of violence and repression that have boosted conflicts in the first place. The 
victims and subordinated citizens have no reason to reconcile with these mechanisms 
and vested interests. Truth and justice cannot be repressed but must come first, 
if reconciliation between equal citizens and a reasonably functioning democratic 
society shall be possible.
Moreover, there is a tendency to focus on the violence against the supporters of 
the post-Suharto leaders, such as various Muslim groups and different factions in 
the Moluccas or Kalimantan. But actually, the violence, repression and sponsoring of 
militias and communal conflicts became established state policy during the massacres 
of 1965–66. Thus it continued, not just in East Timor or Aceh, and then turned more 
localised, as in the Moluccas or Kalimantan, when a central ‘godfather’ was no longer 
able to master it all. So the importance of returning to the earlier catastrophes is not 
limited to finding out what happened, and to rehabilitate and compensate millions 
of individuals, but that people in general (in addition to students and other educated 
and reasonably independent parts of the middle class) get rid of their fear, resurrect 
New but Poorly Anchored Democratic Options in Indonesia 73
74 Popular Development and Democracy
history, and get a real chance to organise themselves independently. That, of course, 
calls for much more massive popular organisation, pressure, and education than the 
current individual and NGO-based networks, advocacy, information, and lobbying. 
And again the democratic West, by failing to reveal its earlier support of repression 
and authoritarianism, including with regard to the massacres in the mid-60s, has not 
really set a very good example.
A reasonably democratic society for citizens to be sufficiently self-confident: 
This relates to more general but necessary prerequisites in terms of a reasonably 
democratic culture based on the combination of, on the one hand, social and cultural 
rights (including of minorities) and, on the other, equal citizenship and open, free and 
plural education and discourse which is not limited to a few students, intellectuals, 
and reasonably independent professionals. There have been improvements (including 
with regard to the Chinese). And the role of the citizen-oriented Muslim reform 
movement in fighting both Suharto’s authoritarian rule and non-pluralistic religious 
streams has been of vital importance, refuting Huntington’s thesis that Islamic culture 
is incompatible with democratisation.57
Generally speaking, however, the problems are severe after decades of massive 
subordination, falsification of history (including of the struggle for freedom of democ-
racy as part of the modern nation state project) and Suharto’s promotion of feudal-
like and authoritarian elements of Javanese values and customs. Moreover, much of 
the vulnerable majority of the population may not have been able to benefit from the 
new freedoms, but may rather have been forced to set aside any potentially independ-
ent views of their own. This is because they usually have to relate to neo-traditional 
patrons, bosses, and ethnic and religious networks to find ways of surviving the 
economic and social crisis. The authoritarian milieu, finally, has also influenced 
the pro-democracy movement. Most organisations therein remain liberal oases but 
continue to suffer from the lack of solid democratic practices and the primary need 
to find strong and influential leaders with access to funding, rather than to serve and 
uphold unity among members (if any) and followers—a phenomenon which in turn 
sustains elitist quarrels and divisions.
In brief, then, the picture is quite clear: There are important freedoms, but the civil 
and democratic rights and institutions are poor, often malfunctioning, and usually 
difficult for ordinary people to make use of. The politically marginalised but resource-
ful sections of the elite would probably have turned to non-democratic methods 
anyway. But what is really wrong with Indonesia’s democratisation is that it does 
not make much sense even to its major potential pro-democratic force—the people 
at large—as a way of promoting ideas and interests, solving conflicts, and agreeing 
with others on how to handle issues of mutual concern. Rather, they usually have to 
find non- and anti-democratic methods and avenues. For instance, they have to pay 
57 See Hefner’s ‘Civil Islam’ (2000), though at least one self-critical leader involved has sug-
gested the alternative title ‘smiling Islam’ and one may wish to discuss the extent to which the 
liberal tendencies among certain intellectual leaders, who Hefner so forcefully analyses, reflect 
the structural and institutional logic of the Muslim movements. 
or bargain for protection and contacts within administration, government and elite 
circles as well as ethnic and religious networks. And if this does not help, they may 
have to take to the streets, occupy land, or end up burning down a police station.
8.4 The rise of a new radical democracy movement
The obvious question, then, is whether radical popular movements, including in rural 
contexts, had more potential? Did they continue to work within the tradition from 
the late-50s onwards where issues other than democratisation were most vital (such 
as imperialism, landlordism and the cold war)? This would support the mainstream 
theses. Or did new and more explicitly democratic preoccupations emerge, as sug-
gested in our alternative arguments?
The basic problem within radical Indonesian opposition is that it is mainly confined 
to students (old and new) and other middle class intellectuals who are rather isolated 
from people in general. This is because of the destruction of the broad popular move-
ments in the mid-60s and the authoritarian rule during Suharto’s ‘New Order’. Until 
recently it was even impossible to form membership-based autonomous organisa-
tions. Aside from religious organisations, there are still very few movements (which, 
moreover, are weak) among the people themselves that activists relate to. The same 
holds true in terms of critical ideologies and historical consciousness. Most of the 
dissident groups have had to work from above and out of the main urban centres 
where certain protection has been available from friends and temporary allies with 
influential positions. Organising in rural areas has been particularly difficult.
This way, layers of fragmented dissidents have developed over the years. Lack of 
space only allows for a very brief review. Of course, common people have always 
tried to find ways of surviving and resisting, in the face of harsh repression. But 
if we talk of movements and organisations that have openly opposed the regime, 
the first may only be called ‘corrective’ (Budiman 2001). The old radical nationalist-
communist organisations had been eliminated. The new dissidents were students 
and other intellectuals who had helped bring the New Order to power but then 
turned increasingly critical of corruption, international dependence, and the unequal 
distribution of resources. Hence they set up study and lobbying groups and staged 
protests, aiming at reform within the system. This proved impossible, however. The 
regime simply cracked down on its own children. And the reply by the most vocal, 
in turn, was of course confrontational: one had to do away with the regime in 
general and Suharto in particular. Hence, neither of these tendencies gave priority to 
democratisation. One wanted reform, another quasi revolution. And as both failed, 
and critical discussions were prevented even at the larger universities, the third wave 
was less political, stressing more cautious work with NGOs. Again, democratisation 
was not the major issue. Instead the focus was on making people more independent 
through alternative livelihood projects and civil organising, as well as defence of their 
legal and human rights to do this and to criticise the regime.
Meanwhile capitalism expanded. The oil-crisis in the mid-80s generated more 
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investment in productive sectors. Rural areas were also affected. On the one hand, 
this called for authoritarian state intervention and gave rise to a multiplicity of 
interests and movements (rather than a unified working class). On the other hand, 
even limited liberalisation created some space which allowed certain people to try to 
improve their standard of living through different local efforts—not always grabbing 
political power first, and then relying on state intervention. Moreover, since it was 
mainly a question of authoritarian state sponsored primitive accumulation, most 
conflicts seemed to evolve between state and people rather than between private 
capitalists or landlords and their workers and tenants. Hence it was also possible 
to predict that the monopolisation of state power, including its repressive organs, 
would become major a issue and that demands for democracy might thus be a new 
unifying option for the opposition, and perhaps even generate a second liberation 
movement (Törnquist 1984).
Many scholars and dissidents were sceptical. The best way to find out if the 
above theory is valid is to analyse critically how various groups reacted and further 
developed in relation to a major and typical conflict that was not limited to the urban 
middle-class framework, but originated among rural poor. By the late 80’s, one such 
case was villagers’ resistance to the state imposed and World Bank financed building 
of a huge dam in the Kedung Ombo area in Central Java.58
Four rather distinct clusters stand out in terms of how different groups related 
to different ways of promoting substantial democratisation, in accordance with our 
model in the first part of the essay:
 59 the top-down catalysts; the grassroots activists; 
the intermediary cause-oriented groups; the dissident political leaders; the problems 
and options of labour movement organisers.
8.5 Top-down catalysts enforce but bypass democracy
Some of the Kedung Ombo villagers were thus trying to resist eviction, expropriation 
of land and low if any compensation in connection with the construction of the 
dam. Radical students linked up. There was some space for protests. This was more 
due to quarrel within the regime on the central as well as local levels than, as the 
students tended to believe, because they staged unusually brave and radical actions. 
The case (and the protests) was thus brought to the attention of the media as well as 
administrators and politicians, locally as well as in Jakarta.
58 For a brief analysis of the Kedung Ombo movement, see Budiman and Törnquist (2001), 
Ch. 1.
59 That is in what way (and to what extent) they promote substantial democratisation by way of 
integrating instrumental and democratic aims; by then struggling for constitutional rights (civil 
and political) and/or institutional channels (‘free and fair’ elections and open and accountable 
government), and/or by betting on building ‘a democratic society’—plus to what extent all 
this is associated with improving citizens’ own capacity to use and improve those means of 
democracy.
The basic rationale of the students (especially those arriving from Yogyakarta) 
was that there was a need for avant-garde politics to break up the regime and to 
thus liberate and give initial guidance ‘from above’ to suppressed people in slowly 
emerging civil organisations. People’s own spontaneous ability to resist and carry out 
collective action only had to be ignited and linked up with networks.
Much of this thinking has deep roots in the Indonesian liberation struggle. There 
is also a tradition of trying to act as a ‘moral force’, above narrow specific interests, 
to thus de-legitimate a ‘bad’ ruler. At times of low tide in collective action, the 
position of the top-down catalysts had been (and continued to be) that of patronising 
various NGOs, courageously speaking up in favour of civil and human rights, and 
defending all kinds of activists on all kinds of issues, while also linking them up 
with disenchanted sections of the elite. With waves of radicalism, as now in the late 
80’s and early 90’s, alternative forms of instigation emerged. Increasingly radical and 
restless students in covert study groups began to look around for signs in actual life 
of what they had read of exploited masses who could make a difference. They found 
local but still rather unarticulated protests among, primarily the rural poor against 
abusive land acquisition. They left most of the ‘established’ NGOs and dissidents 
behind. They formed new action groups, staged daring demonstrations, and thus 
tried to give voice to and space for the oppressed. Some constantly hunted for new 
issues attracting media and were labelled ‘action maniacs'. When unifying rallying 
points failed to appear, they tried to make up for this by simply, (as was the common 
expression) “not talking so much about the future but concentrating on getting rid 
of Suharto".
Hence, little emphasis was given to the strengthening of the villagers own pro-
democratic capacity. It was rendered impossible (given the repression) and building 
‘a democratic society’ was considered too time-consuming a way to proceed. Rather, 
the top-down catalysts had to pave the way, and widen the space, by acting on behalf 
of the villagers. Their grievances would be related directly to the general need to fight 
the state, the very regime, including the president, and to demand justice, human 
rights, and democracy. Some efforts were made to specify necessary rights but very 
little was said and done with regard to democratic mechanisms, even in terms of 
ideals for the future. This was bypassed. Even the catalysts’ own organisations were 
little but networks, with quarrels and infighting. Their relations with the villagers 
were not very democratic. And the co-operation with other less radical groups and 
activists that gave priority to different ways of supporting the villagers was poor.
Over the years, this avant-garde tradition has been most forcefully upheld by 
generations of student activists and alumni-cum-patrons, including the networking 
groups that were so instrumental in doing away with Suharto. (To be fair, in addition 
to a few intellectuals, the top-down catalysts were also among the few pro-democrats 
who brought up the issue of East Timor within the democracy movement.)
A major difference, of course, was that the students of May 1998 were no longer a 
few hundred ‘action maniacs’ from within the major elite universities, but hundreds 
of thousands from often less privileged institutions and with less secure economic 
backup and careers. But just like some ten years earlier at Kedung Ombo, the students 
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again believed that it was only their brave radicalism that mattered—rarely considering 
the importance of the crisis and conflicts within the regime nor years of other activists’ 
more long-term work. Moreover, they were up against similar problems. To put the 
point simply, soon after the ousting of Suharto they were confronted with three great 
obstacles, of which they were only able to surmount the first.
The first challenge was presented by a campaign that portrayed them as immature 
muddleheads who mainly caused traffic problems with all their demonstrations, and 
who wanted to bring down the old order but had no program for what to put in its 
place. There was, to be sure, something to this. In Jakarta, at the time (late 1998), I 
was often reminded of the student movement of 30 years ago in Europe. The latter 
too was not just pronouncedly political; it was cultural and anti-authoritarian as well. 
Yet that was nothing to despise; indeed, it was probably that which had the greatest 
significance over the long run. In addition, there was, among the new Indonesian 
students, a still greater and more hopeful and dynamic power which issued from the 
fact that they were not just breaking with authoritarian structures: they were also 
rediscovering history (which was forbidden) and opening up their society (which 
was closed). The students were the weeds that broke suddenly through the asphalt 
and burst into full bloom: beautiful but disordered. And most of them neither were 
nor are, most assuredly, naive or muddleheaded. Great numbers of them did and do 
read, discuss, analyse, and come to democratic decisions. Never have I encountered 
students with such questioning minds and such a thirst for knowledge as those who, 
in December 1998, took me off in an old borrowed taxi to meet with a larger group of 
young leaders from various campuses, and who then insisted on a six-hour marathon 
lecture on the political situation and the historical background. The hour grew late, 
yet it seemed to me that the gathering burned like a beacon in the Jakarta night. In 
the long run, the students have history on their side.
When the dawn came, however, it still broke over the same Jakarta, and that 
made things harder. The second problem faced by the students was the fact that 
almost all the established forces were trying to tame and use them. For one thing, 
Habibie, Wiranto and their cohorts in the regime were doing their best to keep 
control and to acquire new legitimacy by directing the reform process from above, 
and by marginalising radicals like the students. In addition, leaders like Gus Dur, 
Megawati, and Amien Rais were taking advantage of the fact that the students were 
putting pressure on the regime. This enabled those leaders to compromise with the 
weakened establishment, and to carry out cautious changes at a tranquil pace. The 
moderates were also trying to tame the students, so as to be able to contest the 
upcoming elections with a minimum of disturbance.
The students were at loss as to how to deal with this. In November 1998 (in 
relation to the extra-ordinary People’s Consultative Assembly) they failed to force the 
moderate leaders to unite and to go ahead on the basis of a radical mass movement. 
So then the students were faced with a third problem: that of formulating a political 
program of their own, and building an independent political base. This was the 
hardest challenge of all. The students functioned as a substitute for the lack of broad 
organisations among the middle and lower classes. They had no politics of their own, 
however, for linking their demonstrations either with the concerns of ordinary people 
or with the established political institutions, where negotiations were conducted and 
decisions made.
Changing this was difficult, for the weakness of the students was also their strength. 
Their strength lay in independence, integrity, and a lack of self-interest at a time when 
most everything was (and is) dominated by new and old patrons and bosses within 
politics, the economy, and the armed forces. Largely gone now was the approach of 
the many earlier students, which was to ally themselves with critics in the military, 
the political system, and the intellectual upper crust. Even the pro-democratic elite 
of yesterday complained at the time that the students did not always listen to them 
and did not follow their advice. Yet if this was a strength, it was also a weakness, 
for what would serve as the base for the students’ demands? What were the social 
moorings for their politics, their basis of politicisation? In order to protect their 
independence, as well as to avoid provocateurs and undisciplined masses of people, 
they even hesitated to allow ‘ordinary people’ to take part in the demonstrations and 
to demand their rights and defend their interests.
In the same way, it was both a strength and a weakness that the students were 
lacking a cohesive organisation with a distinct and encompassing leadership struc-
ture. It was (and is) networks that ruled the roost. This meant there was no top figure 
to seize or co-opt. It also meant it was possible to adjust to local conditions and to 
make use of the new vitality. At the same time, however, this loose organisational 
pattern made it hard for the students to reach out beyond their own group, to 
mobilise people on a broad basis, or to reach common decisions over long-term 
questions. The students were only able to unite behind resounding demands which 
were simple enough to be proclaimed on the streets and in the squares.
Worst of all, the students did not know how to relate to the coming elections. If 
we form a party, they said, we will be divided, and our independence and moral 
force will be lost. And if we concentrate our resources on political education and 
electoral monitoring, many added, we will risk legitimising not just a few good new 
forces, but also all those old villains who will assuredly be elected too. So even if the 
students had nothing against elections, their efforts proved irrelevant when election 
fever spread, and people realised that “villains or not—the only ones we have to vote 
for are the politicians of today and their parties.”
In short, top down political catalysts have a long tradition in Indonesia. By the late 
eighties they got a new start with the agitation in favour of rural villagers in remote 
Kedung Ombo and generated much of the powerful May 1998 student movement. 
Their actions confirm, of course, the proposition that popular conflicts with the state 
and political monopolisation are central and may generate demands for democracy. 
Moreover, their assumption about the need to liberate civil society by drastic political 
means before more extensive societal democratisation can take place, may be seen 
as an extreme version of our thesis on the importance of political facilitation and 
intervention to make civil society and social capital democratically fruitful. And to 
put it mildly, the Indonesian catalysts have now proved their point by being the 
pro-democratic group that finally managed to oust Suharto. On the other hand, 
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their experiences also confirm the mainstream thesis about increasingly fragmented 
movements and refute our argument that this would generate democratic and co-
operative solutions. Rather, the issues have been scattered and the actions have 
often been poorly organised and divisive within the democracy movement as a 
whole. With remarkable stubbornness, moreover, the catalysts have kept on abstain-
ing from improving ordinary citizens’ own capacity to promote democracy. The 
masses, especially the rural ones, should first be liberated by well-educated cadres 
with high moral standing, not mobilised, and organised. The catalysts have bypassed 
the promotion of ‘a democratic society’ as well as institutional channels (such as elec-
tions) and only proceeded via rather general demands for human rights to promote 
unspecified democratic aims.
8.6 Grassroots activists foster but limit democratisation
If it had not been for enduring and less conspicuous support of the villagers in 
Kedung Ombo by various grassroot activists, the students would not have many 
protesting peasant farmers to link up with in the first place. The grassroots activists 
also included some students (mainly from Salatiga) but were mainly related to small 
human rights-cum-alternative development oriented NGOs. The most principled ones 
included the groups led by legendary late liberation theologist Romo Mangun (Y.B. 
Mangunwijaya) and human rights activist Johni Simanjuntak. Later on, several less 
principled NGOs also entered the field.
In sharp contrast to the top-down catalysts, a common point of departure for the 
grassroots activists was the belief that there was no need to liberate people from 
above first. Despite tight repression there was instead some space for meaningful 
work in civil society. The basic aim was to enhance people’s own economic and 
political autonomy and capacity to co-operate and then also to build democracy 
from below. People themselves, the argument ran, were quite capable and willing to 
stand up against oppression. Also, there was a good deal of suspicion against ‘central’ 
leadership and integrated organisations; networks were enough.
As already hinted at, this new generation of alternative development and human 
rights NGOs (beyond old charitable organisations) emerged with the intellectuals 
who first supported the New Order but then turned increasingly critical. As they 
failed to reform the regime, many ‘adjusted’ themselves by trying to work ‘from 
within’ the system, while the more principled activists linked up with the radical 
student activists who had been smoked out of campuses and had to find some 
alternative space.
It is important here to separate the grassroots activists who really focused on 
working in the field, from those who instead established organisations to service the 
‘field workers’ and their ‘clients’ or simply to co-ordinate various NGOs. At times 
both functions were upheld within the same organisations (such as the Indonesian 
Legal Aid Association or the BinaDesa secretariat in support of peasant farmer liveli-
hood projects). But the distinction is vital, as the former had both the potential and 
the vision to act as an extended arm of temporarily defunct popular movements, 
while the latter, which we shall return to in the next section, were primarily sup-
portive, acted more like doctors in relation to their clients, or mainly catered to the 
capacity of the professionals themselves, such as journalists or lawyers.
Over the years a virtual but scattered fleet of such popular oriented NGOs emerged, 
covering various sectors, groups of people and geographical areas. Among the most 
dynamic were groups related to villagers (usually with ‘traditional’ leaders) badly 
affected by state-led primitive accumulation of capital in many places other than 
Kedung Ombo: from indigenous populations fighting mining companies to villagers 
resisting several other state backed dams or logging companies, or polluting factories, 
or plantations, or golf courses, or parking lots. Similarly, several dynamic pro-labour, 
pro-urban poor and pro-women groups emerged.60
The experiences of the grassroots activists thus also confirm our proposition about 
the primacy of conflicts against state-backed primitive accumulation. The pro-dem-
ocratic agenda and effects, however, were not self-evident. First, many grassroots 
oriented NGOs were less principled and worked within the established system. They 
included groups related to the socio-religious organisations (the most exciting of 
which was Nahdlatul Ulama, led by Abdurrahman Wahid, Gus Dur) that were among 
the few that could reach out in the rural areas during Suharto. Second, while it is 
generally safe to say, that grassroots contributed to the building of ‘a democratic 
society’, enhanced peoples’ pro-democratic capacity, and contributed to the promo-
tion of human rights, they rarely advanced much further. Like the top-down catalysts, 
they neglected other but shallow demands for and promotion of democratic channels 
(elections/open and accountable government). And while the catalysts were good at 
really pushing various issues and exerting political pressure, the grassroots activists 
mainly helped their local companions to form their own groups (often including 
respected traditional leaders), take their case to the local political or administrative 
bosses or connect their cases to a central service-NGO, who would then, at best, 
continue the work in higher hierarchies and internationally. Third, this in fact also 
pointed to the serious lack of co-ordination within the democracy movement as a 
whole. In addition to the major lack of an organised popular base, there were not 
even good contacts between the explicitly politically operating catalysts, for example, 
and the few grassroots activists that never the less existed.
After the fall of Suharto some activists took up explicitly political work, many 
continued with their previous activities which, of course, were as important as ever, 
for instance with regard to human rights, or the plight of tribes and minorities, or 
environmental destruction, or the promotion of autonomous co-operatives among 
60 For a few recent analyses of their democratic potential, see eg. Budiman & Törnquist (2001) 
Ch. 2 on the Nipah dam case, ch 3 on the Amunge case in Papua, ch 4 on the Medan strike, as 
well as Collins (2001) on peasant farmers’ and workers’ actions in post-Suharto Sumatra. Good 
examples of additional pro-democratic NGOs include the activities generated by the YLBHI 
labour desks, the various associated NGO forums in greater Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya, 
and the Urban Poor Coalition.
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weak sections of the population. But this was the time when all actors had started 
to say nice things about democracy and human rights, and this was the start of mass 
politics. So the voices of the dissidents were easily getting drowned. And they were 
still not very good at either mobilising people or at co-ordinating their activities with 
the outright political activists. So on their own, (and much like the students) they 
came out as rather fragmented pressure-cum lobbying groups that also tried to service 
some more or less popular alternative-development initiatives.
Consequently, a major problem continues to be if, and how, these grassroots groups 
can contribute to the rise, independence, and dynamism of autonomous organisa-
tions among people themselves, such as trade unions and peasant farmer organisa-
tions. Since the fall of the Suharto regime, as space for popular organization has 
widened extensively, it often seems as if the scattered interests and associations 
among people are multiplied by the tendency among the NGOs to compete over 
ideas, territories, contacts, funding and leading patrons. While labourers may think 
twice before splitting up and becoming weaker in fighting state-backed employers, 
police, and gangsters—trying in this way to develop some form of democracy to 
handle their internal disputes—the NGO-activists may just form another institute, 
with new contacts and funding.
On the other hand it remains to be seen what will now come out, in terms of 
democratisation, from the revitalised labour and peasant farmer organisation. Those 
trying to build genuine and democratic unions and peasant farmer groups from below 
are up against a fragmented array of different conflicts (such as between plantation 
labour who fight for their jobs and peasant farmers who want their land back) as 
well as the tendency to form new and ‘free’ unions (as it is difficult to change the 
old ones). Moreover, there is a simultaneous need for resources and some kind of 
co-ordination. This is difficult to mobilise and achieve just from below but is offered 
from above, for instance, from NGOs, foreign donors, and competing egos (such 
as Muchtar Pakpahan) and political projects (such as those related to PDI-P and 
PRD).We shall return to this later with a special section on the particular problems 
and options of labour movement organisers.
Similarly after Suharto, more general rural unrest spread in various parts of Indo-
nesia, not just in the form of partly instigated religious and ethnic violence but also, 
for instance, in relation to long overdue village elections in Java. Reporting was brief 
and scattered and it remains very difficult to draw any reasonably clear conclusions.61 
However, one way of understanding the problems with regard to democratisation 
should be to look briefly into a case which, relatively speaking, has the best of 
possibilities. Ideally it would also relate to the initial case of Kedung Ombo. So, 
once again, I called on a major and principled grassroot activist at that time, Johni 
Simanjuntak in Solo, and asked for a showcase to study. Simanjuntak continues to 
lead a now somewhat larger pro-human-rights and democracy NGO.
In the Central Java village of Gebjok, in Karanganyar district, just after the fall of 
61 C.f. Lane (1999), Kammen (2000), White and Bayu Aji (2000), and ISAI (2002). 
Suharto, a few dissidents asked Simanjuntak’s group for help to sue their corrupt 
lurah (village head). The advice given, however, was that nothing would change 
unless they themselves linked up with others and sought the support of the villagers 
in general. So this is what they did. A komite reformasi was formed to fight the lurah 
who had appropriated money for a fresh water project, over-charged people for land 
certificates and privatised public land in favour of his cronies. Demonstrations, for 
instance, where held at the lurah’s and bupati’s (the head of the district) offices (the 
lurah is still legally responsible to the bupati rather than to the villagers). The lurah’s 
office was occupied for two weeks, and an absolute majority of the villagers came 
forward to prevent the military and the police from intervening. When the lurah 
was brought to trial and temporarily discharged, the committee continued its work 
with regular meetings and public gatherings, initiated a co-operative to support 
agriculture, revealed local Golkar leaders’ usage of the public social safety net for 
their own political purposes, and then discussed how to gear up for demand of 
total reformation of the local administration. None of this was dependent on the 
fluctuations in foreign media coverage of demonstrations outside the Hotel Indonesia 
in central Jakarta.
The committee members were hardly revolutionaries. The chairman was a dynamic 
local factory mechanic in his mid-twenties. Other members included a retired school-
teacher who used to hunt communists in the 1960s, a much younger, well dressed 
and educated radical businessman, and a farmer-cum-agricultural labourer. Their 
party affiliations varied, some supported PDI-P, others the small NU-based PNU and 
one the conservative Muslim PBB.62 “But that doesn’t matter”, they told me, jokingly 
picking at each other. “That’s just general and traditional affiliations. The important 
thing is our list of what should be done here.” This was in June 1999.
My fear was that they would be co-opted and divided by the established politicians 
and administration on the district level. Because this is as far as the official process 
of democratisation has reached, with elections and decentralisation but without 
local parties that are based on genuine popular organisations. This is what the 
international agencies have decided to ‘consolidate’ by strengthening the existing 
institutions—but abstaining from supporting efficient popular organisation (such as 
in Gebjok) and engineering political institutions that such groups could at least relate 
to and make use of. The Gebjok activists at the time responded they did not know 
what would happen. They just wanted to hold on to their own program and relate to 
similar committees in nearby villages, and if possible on ‘higher’ levels too. I asked 
if they knew of any such committee ‘up there’—but of course they did not, since 
hardly any existed.
Between hope and reality, my query at the time was whether it was really beyond 
the capacity of the politically more ‘advanced’ pro-democrats at the more central 
levels to learn from Gebjok and unite on more aggregate but yet concrete minimum 
platforms (rather than only acting as isolated pressure groups or ideological spear-
62 PNU, Partai Nahdlatul Umat, PBB, Partai Bulang Bintang.
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heads). This would help provide links and an organisational and ideological frame-
work between committees on different levels (before they too were infected by neo-
traditional politics and administration and supported, unfortunately, by the interna-
tional democracy-builders). (Törnquist 1999a).
Six months later, little of this had happened. On the 27th of November, just as I 
revisited Gebjok, the committee failed miserably. The new bitter lesson, however, is 
equally important to learn.
It had started well. Golkar lost massively in the June elections and the committee 
won its legal case against the lurah. This meant an election of a new head of the 
village would also take place. But then political reconciliation among the elite took 
place on various levels. The new climate of ‘Pact Order’ took over. No common 
enemy was left to fight. Personal ambitions gained ground in the committee, which 
split. Two candidates for the lurah were nominated; one was brought in from outside 
the group by its then leader, the dynamic skilled worker; another emerged from 
within, the educated radical businessman. While PDI-P won the June general elec-
tions, remained politically and organisationally weak, and neither caused problems 
nor gave help to the committee, Golkar lost the people’s sympathies but retained its 
organisation and remained informally in control of the local administration. Hence, 
the latter candidate (the radical businessman) was skilfully prevented from running 
on legal grounds (he had been residing just outside the village). The politically less 
experienced committee was not able to work out an equally smart counter-move. 
Rather it stubbornly opted instead for boycott. Even worse, it actually tried to prevent 
the election on that Saturday morning (November 27) when I returned—and was 
stopped, of course, by the administration and the police, who therefore appeared 
as defenders of democracy and people’s right to vote. And this people did, rather 
massively—and in favour of a Golkar candidate.
It was virtually possible to see with ones own eyes how what was initially the 
best possible local and popular reformasi group turned out to be totally insufficient. 
The official (and internationally sponsored) local democratisation process did not 
offer a clear possibility for the local group to either form a local party, or otherwise 
participate in local politics in a way that would have made sense, in terms of advanc-
ing their instrumental aims. Rather they had to turn to personalised political competi-
tion and to lobby the parties and groups that continued to monopolise local politics. 
And then without clear ideological and political leadership, even the best of pro-civil 
society and social capital promotion failed miserably.
8.7 Intermediary cause-oriented groups serve but do not anchor 
democracy
If the top-down catalysts and grassroots activists in Kedung Ombo had not been 
protected and able to take the problems of the villagers ‘higher up’ in the movement, 
the case would probably have been lost and forgotten. However, concerned journal-
ists and academics wrote articles and essays. Lawyers from the Yogyakarta and 
Semarang branches of the Indonesian Legal Aid Association (YLBHI), as well as its 
central Jakarta office, offered their capacity to defend, negotiate, argue, and lobby. 
Later, additional human rights organisations at the centre also entered. The joint 
organisation for independent Indonesian NGOs and their foreign partners, INFID,63 
took the case to the international level and put hard pressure on the sponsors of the 
dam, including the World Bank.
As previously mentioned, we are now talking about activists and their organisations 
who mainly aim to service the grassroots workers in the field, promote networks 
among various NGOs, promote their own activists’ professional capacity (for instance 
as concerned lawyers or journalists) and lobby and take cases to the central levels 
of the state as well as to international institutions. At times, these organisations also 
do their own fieldwork, as sections of the YLBHI branches did, for instance. But 
generally speaking they are on an intermediate level, between the people and the 
activists on the grassroots level, and the general (‘national’) discourse, the state, and 
the international ‘top’ level.
A major problem, then, was (and is) that the intermediary organisations were not 
rooted among their ‘clients’ at the grassroots level. They simply did not have a clear 
base, both in terms of members and the people on the ground themselves. In the 
Kedung Ombo case, therefore, as in so many subsequent ‘affairs’, there were frequent 
conflicts between field-activists and well funded, well-reputed and at times self-impor-
tant leaders from ‘above’. But more than that, with so many actors and few bodies to 
co-ordinate (aside from some regional NGO forums), not to mention institutions for 
democratic deliberation and decision-making, various conflicts occurred over perspec-
tives, visions, territory, money, contacts, patrons, and personalities. Civil organisational 
life was thus promoted, but once again it is clear, then, that the strengthening of civil 
society as such does not necessarily promote co-operation and democratisation.
Simultaneously, and over the years, many other groups that were and similarly 
harnessing, servicing, lobbying and cause-oriented have gained prominence. These 
including the environmental NGOs under the Walhi-umbrella, the rural community 
and pro-peasant farmer groups within BinaDesa, additional human rights and policy 
centres such as Elsam and PBHI, the journalists’ and cultural workers’ institute, 
ISAI, for studies and the promotion of freedom of speech, the women’s communica-
tion, information and information centre Kalyanamitra, the more recent series of 
corruption, election and other watchdogs, and the lobbying and advocacy groups 
such as the centre for electoral reform and the solidarity movement for East Timor. 
A few and new mass-member-oriented action groups such as KontraS (to assist and 
organise victims of violence) have also appeared, as well as many others, especially 
at the district level.64
63 INGI (after 1993 INFID), International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development
64 The full names are: Walhi, Indonesian Forum for Environment; BinaDesa, Indonesian Secre-
tariat for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas; Elsam, The Institute for Policy 
Research and Advocacy; PBHI, Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association; ISAI, The 
Institute for Studies on Free Flow of Information; Kalyanamitra, Women’s Communication and 
Information Centre; KontraS, The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence
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By the mid-90s, some of the old problems of weak bases, fragmentation, and lack 
of joint deliberation and co-ordination were addressed by efforts at convergence 
and political intervention. Increasingly many intermediary and ‘non-political’ NGOs 
claimed that alternative development, justice, and human rights called for democra-
tisation. Several groups realised that it was not enough just to widen and strengthen 
civil society. They began to ask questions as to which social and political forces and 
actors could possibly enforce democratisation. This process first revolved around the 
YLBHI, with its self-proclaimed locomotive of democracy, Adnan Buyong Nasution 
(later on deserting the principled democrats).65
Simultaneously, although the 1994 crackdown on media (such as Tempo) and 
journalists with basic integrity was a setback, it also provided a major injection of 
support for the movement (cf Budiman and Törnquist 2001 Ch. 4). Many journalists 
and cultural workers—who had long been in favour of human rights and freedom of 
speech, but had mainly tried to serve the movement by doing their jobs, realised that 
it would be impossible to implement and sustain these rights without reasonably solid 
democratisation. This was not just a question of idealism and ideology, but was in 
line with their purely instrumental interests of being able to think, research, write and 
publish. Of course, the same was true of many dedicated lawyers, students, academics 
and so on, who were able to collaborate through their professional channels and 
work together to do some good. The journalists, however, were now restricted by the 
closure of the media. Those with integrity (some gave up) combined idealism and 
ideological commitment while directly catering to their own interests and constituen-
cies. Alternative unions (AJI)66 and associations (ISAI and others) for alternative 
studies, research, discussion, intelligence, communication and alternative media were 
established, on the basis of extensive networks, some money (from the old profitable 
days), international reputation (of senior editors such as Goenawan Mohamad), 
and organisational skill; plus a good portion of anger and decisiveness. In fact, 
several of the younger leaders were not just good investigative journalists, editors 
and managers, they had also received basic training as principled activists in the 
Kedung Ombo affair.
However, problems remained, as is best shown by the example of the human rights 
activists and journalists, who, with renewed vigour, made major attempts to advance 
democracy. By early 1996, they had generated a kind of action-oriented public space, 
thus spurring increasingly politicised efforts at democratisation. Regular (but fake) 
elections were due in early 1997. Megawati, the symbolic head of the marginalised 
but legal nationalist party, PDI, was in a position to cause some trouble, perhaps 
with unofficial support from Gus Dur’s Nahdlatul Ulama. All this in turn, it was 
argued, could well develop into a breeding ground for genuine pro-democracy efforts. 
One major effort, therefore, was to bring together various groups at the central level, 
intermediate NGOs as well as dissident political formations, behind the forming 
65 The need for more studies and discussions on this within the democracy movement was 
behind the project commencing 1994, see preface Budiman & Törnquist (2001)
66 AJI, The Alliance of Independent Journalists.
of an electoral watch movement called KIPP.67 KIPP would then be used not just 
to state (as usual) but also prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elections had 
been rigged. Thereby Megawati could refuse to accept the result (something which 
had never happened before), which in turn would cause a major constitutional and 
political crisis. In the process of first consolidating KIPP and then defending its 
expected verdict on the elections, plus spreading the demand for justice and substan-
tial democracy, it should be possible to harness the scattered democracy movement 
as a whole, including on the grassroots level, and thus to generate common and 
genuine projects. That was the intention.
Well before serious efforts had been made to move KIPP beyond a discussion 
group among Jakarta elite personalities, however, Suharto intervened to prevent 
Megawati from running in the elections. This in turn led to a stalemate, where the 
democracy activists could not rely on a converging movement and programme of 
their own—since that had not yet evolved—and so did their best to advance behind 
Megawati. Unfortunately there was no alternative, since expansion beyond the circle 
of KIPP’s dissident elite had never been given priority. They had not even linked up 
with the grassroots activists in various ground-level NGOs through the intermediary 
cause-oriented groups. At the time, when one of the best of YLBHI’s leaders was 
asked as to the possibility of using the pro-labour NGO-network on the grassroots 
level to strengthen and anchor the KIPP, he replied that these were two entirely 
different projects. It is true to say that the regime, on July 27, displayed its incapacity 
to reform itself, by having to crack down with brutal force on the activists advancing 
behind Megawati (thus ironically generating ethnic and religious riots instead).68 But 
simultaneously the basic weakness of the movement became equally obvious—its frag-
mentation and its separation between top-down activists who tend to ‘run offside’69 
and grassroots activists who have not yet been able to generate interest-based mass 
organisations from below. After the crackdown on the democracy movement behind 
Megawati on July 27, it became extremely difficult to move ahead.
In conclusion, the intermediary groups were no longer solely focusing on the 
furthering of constitutional rights, or the building (to some extent) of a ‘democratic 
society’, to promote both instrumental and democratic aims. They were also consider-
ing institutional channels in terms of elections and governance. However, in this 
context they mainly functioned as elitist lobby and pressure groups with little integra-
tion and prioritisation between issues, ideas, and cases. Hence they could neither 
substitute for the lack of, nor harness the generation of, popularly rooted political 
parties on the basis of major conflicts and ideas of how society should be organised, 
or even similar mass organisations among peasant farmers and workers.
Little of this changed after the fall of Suharto. Of course, leading activists (at least) 
no longer risked open repression. There were no more intelligence people pretending 
to fish in the canal outside the office of the Alternative Journalist Association, to 
67 KIPP, Independent Committee for Election Monitoring
68 For a brief analysis of the 27/7 affair, see Budiman&Törnquist (2001) Ch.6.
69 Moving too far forward. 
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take but one example. But only a few activists were able to relate their associations 
to the radical political opposition, including the students, offering various kinds of 
support—from advocacy and legal aid, to food and medical assistance. The public 
space created by ISAI and YLBHI, among other intermediary groups, could be used 
by activists who either tried to build new parties or bet on working within the 
mainstream formations with ones that stood a chance in the 1999 elections. But 
the intermediary cause oriented groups as such, mainly retreated to their role as 
lobby and pressure units. The Walhi NGO-network, for instance, rejected the idea 
of generating an alternative green political movement. KIPP, moreover, was turned 
into a mainstream electoral watchdog with few ambitions (not to talk of capacity) at 
going beyond superficial monitoring and voter education by, for example, harnessing 
the entire movement, including the students, in favour of radical democratic reform. 
Rather, KIPP and the elitist NGO-community at large seemed (and seem) to agree 
on promoting majority elections in one-man districts. On the one hand, this might 
undermine the big established (and not very pro-democratic) parties—and also any 
attempt to build new and more genuine ones (which the NGOs do not seem to be 
very interested in). On the other hand there would be some space for personality 
oriented and NGO-rooted lobby and pressure politics (which they do seem to be 
interested in)—but also for elitist and local boss-rule such as that in neighbouring 
Philippines or Thailand.
8.8 Dissident political leaders build and bend democracy
In the early 90s, many of the young top-down catalysts who made their debut in 
Kedung Ombo by negating cautious NGO work in civil society in favour of daring 
demonstrations began to feel that this was not good enough. To advance, they said, 
there was a need for consistent work on the ground, more overall organising, and 
a long term ideological perspective. There was still a need to break up the regime 
and liberate civil society from above by way of avant-garde politics. But this and 
loose networking had to be supplemented by enrolling and mobilising the people. 
In other words, one should build a party with a clear ideology and associated mass 
organisations (among workers, peasant farmers, youth and so on).
This way a new, young, radical generation of Indonesian activists rediscovered 
and partly reinvented the need for and character of modern political organisations 
(such as those developed by West European social democrats as well as reformist 
communists and Christian democrats).
Historically, of course, this was not new to Indonesia, just hidden away during 
thirty years of New Order, and swept under the carpet first by American non-
ideological party politicians and then of non-politicised civil societies. In Indonesia 
there are two historical patterns. One model dates back to the middle class intel-
lectuals who tried to build ‘modern’ parties but did not get popular support and 
ended up with elitist formations, like the former West-oriented Socialist Party, or 
elite-led parties based on conventional loyalties, such as the nationalist party (PNI) 
related to Sukarno and the Islamic modernist party Masjumi, related to the former 
vice-president Hatta.
What remained in the mid-90s, however, was westernised leaders from the elitist 
tradition who initially supported the New Order but then turned critical of it and 
were deprived of their organisational and popular base. Their main enduring asset 
was some integrity and legitimacy in the eyes of may people, and among Western 
governments and agencies. This made it possible for them to mobilise some resources 
and, more importantly, to stand out as necessary partners of any slightly more liberal 
regime and the more or less well connected action groups and NGOs. Examples 
of democratically oriented political leaders at the time included Buyung Nasution 
and associates, Ali Sadikin and other ex-generals in the Petition 50 group, Abdurrah-
man Wahid and Marsilam Simanjuntak’s Democratic Forum and later on Bintang 
Pramukas and Julius Usman’s PUDI-party as well as Muchtar Pakpahan’s pro-union 
groups.70 There were also additional remnants of the old socialists as well as various 
nationalist and Muslim parties. Later on several of them were brought behind the 
electoral watchdog KIPP and tried to get a new lease of life in the 1999 elections, but 
again they suffered from insufficient organisational and popular bases. Only leaders 
who related to the parties that had been allowed to exist and develop networks and 
clientelism under Suharto (i.e. Megawati’s PDI and the Muslim PPP) or to the two 
dominating socio-religious reform movements, Nahdlatul Ulama (led by Abdurrah-
man Wahid) or Muhammadiya (led by Amien Rais) stood a chance. The only major 
alternative was to turn to extra-parliamentary politics and to, for instance, support 
and ‘guide’ various students through alumni associations and old youth movements.
The other model is that of the reformist-communists from the fifties and early 
sixties who also made use of some conventional loyalties but still managed to build 
a comparatively ‘modern’ party with some 20 million people in attached popular 
organisations. While the reformist-communists are no more, the new generation of 
young radical political activists who want to build a modern mass party naturally still 
look at this only Indonesian example for some inspiration.
Like the dissident old elite, the new party building radicals were of course also 
short of a popular base to start off from, and also of contacts and funds. To make 
up for this, they first worked hard within various NGOs with resources and access 
to the grassroots. However, as it was thought that it would take too long, they 
rarely continued by going on to form mass organizations from below, such as unions 
and peasant farmers’ associations. Instead they tried to carry out top-down, cadre-
based mobilisation. In terms of our model of substantial democratisation, this meant 
that they neither emphasised capacity building among people, nor focused on con-
stitutional rights or the alternative generation of a ‘democratic society’ but rather 
stressed the democratic channels in terms of elections and government. This though, 
in reality, mainly implied the building of their own party and various attached ‘mass 
organisations’.
Yet, this way, and particularly because of their organisational skills, the young 
70 PUDI, Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia, lead by Sri-Bintang Pamungkas.
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party-political activists played an important role in the attempts in early 1996 to 
generate a more unified and politically relevant democracy movement. Their party, 
the People’s Democratic Party (PRD), however, was only formally established in 
mid-1996 and was quite unable to make a difference when the general pro-democratic 
strategy (presented in the previous sub-section) was undermined (as Suharto pre-
vented Megawati from running in the elections and KIPP failed to move beyond 
elitist negotiations in Jakarta). PRD could do little but try to advance ‘from within’ 
the populist movement in support of Megawati. This shortcut, as we know, proved 
disastrous: PRD was even officially accused of having instigated the July 27
th
 riots, 
which followed the early morning goon-attack on the PDI-P headquarters, paid for 
and ordered by the regime.
While many liberal and moderate leaders within the democracy groups immediately 
took shelter, the new KontraS movement among principled human rights activists, 
however, and various journalists and cultural workers with ISAI, stood up and got 
a very exciting public reaction. For the first time there were clear signs that more 
and more people simply did not accept the regime’s attempts to explain away its 
crackdown, by accusing ‘communists’ of masterminding the protests and the riots. 
Rather, what then followed was more co-operation between so-called communists 
and liberal journalists, Muslim democrats and human rights activists, among others. 
And the reports of conflicts continued between broader sections of the population, 
including peasant farmers and labourers on the one hand, and the state, with related 
businessmen on the other.
PRD itself, however, was crushed and its main leaders were on the run, imprisoned, 
kidnapped, tortured or at times assassinated. It was not until the economic and politi-
cal crisis generated some new space, that the party-builders could make a new start. 
This time the shortcut was not Megawati but the renewed student movement—plus 
attempts to link them up with various protests in the society at large, including those 
of villagers but primarily with those of workers and the urban poor.
Short of their own mass organisations, however, the PRD-activists could do little 
to alter the situation. Despite being one of the few groups within the democracy 
movement as a whole that had paid attention to the need for democratic institutions 
such as parties, elections, and open and accountable government, the PRD failed to 
spread or give priority to this message among the students, but instead gave priority 
to action in the street. The party even faced serious internal divisions over whether 
or not it should participate in the elections. The actual result was that it did run, but 
not to make a difference, only to propagate.
8.9 Problems and options for new labour organisers
Interestingly, the major expanding party- and democracy-related group is currently 
the more pragmatic and grounded trade union movement led by Dita Sari.71 The 
same goes for the progressive but non PRD-related workers groups that try to build 
organisations more from below (and which we already discussed briefly in section 
8.6 on the grassroots activists). And there are some similar signs from among peasant 
farmers. This, however, is within very complicated fields of action.
To begin with, let us recall the mainstream general thesis that it is the working 
class (rather than the bourgeois forces) which, within the framework of capitalist 
expansion, and in alliance with sections of the middle classes, propel democratisa-
tion—as in many cases in Europe, Latin America and recently in South Africa (cf 
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992). Of course, labourers in general have become potentially 
more important in Indonesia with the expansion of capitalism, but the argument 
about their decisive role in the process of democratisation has not proved particularly 
helpful. It is true that the important Indonesian workers’ organisations during the 50s 
and early-60s testify to the fact that massive and pro-democratic labour organising is 
far from impossible, despite weak and uneven industrialisation. But even the reform-
ist communists at the time did not give priority to the workers. And then followed, 
of course, the destruction of all mass based popular movements, plus thirty years of 
authoritarian ‘floating mass’ politics—which created immense barriers to any kind of 
significant labour organisation.
Yet, and despite this, there were clear signs from the early-80s onwards of demands 
not just for better wages and working conditions (especially intense in new industrial 
sectors which had to compete on the world market and could not compensate 
various costs by increasing prices) but also for fundamental human and democratic 
rights, including the right to organise. This was most visible in private and foreign 
market exposed industries, but also elsewhere. Actually, it is quite obvious that one 
cannot ‘only’ explain the minimal role of workers in Indonesia’s infant democratisa-
tion with reference to the massive repression under the New Order. Rather, one also 
has to add the weak popular politics of democratisation, including the lack of alli-
ances with most of the politicised middle class democrats. Otherwise the breakdown 
of the New Order repression should have generated a massive rise of protests and 
organisation among workers, despite their weakened market bargaining power under 
the economic crisis. But that did not come about. In spite of great potential, workers 
and labour in general continued to play a comparatively minimal role in the pro-
democratic work. So in addition to the historical factors and the sustained crisis, and 
the increasingly privatised violence of thugs and militias, one must add to this the 
weak popular politics of democratisation.
In my understanding the following are the major factors involved: first, the tendency 
to establish many new independent groups and organisations, since it is an uphill task 
to change the old ones; second, the divisive (formal and informal) strings attached 
to much needed resources, including from central organisations, NGOs, and foreign 
donors; third, the problematic way in which foreign partners try to promote ‘unity’ 
which sometimes causes more rifts; fourth, the localisation of politics and bossism 
which often cause further divisions among the unions; fifth, the predominance of pres-
71 Thus effectively refuting deterministic arguments (even in some PRD related circles) of the 
need for more advanced capitalism with more concentrated factories, for instance, before this 
kind of mass organising makes sense.
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sure-politics, lobbying, and clientelism; sixth, the negligible importance for workers 
of parliamentary politics and elections; and seventh the lack of correspondence 
between the two separate progressive strategies of promoting grassroots initiatives or 
broad general-issue-alliances.72
In my judgement, the emergence of a broad labour movement with an independent 
but active political perspective depends on the positive interrelation between these 
two latter components. The first strategy is to try to uphold control and independence 
by building genuine, democratic, and viable unions on the local level, based on 
workers’ concrete interests and the local, contextual opportunities and balances of 
forces. The second agenda (at least tentatively suggested by Dita Sari) is to identify 
the concrete but general (and potentially strategic) issues that may separate the 
genuine leaders and workers from the collaborators and blacklegs as well as unify 
workers on different levels and in most contexts. Tactical alliances may be built 
around the celebration of May 1 as well as to protest against oppressive structural 
adjustment policies and new labour laws. Such alliances may include unions as well 
as student action groups and NGOs. The idea is that they then become strategic 
and linked the local with the national, and the concrete union demands with wider 
political programs.
The major problem with the bottom-up strategy is that too few workers are consist-
ently interested. It is such a herculean task for the principled and genuine worker-
activists to compete successfully on the market (without giving up their integrity) with 
much less upright and much more resourceful unions on the local level. The latter 
mainstream unions, moreover, are often able to both strike a balance with govern-
ment interest in rebuilding a viable labour regime and benefit from internationally 
sponsored projects to promote unity.
But the general-issue-alliance line is also troublesome. It is true, for instance, that 
workers are getting much more aware of the fact that their own concrete demands 
are dependent upon Indonesia’s debts and the structural adjustment programmes. 
This therefore calls for political change. It is also true that there have been extensive 
forceful and so far fairly successful demonstrations against attempts to undermine the 
laws (without offering an acceptable alternative) governing employers’ responsibili-
ties when firing workers. The current regulation (Ministerial Decree no. 150/2000) 
stipulates substantial payouts to the workers. This, together with many other rules 
and regulations that workers either deem unfair or when fair, cannot see that they 
are upheld, continue to be a time bomb. Then again, this need to unite on certain 
general issues may primarily be related to central level negotiations and certain 
specific local manifestations but not affect the ways in which the local unions have 
to defend workers ‘interests’ on a daily basis in the workplace. Or to put it the other 
way around: so far it does not seem to be the basic and contextual local problems of 
defending the workers that call for this unity, but a few separate issues, albeit vital 
ones. In principle one may well argue (with Beckman 2000 and 2000a), that even 
industry should be interested in a more legitimate and efficient labour regime—which 
72 For an extended analysis, see Törnquist (2001b) 
would then include some of those regular basic issues—as it is more expensive to 
handle thousands of furious unorganised workers than to strike a deal with their 
unions and call upon the state to provide decent social security and unemployment 
schemes, for instance.73 But the problem is that this calls for resources which, to my 
knowledge, nobody seems to be capable or willing to invest, including among foreign 
donors and/or investors. It is true that the IMF and the World Bank, for instance, 
were eager to involve organised labour in the attempts to promote a social pact in 
post-crisis South Korea. But that presumed that organised labour was already so 
strong that it could not be neglected, neither as an enemy nor as a partner.
8.10 The dynamics of the stumbling blocks
In Indonesia, as in the case of the Philippines, the results thus remain incomplete. 
Many of our propositions have been confirmed. Over the years, the struggle against 
authoritarianism tended to focus on political monopolisation as a basic element of 
primitive accumulation of capital as well as on general demands for democracy. 
Politicisation (and finally even a student revolt) was necessary to strengthen and turn 
the wider civil society in a pro-democratic direction. The then instant crafting of 
democracy has already proved deficient. Even in a country where conflicts between 
West oriented social democratic and communist theses have been most disastrous 
and remained paradigmatic well beyond the end of the cold war, our argument 
about possible new alliances within the Left seems to have been vindicated since 
the mid-90s.
On the other hand, however, two major puzzles remain to be tackled. The demo-
cratic aims remained shallow. The breakthrough was only possible once globalised 
neo-liberals finally turned against their former strongman. And soon, of course, they 
were the ones dominating the agenda. Moreover, the mainstream argument that 
capitalist modernisation generates deep economic, social, and political fragmentation, 
was vindicated whilst the alternative thesis that this would necessitate democratic co-
ordination among the opposition was proved wrong. Most serious, while many pro-
democrats regarded human rights, and at times democratisation of civil society, as 
necessary means to enforce democratic principles and reach their instrumental ends, 
they never really bothered about shaping democratic institutional channels for people 
to be able to make use of elections and develop open and accountable government. 
Aside from advocacy, monitoring, and lobbing, they instead tried to bypass this by way 
of ‘people power’ and seminars on direct democracy, thus turning politically almost 
irrelevant as soon as reformist incumbents and moderate dissidents had brought the 
situation under control.
73 For example, the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Jakarta, James Castle 
of the Castle Groups, has given voice to the need to realise that “labor, management and 
government depend on each other”, implicitly calling for a functioning social pact. Jakarta 
Post 20/701.
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What were the dynamics of these key problems of democratisation? The dif-
ficulties are very reminiscent of the interim conclusions drawn from the Philippine 
experiences. So once again—though now in the special Indonesian context—we need 
to ask why it has been so difficult for pro-democrats to fight fragmentation and to 
transform extra-parliamentary action into institutionalised political alternatives for 
society as a whole.
Like in the Philippines—despite the very different context—none of the major 
propositions from section 5.6 (operationalised in section 6) seems to be validated. 
First, the young class-party builders of the PRD have definitely injected fresh and 
critical perspectives into the democracy movement. But they have focused on propa-
ganda and attempts at mobilising people from the top down. There are no clear 
empirical indications that their propositions for how to advance would be more 
fruitful than most of the others within the democracy movement as a whole. The 
adherence to democratic centralism may further the efficiency of the core group but is 
hardly likely to leave the same effect on broad alliance work that is based on trust.
Secondly, neither of the typical pragmatic arguments among many Indonesian 
reformists has proved particularly successful. One is that the dissidents should gain 
as much influence as possible within the elite and avoid mingling with uneducated 
masses who are often attracted and misled by authoritarian doctrines and leaders; 
another is that leading democrats should make their way to the top by drawing on the 
‘traditional’ clientelist and populist clout of leaders such as Wahid and Megawati. The 
moderate reformists working within the New Order system were effectively domesti-
cated and isolated, with, at times, the partial exception of Abdurrahman Wahid and 
Megawati. After Suharto, then, first Habibie’s moderate reformists, attached to ICMI, 
and thereafter Wahid and his Democratic Forum friends, largely failed to reform the 
country and in the last case, even to govern it. At present most radical reformers 
behind Megawati have also lost out.
There is much to the grassroots thesis that conventional political dissidents focus 
on the elite-level at the expense of local, grounded work. There is even less indica-
tion than in the Philippines, however, that the grassroots prescriptions have been 
vindicated. Liberal promotion of civil societies and self-management, as well as more 
focused but still locally ‘autonomous’ interested based organising (such as among 
workers and farmers), continue to be plagued by fragmentation.
In Indonesia the political-market proposition (in terms of forming a generally 
progressive political vehicle that would stand a chance in elections) has so far only 
been attempted behind Megawati in early 1996 and in the post-Suharto building of 
the PAN-party. Both efforts, however, soon lost out to powerful traditional politicians 
with firm access to political machines and the capacity to draw on populist charisma 
and religious and other loyalties.
The most obvious case of the fifth extra-parliamentary militant network thesis, 
finally, is that of the Indonesian students who demonstrated their point by radicalis-
ing the discourse, opening up new agendas and overthrowing Suharto. But as we 
know from the previous analyses, no matter how brave and important their actions, 
they did not achieve this on their own. There were vital structural and other precondi-
tions, including the political and economic crisis and the work for many years of 
so many other sections of the democracy movement. What is more, the activists 
fundamentally unable to broaden and sustain their work and efforts, particularly 
when facing issues of representation (including elections) and demand for alternative 
policies and governance.
Just as in the very different context of the Philippines, therefore, we have to go 
beyond the common explanations and prescriptions by asking why they do not make 
sense. Are there any unifying factors (in terms of position in the political terrain 
and politicisation; see sections 4.4 and 4.5 above) that could help us discuss what 
is wrong with the different theses?
Despite the many sharp differences between the Philippines and Indonesia, for 
instance in terms of socio-economic structure and political opportunities, the pattern 
seem to be quite similar: the predominance of single issues and specific interests, 
on the one hand, and the insufficient co-ordination between actions in the civil-, 
civil-political, and explicitly political society, as well as between central and local 
levels, on the other.
Single issues and specific interests: Aside from the class-party builders who stress 
ideology and collective interests—but have rarely been strong enough to practice 
this consistently beyond the level of propaganda—the pragmatists who have worked, 
for instance, as specialists under Wahid and Megawati, have not just (as in the 
Philippines) been subordinated to the agenda of their masters, as in the Philippines. 
In Indonesia most of the pragmatists have also tried to benefit from identity based 
loyalties behind such leaders—but suffered from the shallow general ideas involved 
and the host of specific groups and interests under their surface.
The problematic pattern with regard to proponents of the grassroots thesis is 
even more pronounced in Indonesia than in the Philippines. Collective and interest 
based organisation was prohibited for more than three decades. NGOs have had 
few chances to relate to (or promote) anything but fragmented groups and specific 
interests, or rather innocent civic issues. Pro-democratic campaigners in favour of 
human and social rights, sustainable environment, freedom of the press and so on 
have tried to form civil-political alliances in relation to certain ‘hot-cases’, and later 
on also within their realm of specialisation. But the focus on certain and separate 
key-issues and interests remain the same.
The advocates of the political market thesis in Indonesia tried to pave the way 
for aggregation of issues and interests by boosting processes that might generate 
broad and comparatively progressive political parties. But the support (in 1996) for 
Megawati and the building of a politically broad-based electoral watch organisation 
were short even of unifying ideas on democratisation. And the more recent (1999) 
PAN platform was mainly established to attract middle class voters behind good 
solutions to a series of separate issues, while the major glue and ability to mobilise 
support still rested with modernist Muslim values and loyalties.
The most extreme form of concentration of single issues and specific interests, 
finally, is among the extra parliamentary militant networks that were even more 
important in Indonesia than in the Philippines. The students were very important but 
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‘only’ did away with Suharto. Suharto, corruption, human rights and a few others 
issues had become the major focus of so many different groups, old and new. A series 
of additional issues and interests were of course related to them, but class-based 
labour and peasant farmer issues, for instance, were set aside. Students in terms of 
a moral force (or the lonely cowboy coming to town and cleaning up),74 were at the 
forefront. And few knew how everything fitted together, if it did at all. Nobody was 
able (or willing) to try to work out priorities or elements of a program. Those who 
tried split immediately. Hence, there was no focus on an alternative project in terms 
of government, governance and development of the society as a whole at different 
levels—only on promoting or resisting this or that. So when elections appeared at the 
top of the agenda, the militant networks were immediately marginalised.
Civil vs. political society; central vs. local level: The Indonesian adherents of the 
class-party proposition have continuously focused on the central level and political 
society. Their weak local basis is of course much due to decades of repression, 
but aside from the separate trade union work, and some attempts among peasant 
farmers, priority has been given to top down propaganda approaches and attempts 
at broadening campus-based student activism. Also, there has been more belittling of 
grassroots civil society work than attempts at finding ways of relating and linking it 
up to efforts at the level of political society. Like in the Philippines, this is related 
to the previously identified tendency to promote democracy by bypassing much of 
the ground-work (in terms of enhancing people’s democratic capacity as well as the 
various means to promote democratic principles) in favour of one single and top-
driven institutional channel, the party and its associated organisations. In the most 
extreme case of Indonesia, this in turn has generated interests in shortcuts by rallying 
behind popular leaders, such as Megawati in 1996.
The Indonesian pragmatists that have tried to influence the mainstream elite have 
been even more isolated than in the Philippines and have been even more unable to 
mobilise popular support than the class-party activists in their own country, especially 
on the local level. Some have made up for this by relating to politicians with an 
ability to mobilise mass following through populism and clientelism. Certain attempts 
have also been made to establish more independent forms of alternative patronage 
through foreign funded central NGOs. Yet the problems have persisted and become 
even more serious with the localisation of political power. Many of the populist and 
clientelist ways of incorporating people into politics have been based on, on the one 
hand, religious and ethnic loyalties and, on the other hand, rough political methods. 
The result, of course, is even more divisiveness, dangerous conflicts between various 
communities, patrons, bosses, thugs and followers—and an even weaker democracy 
movement.
Also, as in the Philippines but more dominant and serious in Indonesia, the sup-
porters of the grassroots proposition have to a great extent been confined to the 
local level and to civil society work. It is true that many activists have refrained 
74 To use the allegory of one of the founding fathers (from the mid-60s) of the contemporary 
Indonesian moral-force-student-movement, Arief Budiman.
from entering or linking up with political work in order to be able to focus on the 
strengthening of civil society or the building of a trade union or a peasant farmer 
organisation without being abused by politicians of all kinds, left or right. But also, 
as in the Philippines this simultaneously indicates an incapability of the grassroots 
activists themselves to offer an alternative way of relating the local to the central as 
well as civil to political efforts. Hence, they have either remained in the margins, 
or have had to relate to rather top-driven central NGOs and pressure groups. In 
the latter case there are examples of civil-political societies that link and include 
actions at both the political and civil levels. But these have often been top-driven 
with limited internal democracy, leading personalities (including ‘friendly pragmatics’ 
within political society) are weakly anchored among popular organisation on the 
ground, and confined to specific issues such as human rights, sustainable develop-
ment, or sectoral but highly factionalised attempts at building trade union federa-
tions. In terms of politics of democratisation, this has further exposed the previously 
revealed fundamental weakness of the grassroot thesis—its neglect of institutional 
channels.
The Indonesian proponents of the need to apply the political market thesis have 
been both weak and unsuccessful. The efforts to generate a positive dynamic in 
the support for Megawati against Suharto—including through the forming of the 
KIPP electoral watch movement—mainly remained a top-down project with few 
efficient links to the local level and between political and civil society. The post-
Suharto middle class and issue based PAN party remained dependent on certain 
Muslim communal loyalties. Political activists within various NGOs (such as Walhi) 
abstained from forming new parties (which they had too poor a popular following 
to build anyway) and bet instead on electoral reform. The aim was to dethrone the 
existing parties by introducing single member constituencies and direct presidential 
elections (which, unfortunately, would be likely to produce local political bossism 
instead) and thus pave the way for lobbying and pressure politics.
Finally we come to the extra-parliamentary militant networks. These have been 
particularly important in Indonesia. The pattern is very clear. Firstly they are cen-
tralised in cities and on campuses and focused on individuals. Secondly, their net-
working activities are not disciplined and they lack democratic coordination. The 
basic requirement of democracy, in terms of clear demarcation of the demos (or 
the members), who both have the right to decide and the obligation to adhere to 
collectively binding decisions, is negated. Thirdly, total priority is given to political 
societies and there is no firm co-operation with civil society organisations beyond 
the need for logistical support. The general consequences in terms of efforts to 
promote substantial democratisation are obvious: lack of sustainability; vulnerability 
to elitist shortcuts, manipulation, and infiltration; total neglect of the need to build 
institutional channels and to address issues of alternative open and accountable 
governance.
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Chapter 9. Pioneering Attempts to Renew the 
Kerala Model75
9.1 Politicised class-based engineering of democratic 
development
Kerala is not just uncommonly beautiful, it has won international reputation for 
having accomplished, in addition to stable democracy, comparatively high levels of 
health, education, and social welfare despite a gross national product per capita 
lower than the Indian average. According to the old deterministic thesis, Kerala’s 
achievements in the face of low economic growth should be almost impossible.
But what of the more idealist contemporary arguments about the crafting of ‘good’ 
development by way of essential rights and institutions in state and society? Is it not 
true that the key to the puzzle is that Kerala has one of the Third World’s strongest 
civil societies? Partly it is. Public debate is lively, the free media are numerous, and the 
majority of citizens are both literate and voluntarily organised in a multitude of organ-
isations. Among the latter we find a wide range: socio-religious associations, educa-
tional bodies, development organisations, environmental groups, women’s organisa-
tions. And this is nothing new. This strong civil society has its roots in popularly 
based demands since the latter half of the nineteenth century in the two British-
dominated principalities of Travancore and Cochin, in the south of what today is 
Kerala. The demands in question were for greater equality in religious and social life, 
for the right of all to seek public employment, for fairer economic legislation, and for 
state support for the improvement of health care and education. A sort of embryo, in 
other words, of a bourgeois revolution. A bourgeois revolution which was, however, 
inhibited by colonialism. Later on there appeared so many other citizen associations 
as well, such as co-operatives and a library movement—in addition to political parties 
and trade unions.
On closer inspection, however, it is also clear that Kerala’s achievements vary over 
time—and that (given the economic constraints) they vary less with the strength of 
civil society and (roughly estimated) social capital, than with supportive and execu-
tive popular and government politics in favour of structural change to enhance the 
democratic potential of ordinary people to make use of (and improve) favourable 
democratic means, principles and instrumental aims.
In a comparative Indian perspective, to begin with, Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze 
75 For background analyses, see Törnquist (1989, 1990, and 1991). For more extensive reports 
from the current case studies over time, see first Törnquist (with Tharakan) (1995), which is a 
full report up until about 1994, and then partial reports on additional field studies in (1996a), 
(2000b), and (2002a). (I’m particularly indebted to long time co-operation with P.K. Michael 
Tharakan and operational support from, among others, M.P. Philip, N. Rajmohan, and Alwin 
Jayakumar.)
have concluded that “determined public action” both with and for state backing 
explains the positive human development in Kerala as compared with the less impres-
sive West Bengal indices and miserable (but economically partly dynamic) Uttar 
Pradesh. Liberation of economic initiatives, they argue, must therefore be accompa-
nied by more, not less, government intervention in favour of public action (Drèze 
and Sen 1996).
Secondly, the great advances stemmed from activities in the 1920s and onwards. 
This was when broad, radical, and politicised popular movements extended and 
broadened previous caste and communal societal movements. There thus emerged 
socially embedded, but also class based movements, among peasant farmers, agricul-
tural and other labourers, as well as civil servants and many others. While civil 
society was strongest in the south of what today is Kerala (in the comparatively 
autonomous and enlightened principalities), the strongest class-based organisations 
emerged in the more feudal north—in Malabar, which was governed by the British 
via Madras. Simultaneously, equally class- and ideology rooted parties (as opposed 
to the more normal patron-client based Congress party) also developed; and later 
on a series of progressive state governments ruled on top of a comparatively well 
functioning public administration. In fact (and of course quite against the mainstream 
theses), the first elected Kerala State government was led by moderate communists.
Two years later, this government was undemocratically ousted by a reputedly more 
liberal-democratic Congress Party and its Western supporters. The Left-led govern-
ments have never managed to stay in power for long periods. (Anti-incumbency 
sentiments have often been decisive in elections usually won with very narrow 
margins by either The Left- or the Congress- led Fronts.) But while there have been 
more democratic advances under the Left-centre coalitions, the popular movements 
have also kept up pressure when Congress has been in office, thus often preventing 
outright bourgeois policies.
This way, radical leftists and social movements finally enforced India’s most consist-
ent anti-feudal and bourgeois land reform. Of course, there were serious limitations 
to the reform. It is true that the idea of a rice levy on the largest owners (to be 
redistributed through fair price shops) did not prove effective. Nor did the ceiling 
of the size of land-holdings generate much surplus land to be redistributed to the 
landless, and the tribal people and the fishermen were largely set aside. But the 
basic concept of doing away with landlordism was fairly consistently implemented. 
Tenancy was abolished in land. Landlords were compensated and tenants became 
new owners. This did not help labourers, but tenancy in house-compound land was 
also eradicated, and unions and radical party factions successfully pressed through 
an agricultural worker’s act, including regulations of employment conditions and 
social security arrangements. Moreover, similar advances were also made through 
very extensive (and innovative) unionising of other labourers—including in the so-
called informal sector—private professionals, and civil servants.
Thirdly, this strong, propulsive leftist movement is actually rooted in the former 
British Malabar in the North—with initially much less civil society than in the 
subordinated princely states of Cochin and Travancore in the South. Thanks to 
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popular pressure and state intervention, these socialists and communists have not 
just managed to implement the land reform in the state as a whole, but also to 
create more civil communities in the previously quite feudal North than in the South 
where, despite ‘modernisation’, caste identities still play a more important role.
Hence, the case of Kerala now enables us to discuss critically the validity of Robert 
Putnam’s claims about the importance of civil society and social capital. In Putnam’s 
case of Italy it is difficult to test the competing hypothesis that radical politics, 
rather than path dependent social capital, explains both citizen co-operation and 
good democratic government, because leftists never even come to power in southern 
Italy. (This would have made it possible to study their performance in an area 
with less civil society and social capital) (Levi 1993). However, this situation has 
now occurred in Kerala, and the competing hypothesis is confirmed. (The case of 
West Bengal is another example.)76 What is more, generally speaking, even the new 
and internationally unique campaign for democratic decentralisation and popular 
planning from below, which we shall return to, seems to have been more successful 
in rural than in urban areas. The campaign also had more success in the old feudal, 
but now Left dominated north, down to the central Trichur district, than among the 
old civil societies of the South.
9.2 The old model undermined
However, by the 1980s, these earlier achievements, often unaccompanied by economic 
growth, had clearly also contributed to the emergence of new problems. To begin 
with, social and economic benefits had seldom been tied to economic growth (in 
the form, for example, of alliances between trade unions and modernisation-oriented 
entrepreneurs). The economy still bore a colonial stamp. The production of raw 
materials for export predominated, but was less profitable than it had been; agricul-
ture of the ‘usual’ kind was stagnating and industry remained small and weak. The 
only branch of the economy that was growing was the commercial and service sector, 
which of course implied large scale import of consumer goods. In addition, demands 
from below for measures from above had helped to produce unwieldy, expensive, 
centralised and badly co-ordinated state organs. The bosses and employees of these 
organs, moreover, had developed their own special interests. Meanwhile the old 
fragmentation of civil society (with tight boundaries between different arenas and 
associations) had left its stamp on the parties and on political life in general, as well 
76 Similarly, the communists in West Bengal do not only have their main base in rural areas with 
deep feudal roots, but have also, since the mid-70s, managed to generate India’s most impressive 
democratic decentralisation, and a good deal of community co-operation and development too 
(despite using some alternative patronage and many top-down policies compared to Kerala). 
This is a bit more than one can say of the eastern part of Bengal, Bangladesh, with, in the late-
seventies, similar landlordism and ideas about democratic decentralisation, but later a myriad of 
voluntary associations (promoted by all kinds of foreign agencies in favour of civil society and 
social capital) rather than forceful democratic communists (cf Thörlind (2000)).
as on a range of trade unions and co-operatives.
In this way, then, Kerala had developed a system of politically organised special 
interests. This system had provided subventions to various groups, but it had also 
undermined common efforts at economic development. In brief, the successful work 
of distributing the pie to as many people as possible had been done in such a way, 
and with such specific interests in the foreground, that it had contributed to the 
difficulties of making the pie grow at the same time.
Since the mid-1970s at least, much of production had tended to stagnate, both 
in industry and in agriculture, despite the land reform. This problem was primarily 
related to its consistent bourgeois character. A positive outcome of this was many 
more independent citizens than in West Bengal. A negative outcome was economi-
cally fairly uncooperative individuals and families. Hence, while intensive political 
organisation and state intervention survived, this ‘old’ organisation and politicisa-
tion were increasingly affected by privatised and atomised economic activities and 
interests—soon extending beyond farming into commerce, real estate, etc. So, even 
though many talked of ‘over-politicisation', this was only true in the sense that 
atomised economic actors often made selfish and non-productive use of state and 
conventional politics. The problem was instead privatisation and atomisation that 
caused lack of co-operation among the producers and the citizens at various levels. 
Coping with such problems, as we shall see in a moment, actually required a good 
deal of political facilitation.
Unemployment statistics, furthermore, had risen catastrophically, and were usually 
estimated at a fifth of the labour force. Moreover, the state authorities were receiving 
too little in the way of taxes to meet the costs of the far-reaching welfare system, 
which was accordingly in disrepair. This problem was exacerbated by the fact that 
the state authorities were (and are) subordinate to New Delhi in tax questions. In 
addition, Kerala only benefited to a limited extent from all the monies repatriated 
by migrant workers who hailed from the state. Finally, the state’s ability to protect 
and reform exposed sectors had diminished on account of the more liberal economic 
policy, at that time quite recently introduced by India.
Were one inclined to put the point harshly, one could say that while public con-
sumption had been reduced—including the ability to make strategic productive invest-
ments and to improve quality within the public sector—the comparatively high level 
of private consumption (including the growing private sector in health care and 
education) was being maintained by the labours of young Keralites who toiled under 
miserable conditions in the Gulf states and elsewhere in India, and who sent home 
a portion of what they earned. (Young Keralites, that is, whose parents struggled for 
decent conditions in Kerala.)77 But just as former tenants had turned petty bourgeois 
and seldom worked together with others to produce more on the lands they obtained 
through the land reform, the incomes earned by migrants were individual in nature, 
and often spent unproductively. Cynicism, furthermore, was spreading, as evidenced 
77 These monies are often reckoned to account for between ten and thirty percent of Kerala’s 
gross yearly product.
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by widespread comments to the effect that “The economy is deteriorating and there’s 
nothing one can do about it—because the market decides, and politicians serve their 
own interests. So let him save himself who can.”
In the mid-80s, therefore, my own conclusion was that the old mainstream Left 
had stagnated and seemed caught in a dead end. The old land reform policies did not 
make sense any more. New and complicated relations of exploitation and subordina-
tion had developed. Top down solutions were undermined by compartmentalisation, 
factionalism, vested interests, locked political conflicts and, of course, lack of suf-
ficient revenues. Old organisations and leaders became defensive and were lacking 
visions and alternatives. New and partly rival groups and movements emerged, from 
the left and the right and various identify-based organisations. All the factors that had 
previously forced narrow (religious and caste) communalism into retreat were now 
losing ground—socio-religious reform efforts, public welfare measures, fairly clear-cut 
class conflicts, and class based political organisations.
9.3 Renewal from the Left
To my utter surprise, then, the left-centre front in 1987 again succeeded in winning an 
election and forming a government, after many years in opposition. This was mainly 
a result, most probably, of widespread dissatisfaction with rule by the right-centre 
front under the leadership of the Congress Party. Left had not been able to renew 
itself and the reform-oriented groups within it were in a clear minority. Yet, there 
were some attempts that may have played a positive role. These were about going 
beyond the old policies and to address new major issues such as unemployment and 
the need for further democratisation (rather than privatisation) to curb increasing 
corruption. Even more importantly: after the elections had been won, and after 
lengthy discussions, the reform oriented groups were able to initiate a series of 
innovative campaigns. In these they were supported not so much by the dominant 
party, CPI-M, as by some parts of the Left Front government, as well as by a series of 
volunteer organisations, with the KSSP, the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishat (KSSP), 
the ‘People’s Science Movement’, as the leading force.
Here was thus an exciting and important opportunity to observe and analyse over 
time whether there was some substance to the alternative propositions about the 
dynamic, pro-democratic and more unified Left (outlined in Part I) in an already 
liberal-democratic and post-land reform context.78
9.4 Impressive campaigns, insufficient base
The most important driving force in the pro-reform work was (and is), thus, the 
KSSP, winner of the 1996 alternative Nobel Prize. The KSSP began as a rather 
narrow educational organisation aimed at spreading rational thinking and scientific 
methods to ‘the people’. In the 1970s, however, the association was broadened and 
changed. Tens of thousands of activists opposed first the New Delhi emergency rule 
and then, in the name of environmentalism and alternative development, a large 
power plant in Silent Valley in northern Kerala. The work was carried on by students, 
youth, retired administrators and scientific experts. By the mid-80s the KSSP was not 
just a typical progressive and urban-based middle-class organisation, it also built on 
the unusually strong educational ideals of the peasant farmer and labour movements 
in Kerala. During the struggle for national liberation, for instance, three movements 
were formed everywhere: the political movement, the trade-union movement and 
the library movement. Moreover, Kerala still contains no really large cities in which 
modern social life is concentrated. In the lowland countryside, as well as a good 
way up into the mountains, semi-urbanised areas lie close up against one another, 
complete with both middle-class groups and organic intellectuals. So the social 
basis and actual presence of the KSSP was widespread—with clear and strong rural 
dimensions.
Like many other development-oriented volunteer organisations (NGOs) in India 
and elsewhere, the KSSP worked along two parallel tracks: firstly to scrutinise public 
development policies and sketch out alternatives—e.g., within health care and educa-
tion; secondly to carry out pilot projects to show how people themselves could 
change their situation—e.g., by installing cheap stoves which reduce indoor smoke 
and require less fuel. Like other radical NGOs, finally, the KSSP took the view that 
an alternative path of development presupposes far-reaching social and economic 
change. In contrast to most like-minded groups in India, however, the KSSP did not 
turn against the previous generation of progressive political and trade union organisa-
tions. Instead, the KSSP reasoned, alternative development work and traditional 
political commitment both can and should enrich each other.
Many KSSP members were accordingly active in political parties which typically, 
though not always, formed part of Kerala’s left-centre front. This front was (and 
is) dominated by the largest communist party, the CPI-M, which is considered 
reformist and by all practical means social-democratic, apart from the fact that 
it still upholds the principle of democratic centralism. At the same time, however, 
it is often the case that other parties within the front—including breakaways from 
78 The analysis which follows takes up two different matters: to begin with, the first generation of 
campaigns, which took place under the government of the left-centre front between 1987–1991; 
and subsequently, the impressive attempts beginning around 1994 to undertake renewed efforts. 
The first period is covered in my research with P.K. Michael Tharakan (Törnquist 1995). The 
study of the second period is not yet concluded. Here I must rely on my (not yet fully analysed) 
interviews (including with the People’s Planning campaigners and their local partners), on 
running press coverage (mainly the Hindu and Frontline), on certain key documents, reports 
to and deliberations at conferences on the Kerala experiences, and preliminary observations 
(including from an intensive round of discussions in verious panchayats in early 1999)—some 
of which have been reported upon in (1996a), (2000b), and (2002a); (cf footnote 66 above).—as 
well as observations by colleagues; see, e.g., Isaac and Tharakan (1995), Isaac and Harilal 
(1997), Franke and Chasin (1997), Bandyopadhyay (1997), Chekkutty (1997), Isaac (1998), 
BCAS (1998), Parayil (2000), Issac with Franke (2000), Social Scientist (2001–2).
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the Congress Party—wield an influence out of proportion to their numbers. Their 
voters, after all, are strategically important in the hard fight to win majority elections 
in single-member districts.
Within the CPI-M, the ideas of the KSSP enjoyed the least support among those 
who called for a revitalised policy of centralised and state-led modernisation; this 
group included many trade unionists connected with industry and parts of the public 
sector. Others, however, were more favourably disposed, if for no other reason than 
that certain party leaders bore a grudge against the ‘trade-union fraction’. This did 
not mean, however, that those two faction-like sides of the party each took a distinct 
view of development policy. In and around the party there were many patterns of 
conflict, which coincided with each other only in part.79 On the specific question of 
development, I have distinguished instead between ‘state-modernises’ and ‘popular-
developmentalists’. These tendencies are found in many different groups—both within 
and outside the CPI-M.
Hence it was the popular developmentalists, the PD’s, who after the Left Front 
victory in the elections, were able to put forward elements, at least, of an attempt 
to renew the increasingly defunct Kerala Model. The basis of their efforts was three 
campaigns and efforts at decentralisation.
The first campaign consisted of a massive literacy drive. It may seem strange that 
the primary efforts of the most literate state in India were focused on eliciting the 
engagement of the comparatively small proportion of the population (ca. 20%) who 
could not read or write. Firstly, however, human (rather than just economic) develop-
ment requires that all be able to take part; secondly, it was politically important to 
try to emancipate many poor groups which had hitherto relied chiefly on religious 
patronage; and thirdly, a massive literacy drive, coupled with various follow-up activi-
ties, was an excellent way to mobilise the efforts of all those who had previously 
been attracted by the KSSP’s educational efforts.
The pilot campaign was carried out in the district of Ernakulam (including the 
small but internationally better known city of Cochin). Enthusiasm was at a high 
level. Unlike most Indian NGOs, the KSSP did not focus its efforts (any longer) 
on a project of its own, but rather a broad collaboration among a large number of 
volunteer organisations and interested parts of the central and local administration. 
In this case, both the literacy commission in New Delhi and the district administra-
tion under the leadership of a previous chair of the KSSP was engaged. A great 
many activists and volunteers were mobilised. At first, 50,000 volunteers carried out 
an investigation of all 600,000 households in the district, whereupon 18,000 largely 
volunteer instructors made contact with those people who could not read or write. 
The initial results were impressive. Already after a single year’s work, Prime Minister 
V.P. Singh could in February 1990 proclaim Ernakulam to be the one completely 
literate district in India. The KSSP garnered appreciable international recognition 
79 Rammohan’s (1998) attempt to analyse conflicts within the CPI-M by using my results (among 
other materials)—but without taking the several different conflict patterns into account—is 
therefore partially misleading. 
(which by rights ought to have extended in part to the local administration as well). 
The popular-developmentalist forces in Kerala got wind in their sails. The campaign 
in Ernakulam was used as a model for a larger campaign in the state as a whole. It 
was applauded by the literacy agencies in New Delhi, and it inspired a multitude of 
groups in India as a whole.
But there were also significant problems. The air soon went out of the campaign. 
For one thing, the organisations had not prepared—though they knew better—any 
proper program for following up the campaign. For another, political parties and 
groups did not show themselves to be especially interested in engaging a large number 
of new sympathisers from the very poorest groups. Finally, it proved even harder 
than anticipated to get co-operation between campaign-oriented volunteers and per-
manent public administrators to function well.
The second campaign sought to promote co-operation within agriculture—
through ‘group farming’. Despite India’s most consistent land reform, production 
had not notably increased. A particular worry was the production of rice. The large 
number of small landowners seldom joined in collaborative efforts. Sometimes, in 
fact, they worked at cross purposes with each other, as seen in the transition from 
rice cultivation to coconut production, which made the irrigation of the remaining 
rice fields more difficult. In addition, centrally directed agencies that controlled vital 
components within agriculture also found it difficult to co-operate at the local level: 
some, for example, were responsible for irrigation pumps; others for the electricity 
required to run them. Furthermore, conflicts arose between small landowners and 
agricultural labourers. And finally, the countryside too was being affected in ever 
greater measure by the incomes of mobile migrant workers. In many cases, landown-
ers and their families preferred to concentrate less on agriculture than on other 
activities which were more profitable in the short term, including land speculation 
on the outskirts of the many towns and urban areas. For a substantial portion of the 
rural population—including supporters of the left parties—property and speculation 
seemed to have become more important than work and production.
Earlier attempts at collective solutions had failed miserably, and the left in Kerala 
could not follow the example of their comrades in West Bengal. In West Bengal, the 
formation of separate organisations for agricultural labourers had been prevented; 
in Kerala, such organisations already existed. In West Bengal, tenants and small 
farmers had not been furnished with more land, but rather with political protection; 
in Kerala, by contrast, the land had already been redistributed. In West Bengal, 
the policy had been tied to the decentralisation of administration and development 
efforts on the one hand, and continued central political control on the other; in 
Kerala, the odd combination of Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party and the rather small 
pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI) that were in power when the land 
reform was implemented never dared to undertake decentralisation. (They would in 
that case have lost power to that section of the left led by the CPI-M, which was 
much stronger on the local level.) All of the factions then turned their efforts to 
conquering and keeping the power that had been concentrated in the central organs 
of the state government.
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Yet something still had to be done in Kerala. The strategy that emerged was 
to promote volunteer co-operation among cultivators—or ‘group farming’. First, an 
uncommonly dynamic minister of agriculture saw to it that the operations of his 
ministry were delegated to its local units, and that much of the support it disbursed 
went to the co-operating farmers. Second, certain experts sought, together with local 
interest and volunteer organisations, to mobilise popular support and participation.
The campaign won broad support, including within the left-centre front and the 
government. It also produced results in the form of higher rice production and 
reduced tensions between landowners and agricultural labourers. Soon, however, a 
series of new problems came to the fore. The active collaboration of the agriculture 
ministry was important, but its delegation of tasks to local units of the ministry itself 
also conserved the old top-down approach, and it did not provide a good way to 
solve the lack of co-operation between different centrally directed agencies at the 
local level. The rise in production, moreover, was at least as much due to subsidies 
and a heavier use of pesticides than to co-operation among farmers. Landowners 
often seemed more interested in obtaining external support than in co-operating with 
one another. And just as in the case of the literacy campaign, political parties and 
groups were not very interested in truly committing themselves to development work 
and in this way trying to win new sympathisers.
A third campaign—‘resource mapping’—was launched in order to remedy the 
problems arising in connection with the lack of follow-up in the literacy campaign, 
as well as in connection with the inadequate grassroots work in support of co-
operative cultivation. Anyone who has visited the central office of a local government 
in Scandinavia, for instance, knows that all development work carried out there is 
based on a far-reaching mapping of local resources and the manner in which these 
are used. This is lacking, wholly or in part, in India and in Kerala. The deficiency 
in question could quickly be remedied, certainly, with the help of modern methods 
of measurement, including the use of satellites. But the purpose of the campaign in 
Kerala was not just to create maps; it was also to ensure that people would be able to 
use them! The mapping of resources, it was hoped, would promote local conscious-
ness of existing resources, and discussion about how these could be put to better 
use. Some able and committed geographers, accordingly, sketched out a program 
whereby they themselves would attend to the advanced aspects of the mapping, while 
volunteer groups would gather a large portion of the information. Afterwards, then, 
the whole lot of them would be able to discuss different development initiatives 
together with local politicians, experts and interested parties.
The resource-mapping program got under way too late, however, to benefit from 
the enthusiasm which had been built up during the literacy drive. Aside from the 
activists of the KSSP, it was for the most part devoted youth who took part. Once 
again, neither local administrators nor political groups showed any great interest.
Fourthly, decentralisation: It now became clear, moreover, that successful local 
alternative development required that local governments (panchayats) possess some 
resources, and a measure of decision-making power as well. The lack of any signifi-
cant measure of local self-rule proved, in fact, to be a fundamental obstacle to all 
